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This dissertation examines the survival and expansion strategies of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) by focusing on its organization and mobilization activities 
during the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945). I argue that the Communist 
forces quickly expanded during the wartime not merely because the War provided an 
opportunity to avoid the Guomingdang (GMD)’s intensive military aggression and 
legitimately expand itself throughout China. More importantly, it also allowed the CCP to 
develop a unique political culture with a grasp on local knowledge during the years under 
investigation. This cultural climate worked to rejuvenate itself through organizational 
consolidation and the rebuilding of political identity. Together, these factors accounted 
for the dramatic expansion of the CCP’s membership and military forces, which prepared 
the Party for its takeover of the country after the Japanese surrender. 
The main body of this dissertation is composed of five thematic chapters. Chapter 
two explores the CCP’s penetration into local society through mass resistance 
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associations and political renovation of existing power structures. Chapter three 
investigates Communist propaganda activities, the success of which laid in coordination 
with the Party’s follow-up organizational arrangements. The next chapter examines the 
Communist educational institutions as a channel of mass mobilization that further 
reinforced its penetration into various social groups. Chapter five uses Grain Tax, 
conscription and mobilization of anti-pacification campaign, all of which required 
personal sacrifice from the masses, as three instances that exemplified the Party’s 
controllability over local communities. Finally, chapter six focuses on its strategies to 
contain undesirable tendencies of local cadres and strengthen ideological consensus 
within the Party. 
 ix 
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................... ix 
List of Tables ......................................................................................................... xi 
List of Illustrations ................................................................................................ xii 
Note of Chinese Names and Terms ..................................................................... xiii 
Chapter One  Introduction .....................................................................................1 
Macro-history and the Search of a Decisive Reason ......................................5 
Base Area Studies: between Power Politics and Social Revolution ...............9 
“Local Knowledge” As the Major Approach ................................................15 
Base Areas in Jiangsu Province ....................................................................20 
Chapter Two Penetrating Local Society: from Economic to Political Struggle28 
Establishing the Peasant Resistance Association ..........................................32 
Focusing on Economic Redistribution: Rent Reduction and Grain Borrowing
..............................................................................................................38 
Residency Council—a Placebo for the Local Gentry ...................................52 
Extending Connection in the Secret Societies: Parochial Mobilization .......60 
Back to Politics: the New Township Renovation .........................................66 
The Puzzle of the Triangle Relationship: the Government, the Party and the 
Mass Associations ................................................................................78 
Chapter Three Organizing Propaganda ...............................................................86 
What is Propaganda?.....................................................................................89 
A Mass Line in Newspaper Publication........................................................95 
Stage Play Associations: Itinerant Propaganda Stage .................................103 
Reward and Punishment: Assimilation of Collaborationist Personnel .......119 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................129 
Chapter Four   Education: Another Channel of Mass Mobilization .................133 
Conventional Schooling System .................................................................134 
 x 
The Educator and the Educated ..................................................................141 
Adult Education ..........................................................................................156 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................164 
Chapter Five In the Name of Resistance: Taxation, Conscription, and Mass 
Mobilization in the Base Areas ...................................................................169 
Grain Tax Collection: the Emergence of a Growing State Power ..............171 
The Party’s Strategies of Mobilization .......................................................177 
Responses and Reaction at Local Level ......................................................184 
Local Militia Recruitment: Parochial Mobilization ....................................187 
Conscription for Regular Forces .................................................................195 
Kongshi Qingye—During the Anti-pacification Campaign ........................213 
Pre-campaign Mobilization ................................................................216 
The Process of the Anti-mopping-up Campaign ...............................219 
After the Anti-mopping-up Campaign ...............................................226 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................229 
Chapter Six  Self Rejuvenation: Reinforcing Internal Consensus and 
Centralization ..............................................................................................232 
The CCP Local Recruitment .......................................................................235 
The Formation of the Communist New Elite—the Issues of Waste and 
Corruption ..........................................................................................240 
Jingbing Jianzheng—Reinforcing Centralized Leadership ........................249 
The Rectification Campaign—A Shift from Quantity to Quality ...............259 
The Second Phase: Anti-traitor Movement.................................................273 
Inevitable deviation: an Extreme Case in Siyang .......................................285 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................293 




List of Tables 
Table 1： Rent reduction date of Yejing village (Suzhong Regional Base) .....45 
Table 2： Peasant Associations in Yanfu District (till July 1941) ....................50 
Table 3： Party members and branches distribution in Yanfu District (till July 
1941) .................................................................................................50 
Table 4： Numbers of Elementary schools in Suzhong Regional Base ..........139 
Table 5： Numbers of Yanfu District Elementary Education (private school 
excluded) .........................................................................................140 
Table 6: Numbers of Yanfu District Middle School Education ....................140 
Table 7: Elementary School Subjects and Weekly Teaching Time (minutes)147 
Table 8: Price of Daily Necessities ...............................................................174 
Table 9: Grain Tax Rate Comparison (1942) ................................................176 
Table 10: Rugao(dong) County People’s Military Forces during the War of 
Resistance .......................................................................................193 
Table 11: Statistics of District Small Guerrilla Groups and Militia in Rugao(dong) 
County (1944.7) ..............................................................................194 
Table 12: The Militia Promotion of Rugao(dong) County during the War of 
Resistance .......................................................................................194 
Table 13: The Actual Enlisted Number in Sishu County (1943.12) ...............206 
Table 14: The Enlisted Number of Rugao(dong) County (1944, Suzhong) ...207 
Table 15: The Enlisted Number in Huai’an County (1945.3, Subei)..............208 
Table 16: Structure of District Leading Organs (i) .........................................253 
Table 17: Structure of County Leading Organs (i) .........................................254 
Table 18: Structure of Sub-district Leader Organs (i) ....................................255 
 xii 
List of Illustrations 
Illustration 1: Yanfu Dazhong (Source: 1944.5.13, p.1, p.4) ..........................100 
Illustration 2: Yanfu Dazhong (Source: 1945.11.30, p.2-3) ............................101 
Illustration 3: Structure of District Leading Organs (ii) ..................................253 
Illustration 4:  Structure of County Leader Organs (ii) ..................................254 





Note of Chinese Names and Terms 
 
 
This dissertation follows the standard practice in the field of using Hanyu Pinyin 
transliterations for Chinese names, places, and other special terms, except for some 
conventionally renowned names in English literatures, such as Sun Yat-sen and Chiang 
Kai-shek. The general treatment of Chinese words here is to put English translations in 
the text and original transliterations in perentheses right after. 
 
Political/Military Structure of the Communist Base Areas in Jiangsu (1941-1945) 
 
Political Unit Military Unit 
Region, i.e. base (genjudi) Division (shi) 
District (qu/fenqu)  
County (xian) Regiment (tuan) 
Sub-district (qu) Company (lian)/Battalion (ying, sometimes) 
Town (xiang) Platoon (tuan) 
Village (cun/bao)  
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Chapter One  Introduction 
When thirteen young men congregated in a house in the Shanghai French 
Concession in 1921 to discuss the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
communism was merely a fashionably exotic discourse that some Chinese intellectuals 
suggested for modernizing China. When the Soviet government in Ruijin, Jiangxi 
Province, was founded in 1932, the CCP had forfeited the majority of its urban branches 
and retreated to the countryside in order to restore its military strength and organizational 
structures. When Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist (Guomindang, abbreviated as 
GMD) government launched five consecutive offensives on the Jiangxi Soviet, forcing 
the CCP to evacuate from their newly built base regions in 1934, the permanent 
extermination of Chiang’s “disease in heart” (xinfu zhi huan) seemed inevitable. A year 
later when Mao Zedong claimed a major victory in the “strategic transferring,” better 
known as the Long March, the CCP had actually lost almost 90% of the regular military 
forces it developed in the Jiangxi period.1 
Despite these early setbacks, however, by 1945 the CCP was able to construct a 
military force of 310,000 soldiers and establish seven regional bases in central China. In 
Jiangsu Province, the focus of this dissertation, alone, the three major bases held more 
                                                 
1 The most prevalent estimation in China is that the First Corps had about 80,000 soldiers when leaving 
Jiangxi but only about 8,000 survived when they arrived in Shaanxi in 1935; the Fourth Corps was about 
80,000 soldiers large originally and less than 30,000 when they arrived in 1936; the Second and Sixth 
Armies of the Second Corps had about 17,000 soldiers at the beginning and around 10,000 upon arrival at 
Yan’an; the 25
th
 Army suffered less battle loss and maintained the size of about 3,000 soldiers. However, 
these figures do not indicate the newly enlisted pencentage during the course of the Long March. 
According to Chen Yung-fa, there were about 25,000 soldiers who breached the Nationalist besiegement in 
October 1934 survived when arriving in Shaanxi (Chen 1986, 1). However, it is not clear whether he 
included the ones who arrived in 1936. 
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than 15 million people within its total area of 90,000 K㎡  jurisdictions. This 
unprecedented development occurred during the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-
1945). Four years later, in events as dramatic and surprising as any Hollywood 
blockbuster, the Chinese Revolution concluded with the Communist triumph and the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China. The reasons of the CCP’s success have 
become one of the most popular topics among scholars of China.
 
This dissertation contributes to the historical scholarship about the Chinese 
Communist Revolution by exploring the local Communist movement in base areas in 
Jiangsu Province during the War of Resistance. By reconstructing daily operations and 
development of various CCP initiatives, it sheds light on a series of questions hovering 
over studies of the Communist movement: What factors accounted for the sensational 
development of the CCP during the War of Resistance? What kind of incentives did the 
Party employ to appeal to the masses in places with a prosperous economy? How did 
various social classes respond to the Party’s mobilization? How did revolutionaries, local 
elites, peasants interact under the circumstances of the Communist mobilization and 
ongoing warfare? To what extent was the Party able to control local communities? And 
ultimately, how did such experiences contribute to the CCP’s ultimate triumph in 1949? 
My concentration on the base areas of Jiangsu partly stems from the less scholarly 
attention on this region in previous studies about the Chinese Revolution. Such neglect 
results from both the scarcity of primary sources as well as the conventional belief that 
Jiangsu was on the periphery of the Communist movement. The base areas of Jiangsu 
provide a provocative counterpoint to historian Mark Selden’s reasons for studying the 
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Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region on the outcome of the Resistance War as well as the 
course of the Chinese revolution (Selden 1995b: 9-10).2 They were the most prosperous 
areas in China, even under the Japanese occupation; Land redistribution initiatives had 
never been launched upon the CCP’s arrival; they were adjacent to Nanjing, the capital of 
the collaborationist government, and thus, subject to the most powerful threats from the 
Japanese; they were located far from the central Party and military leadership in Yan’an, 
which, piror to 1941, made them more difficult to control than northern and northwest 
base areas. Previous studies also show that tenancy ratio and population density were 
higher in Jiangsu than the North China Plains and lands were concentrated in hands of big 
landlords who, in some cases, had moved to urban areas and hired brokers to collect rent 
on their behalf. A relative temperate natural environment and the lack of clear 
revolutionary targets have encouraged scholars to assume that peasants of Jiangsu were 
less likely to embrace revolutionary impulses. 
This conventional perspective, however, has become subject to revision in light of 
recent research of the socioeconomic development of China. Peasants in Jiangsu 
Province, as Philip Huang convincingly demonstrates, did not enjoy a growing income 
with the increasingly commercialized economy and expanding market. According to 
Huang, gross production in both agriculture and family industry was improved because of 
the low cost of labor rather than technical innovations. As a result, the per capita income 
                                                 
2 According to Selden, Shaan-Gan-Ning was unique in four ways: “it was the poorest of the base areas; it 
alone had completed land redistribution in significant areas prior to the shift to united front strategies; it 
was largely spared Japanese invasion so that guerrilla warfare assumed a less central role than it did 
elsewhere during the resistance; and, finally, it was the home of the central Party and military leadership 
and the mecca for thousands of intellectuals and other patriot drawn to the resistance.” 
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shrank during the Republican period (Huang 1990, 11-16). It is therefore reasonable to 
infer that increasing economic pressures provided the peasantry with sufficient cause to 
enact revolutionary mobilization of the CCP, even if they were not strong enough to take 
the initiative to rebel. 
The Jiangsu experience, moreover, was pertinent for illustrating the CCP methods 
for future rule in China. It provided the Party with first-hand experience in governing a 
region with a prosperous commercialized economy, stable social structure and influential 
local elites. Jiangsu might stand in the periphery of the Party’s revolutionary map. 
However, a region that provided annual revenue that almost matched the sum of its core 
revolutionary areas would inevitably become one of the focuses of the Communist 
government when the revolution succeeded. In this sense, the Jiangsu experience sheds 
light on the Party’s future government as a state power after 1949. 
The increasing accessibility of county-level Party documents makes a localized 
study feasible. While previously inaccessible, these resources can now be divided roughly 
into three categories. The first category contains internal party documents, including 
annual, semi-annual, quarterly working reports, investigating reports of different towns, 
and compiled local cadres’ reflections on specific issues. Circulated within the Party, 
these documents reflect the conflicts and tensions between the masses and cadres, as well 
as the Party’s perspective of the Communist development during the wartime. The second 
category consists of local newspapers, especially popular ones, the reporters of which 
were mostly local amateurs with low rate of literacy. These newspapers provide a good 
channel for evaluating the responses from ordinary peasants to the Communist 
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mobilization. The last category comes from collections of Literature and Historical 
Materials (wenshi ziliao) at county and lower levels, composed of local cadres’ memoirs.3 
These memoirs are helpful in shedding light on the role of local cadres as mediators 
between the Party and the masses. 
MACRO-HISTORY AND THE SEARCH OF A DECISIVE REASON 
Influenced by the historiographic trend of reconstructing macro-history, studies of 
the wartime Communist movement before the 1970s are more interested in seeking for an 
overarching or decisive reason, which can be applied to all the Communist base areas as a 
whole, to interpret the victory of the CCP. Meanwhile, confined by the accessibility of 
primary sources, scholars have focused primarily on elites, officials, and operations and 
decision-makings of high-ranking administration. While these studies have been useful in 
depicting a larger historical context, they simplify the course of the revolution and 
overestimate the agency of ordinary people for lacking a local perspective. 
Although George Taylor has argued in 1940 that the CCP demonstrated an ability 
to incorporate peasants into its revolutionary movement by providing leadership for their 
military maneuvers against Japan in north China, this idea was not conceptualized and 
treated academically until Chalmers Johnson presented the theory of “peasant 
nationalism” (Johnson 1962). Johnson argues that Chinese peasants were outraged by the 
                                                 
3 These memoirs are compiled on the basis of a series of interviews that were conducted in the 1980s and 
1990s by local university history professors and students or researchers. These interviews serve as a part of 
a large-scale program, sponsored by local governments, aimed at constructing local history and attracting 
tourists and investment. There is no doubt that the patrons and the interviewers had their own agenda when 
conducting these interviews. However, such preset agendas do not exclude their historical values. As 
Gregor Bentor indicates in his books on the three year war and the New Four Army (1992, xx-xxv; 1999, 7-
8), which use the similar sources as I do, with scrutiny, one can detect the embedded logic irony and 
ideological distortion, and thereby avoid misleading. 
 6 
atrocities and hardships brought by the Japanese invasion, and their spontaneous 
resistance evolved into “peasant nationalism,” which the CCP took full advantage of 
during its own development. This theory has become a milestone in research on the 
Chinese revolution, turning scholarly attention from the ideologically biased theories of 
“Comintern conspiracy” and “Soviet manipulation” to the War of Resistance.4 However, 
its overemphasis on the single extrinsic reason, i.e. the Resistance War, in deciding the 
course and outcome of the Chinese revolution largely ignores the social and economic 
conditions propelling peasant discontent. Such a simplistic explanation may have resulted 
from Johnson’s complete reliance on Japanese archival sources, preventing him from 
seeing a deeper interaction between the CCP and peasants. Nonetheless, it also reflected 
the issues embedded in other researchers of China at the time—to view the Chinese 
revolution as a purely imported product from external influences, especially western 
imperialism, and interpret it through an “impact-response” mechanism (Cohen 1984).  
Johnson’s critics attribute the CCP’s phenomenal wartime growth to the 
socioeconomic actions of peasants as well as the Party. Mark Selden presents his model 
of the “Yan’an Way,” which, he contends, “represents a distinctive approach to economic 
development, social transformation and people’s war…[that] characteristic features 
included popular participation, decentralization and community power” (Selden 1995a, 
170). The prerequisite of this model required implementation of the land reform program 
and redistribution of land ownership, which also helped the CCP survive the GMD’s 
                                                 
4 For detailed discussion, please refer to Mark Selden (1995b, 16-17). The representative works can be 
found but not limited to Hsiso (1961), McLane (1958), and Wilbur and How (1959). 
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attempts at annihilation. Selden incisively connects the socioeconomic dynamics, 
especially the deteriorating financial conditions, of the peasantry with the course of the 
Party’s political revolution. As the first study of Communist base areas, his work 
encourages later scholars to dig into the intrinsic dynamics of peasant lives that would 
actively respond to the Party’s mobilization.5 However, Selden places too much faith in 
the Party’s seemingly democratic and egalitarian institutions. He fails to recognize that all 
the moderate policies towards traditional elites and withdrawal of land reform were 
simply an expediency to minimize opposition and achieve growth in political and military 
forces during this unusual period. It is especially inconsistent when one tries to bring his 
populist image of the Party into subsequent events, such as the anti-rightist campaign, the 
Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution after 1949. Furthermore, although 
Selden insists on the significance of the Yan’an case regardless of its geographic and 
socioeconomic uniqueness compared with other Communist bases, it is difficult to apply 
this model to base areas, such as those in Jiangsu, where despite a complete absense of 
land reform the growth of party members and military strength was still unprecedented. 
Other scholars have made significant influences on the scholarship by 
approaching the Communist Revolution from an organizational perspective. Tetsuya 
Kataoka called academic attention to the significance of the Second United Front, which 
he considers essential to the Communist success for its ability to neutralize oppositions, 
especially from the GMD, and maximizing support from the neutral power (Kataoka 
                                                 
5 Although Selden’s book mainly focuses on the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, the author obviously 
believes that the Yan’an experience is applicable and illustrating as far as other base areas are concerned 
(Selden1995b, 10). Also, his work talks less about the operations of lower level administrations, which is 
very different from later area studies. Therefore, I discuss this book in this section. 
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1974, 4-17). He shares Johnson’s contention that views the CCP as the beneficiary of the 
Resistance War in terms of its own development. However, Kataoka asserts that Japanese 
atrocities aroused parochial protection, instead of “peasant nationalism,” among peasants, 
who formed “spontaneous mobilization” facilitating the Party’s local Communist 
movement (101-116). His elitist focus prevents him from appreciating peasants’ intrinsic 
request for revolution. Instead, he regards them as a passive factor subject to the Party’s 
skillful mobilization (295-297). Logically, Kataoka does not find the necessity to 
examine socioeconomic conditions since he believes “[i]f poverty is related to 
revolution…the most massive poverty came with the revolution rather than as its 
precondition” (234). Therefore, he devotes his work to investigating the inner-party split 
on United Front policies between Mao Zedong, who argued for a peasant route, and 
Wang Ming, who claimed himself as an orthodox Marxist in favor of urban revolution. 
Kataoka suggests that it was because of the success of the United Front that the Party was 
able to appeal to a large enough number of urban intellectuals in rural regions to preempt 
peasant movement. 
No matter what perspective the above studies adopt, they put the CCP and 
peasants on opposing sides of a scale, considering the former as the dominant force while 
completely silencing any reaction from the latter. Even Selden regards socioeconomic 
conditions as simply a reason for peasants to join the Communist revolution. In this 
sense, he adopts a method of investigating peasant involvement similar to Johnson and 
Kataoka. Their common and most problematic proposition lies in the one-way 
relationship between the Party and peasants in which the latter had little notable influence 
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on the revolution. With the development of area studies and a focus-shift from elites to 
history from the bottom up, scholars have become increasingly focused on exploring 
popular uprisings and a growing emphasis has gone into investigating peasants’ role in 
shaping the course and outcome of the Chinese Revolution. 
BASE AREA STUDIES: BETWEEN POWER POLITICS AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION 
The People’s Republic of China’s open-door policy begun in the late 1970s has 
increased accessibility to local archives, encouraging a more detailed investigation of the 
Chinese Revolution in many different localities. Kathleen Hartford’s observation on the 
Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region shows that Japanese repression, both “contingent and 
generalized,” did not necessarily prompt “peasant nationalism,” as Johnson asserts. On 
the contrary, it exerted considerable psychological intimidation on local population, so 
much so that mass participation in resistance activities led by the CCP decreased 
considerably. Under such circumstances, survival, not mass mobilization, became the 
primary concern of a series of wartime measures for the Border Region (Hartford 1989, 
94-96). Later, Pauline Keating’s study convincingly demonstrates that even within Shan-
Gan-Ning, the “Yan’an way” was not applicable to the entire border region. Although 
recognizing Selden’s theoretical contribution, she qualifies the “Yan’an way” as “a 
product of quite special circumstances that were not replicable in most other parts of 
China” (Keating 1997, 2). Keating suggests that ecological characteristics were essential 
in shaping the course of the local Communist movement and accounted for the varieties 
between the two adjacent subregions, Suide and Yanshu. Generally speaking, base area 
studies are more interested in offering detailed descriptions of local Communist 
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movements than constructing an overarching framework applicable to explain the 
outcome of the Chinese Revolution. 
In addition to the emphasis on local characteristics, another major theme 
emerging from studies of base areas is their struggle to align with one side of a wider 
historiographical debate—to view the Communist movement as either a course of power 
politics or a social revolution. Scholars rarely disagree with the idea that the CCP and the 
peasantry were the two major factors in the Communist Revolution, but their debate is 
usually centered on the relationship and interaction between the two. Those who 
conceptualize the Communist movement as one ofpower politics usually stress the 
Party’s organizational excellence, while proponents of the social revolution paradigm 
value the intrinsic dynamics of preexisting socioeconomic conditions motivating 
peasants’ mass participation in the revolution. No longer confined within a theoretical 
obligation to monocausal interpretation, their contentions do not fall on either end of the 
spectrum, nor do they regard the other as mutually exclusive. Actually, both sides agree 
on various dimensions of the Communist Revolution. Their divergence occurs when it 
comes to deciding who, the CCP or the peasantry, played a deciding role in shaping the 
revolutions’ course and outcome. 
This oscillation between the arguments of power politics and social revolution is 
better understood within the framework of another far-reaching debate about “moral 
economy” versus “rational peasants.” The growth of base area studies has indicated a 
shift from an elitist perspective to a popular history approach in understanding the 
Chinese Revolution, bringing the peasantry to the center of the discussion. Thus, the most 
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fundamental and frequent inquiry falls on the motivations that made peasants join or 
initiate the revolution. James Scott, a pioneer moral economist, contends that revolution 
in precapitalist peasant societies is essentially peasants’ radical reaction to the breach of 
the communal moral agreement that guarantees the right of subsistence and the principle 
of reciprocity among community members, most importantly, the “subsistence ethic.” 
Once peasants’ right of subsistence was denied or became insecure, peasants would 
widely endorse violent actions, such as uprisings or revolutions (Scott 1976). This theory 
also explains why protests or revolutions typically coincided with natural disasters. Under 
this influence, most base area studies pay special attention to the ecological environment 
of their localities and how it shaped the characteristics of local Communist movement 
(Wou 1994; Keating 1997).  
Moral economists’ major critics refuse to accept the preexistence of the 
subsistence ethic, which conceptualizes peasants’ behavior fundamentally as a pattern of 
risk-aversion, and the assumption that peasants were satisfied to keep their lives at the 
level of subsistence. Instead, Samuel Popkin insists on regarding peasants as rational 
entrepreneurs who maximized individual or family interests throughout the course of 
revolution (Popkin 1979). In this sense, their commitment to revolution was contingent 
and easy to shift when the incentives that had motivated them changed or disappeared. 
Popkin puts too much stake in economic profits and in doing so largely simplifies the 
process of mobilization, making it into a social exchange between material benefits and 
political support while neglecting other local factors, such as conventions, rituals, 
underlying moral codes and public opinions. 
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Apart from the contention of “moral versus material” incentives, a fundamental 
disagreement in the power politics versus social revolution debate falls on their 
distinctive treatment of the role of the peasantry: whether they were able to maintain their 
autonomy to shape the course of the revolution or merely exchanged their loyalty with 
outside revolutionaries to maximize personal gain. Ralph Thaxton insists that peasants 
played a dynamic role in the development of the Chinese Revolution. Based on his study 
of northern China, he argues that revolution was a bottom-up process in which peasants 
not only participated but also fashioned its course with their intrinsic revolutionary 
initiatives embedded in popular culture (Thaxton 1983). He further asserts that “[t]he 
CCP derived its legitimacy by dancing to the demanding tunes of decentralized 
governments, not by orchestrating its own centrist plan for power” (227). In his later 
book about peasant salt-makers of the North China Plains, Thaxton continues to 
emphasize the peasants’ deciding role in the Communist movement, contending that 
Party organizers succeeded in winning local support only because they were willing to 
ally with existing local protest organizations established by salt producers, which also 
accounted for the GMD’s failure in this region (1997).  
When stressing the central role of the peasantry in shaping the Chinese 
experience, researchers can never avoid the role of an outside revolutionary organization, 
namely the CCP. According to Scott, peasants resorted to uprising or revolution with the 
ultimate goal of restoring the breached moral codes of the subsistence ethic. 
Nevertheless, their attempt did not square well with the Communist revolutionary agenda, 
which intended to destroy the existing power hierarchy and mechanisms of rule of elites, 
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redistribute social resources, and establish a new state. How did such a conceptual gap 
merge and how did the CCP prevent peasants from satisfying with reestablishing political 
order in their communities in order to push the revolution forward? Scholars who regard 
the Chinese Revolution foremost as power politics focus on an organizational perspective 
to explain how the CCP forged and reinforced the Party-peasant coalition. Thus, in his 
encyclopedic study on the base areas of eastern and central China, Chen Yung-fa 
continuously emphasizes the Party’s skillful organization, implied by his title, “Making 
Revolution” (Chen Yung-fa 1986). Although recognizing “it was primarily redistribution 
that enabled the Communist Party to involve peasants in the anti-Japanese resistance” 
(99), he argues that the organizational development, which he defines as a process of 
“controlled polarization,” was responsible for irreversibly deconstructing the bond 
between peasants and traditional rural elites and forging the new Party-peasant coalition 
during the War. Chen points out that the CCP deliberately blurred the rigid class division 
it had adopted in the Jiangxi period (1932-1934) and simply categorized people as the 
“basic masses” (jiben qunzhong) and the “feudal forces” (fengjian shili). Hence, when it 
engaged in rural struggle between the two groups, the Party was able to maximize 
popular support by siding with the local majority. 
Odoric Wou’s study on Henan Province, which traces back to the peak of the 
urban proletarian movement in 1925, shares Chen’s contention about the strategic and 
organizational supremacy of the CCP in seizing opportunities for mobilization, though he 
is quite aware of the importance of the Party’s efforts to improve the material conditions 
of peasants, in the form of famine relief and production programs (Wou 1994, 314-326). 
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He persuasively demonstrates that relying on appropriate strategies the Communists were 
able to mobilize people in both remote and backward villages as well as more 
commercialized areas (129). Steven Levine goes even further in emphasizing the Party’s 
organizational skills. Based on his study of the Communist Revolution in Manchuria, he 
denies the existence of any innate revolutionary initiative in the peasantry. Instead, he 
claims, it is “inaccurate to term the Communist revolution a peasant revolution if by that 
term one means a radical rural transformation carried out by a movement led by authentic 
peasant leaders in order to achieve the reordering of political, economic, and social power 
relations in the countryside” (Levine 1987). For Levine, it was the Party’s military 
strength and skillful organizational manipulation that accounted for their success, at least 
in Manchuria. 
The varieties of different regions in China, including geographic, ecological, 
socioeconomic and cultural characteristics, explain the complexities and nuances of the 
course of the Chinese Revolution. The roles of the peasantry and the CCP—the degree of 
the former’s autonomy or the effectiveness of the latter’s organizational ability—varied 
considerably in different areas. For instance, when one discusses the course of the 
Communist Revolution, the importance of resource redistribution, regardless of whether 
they were due to peasant’s internal impulse to restore their subsistence or a material 
benefit that the CCP utilized to forge the Party-peasant bond, is undeniable. Previous base 
area studies have shown that redistribution was achieved through various channels. In 
North China, where owner-cultivators comprised the majority of population and the Party 
appeared as a visible state power, land reform proved to be the most effective, although 
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radical, way to accomplish the goal of redistribution (Selden 1971; Wou 1994; Keating 
1997). In eastern and central China, Chen Yung-fa suggests that the process of 
redistribution largely relied on rent and interest reduction, tax reform and the mutual aid 
program (Chen 1986). However, the effectiveness of tax reform as a measure of 
redistribution is dubious considering that the tax rate in Jiangsu remained unchanged, if 
not increased, during wartime. Meanwhile, the high tenancy rate among the local 
population made rent rather than tax the population’s primary burden (Bernhardt 1992; 
Liu Chang 2003). I will show in later chapters that redistribution in the base areas of 
Jiangsu occurred in a more moderate fasion. It consisted of a series of measures including 
rent reduction, mutual aid and tax rate (not reform) favorable to the class of middle 
peasants and encouraged social mobility. All these varieties and complexities in specific 
regions must be conceptualized in terms of a comprehensive consideration of different 
theoretical models as well as concrete local conditions. 
“LOCAL KNOWLEDGE” AS THE MAJOR APPROACH 
This dissertation suggests that the secret of the Communist success in the Civil 
War (1946-1949) lays in the Party’s consolidation efforts before the war. Such efforts 
made the CCP fundamentally different from the GMD, which lacked organizational 
cohesiveness and ideological indoctrination despite its design as a Leninist party. I argue 
that the Communist force quickly expanded during the War of Resistance not merely 
because the War provided it with an opportunity to survive the GMD’s intensive military 
aggression and legitimately expand itself all over China. More importantly, it also 
allowed the CCP to develop a unique political culture with its grasp of local knowledge 
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during the years under investigation—a cultural climate which worked to rejuvenate itself 
through organizational consolidation and the rebuilding of political identity. Together, 
these factors accounted for the dramatic expansion of the CCP’s membership and military 
forces, which prepared the Party for its future takeover of the country in 1949. The 
fundamental methodological principle guiding this inquiry, therefore, is its stress on the 
Communists’ efforts to build a revolution on the basis of preexisting social and cultural 
nexuses embedded in the peasant society, rather than breaking with them. 
I shall demonstrate that local cultural and habitual practices, such as customs, 
rituals, and conventions, played a key role in shaping the behaviors and adopted strategies 
of the mobilizers and the mobilized in the development of the Communist movement. 
Instead of entirely destroying them, the Party heavily relied on these existing cultural 
nexuses to approach the masses, appeal to them and carry out their revolutionary agenda. 
For instance, during conscription, it employed different rituals and traditional ceremonies 
to rid villagers of the old idea that “good men do not join the army.” In the propaganda 
targeting the collaborationist forces, local cadres designed a strategy based on a 
combination of kinship affection and popular folk songs to incite their turn-over. The 
clever employment of “local knowledge”, to borrow from Clifford Geertz, became the 
key to Communist success in Jiangsu. 
Working with the idea of “local knowledge,” I redefine the concept of “rational 
peasants.” I utilize Popkin’s idea that peasants attempted to seek profits through rational 
choices over the course of revolution. However, the definition of “ration” does not merely 
include maximizing economic benefits, nor are personal and family interests their only 
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concern. Clifford Geertz refers to the concept of “thick description” to demonstrate that 
the same gesture or phenomenon actually conveys different meanings depending on 
cultural settings, environments, participants’ physical conditions and psychological 
inclinations (Geertz 1973, 3-30). Accordingly, peasants’ decision-making over the course 
of the Communist movement was also a complex process determined by peasants’ 
personal evaluation of socioeconomic conditions, kinship relations, career expectation, as 
well as the embedded conventions, rituals, public opinions of their communities. This 
concept is particularly helpful as historians attempt to recognize peasants’ autonomy and 
view them as “rational” individuals at the same time that they view them in a collective 
manner. Relying on the local cadres, the CCP developed a comprehensive understanding 
of “local knowledge” in base areas and readily applied them to the process of each 
campaign and program. This enabled the Party to transform prevalent individual or 
communal impulses into a powerful social force that eventually facilitated the CCP’s 
penetration into communities and control of local society. 
The “local knowledge” approach calls for special attention to the dual role of local 
cadres during Communist mobilization and penetration into local communities. Previous 
studies about the Chinese Revolution, regardless of whether they stressed external 
propellers or the intrinsic dynamics of the peasantry, dichotomize the CCP and its 
objectives in their attempts to investigate interaction between the two groups. Rarely do 
scholars investigate the people who actually make such interactions possible. Instead, 
scholars frequently reiterate that the Party sought out potential activists among the 
peasantry, and recruited them once the latter underwent significant training, making them 
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into “party cadres” and formal members of the Party. This generalization, however, 
simplifies the complexity and nuance of the multiple identities that “party cadres” 
developed. Instead of “party cadres,” I refer to these men as “local cadres,” addressing 
two of the important identities they carried: “local” men vis-à-vis the Party and party 
“cadres” vis-à-vis their own fellows. Besides the two roles, they were also fathers (in 
very rare cases mothers) to their families and had various social roles in their 
communities. These identities and their implied cultural meanings created numerous 
tensions in shaping the daily operation of the Party policies as well as the course of the 
local Communist movement. 
Dedicating special attention to local cadres necessitates highlighting the 
significance of various mass associations, especially the peasant resistance association, as 
a buffering channel of “substantive government” to assist the Communist government in 
local administrative duties. There was a great variety in local administration in different 
localities of prewar China. Scholars such as Duara and Huang argue that the increasing 
tax burden demanded by the expanding state asparatuses discouraged traditional elites 
from acting as mediators between the state and the masses. A power vacuum resulted and 
was taken advantage of by local strongmen who abused this power for personal benefits. 
This transition of local power not only weakened the state’s control over the society; it 
also aroused massive resentment towards the state due to the misconduct of local bullies 
(Huang 1985, 264-291; Duara 1988, 217-243). Li Huaiyin confines this model to the 
peripheral areas of the North China Plains and argues that core areas, such as the Huailu 
County in Shandong Province, showed a more cooperative pattern in communities with 
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solitary linage bonds, powerful elite leadership and an ecological friendly environment 
(Li Huaiyin 2005). Li refers to “substantive government” to describe the Xiangdi system 
as a semi-official institution in local tax collection. His model becomes particularly 
illustrating when I borrow it to examine the function of various mass associations in the 
daily operation of local Communist administrations. While Li emphasizes “the 
government’s noninterference, laissez-fair orientation and the predominance of informal 
practices” (10), I focus more on the “substantive” part, which the Party adopted as a 
convenient short cut and de facto administrative office to approach the masses. The Party 
labeled these associations as the representative of the masses’ opinions, hiding behind 
them to lead campaigns, such as rent reduction and mutual aid. However, the personnel 
overlap between mass associations, local administrations and party organs largely blurred 
the identities of local cadres and people’s perception of them, which revealed the CCP’s 
authoritarian heritage embedded in its political institutions. 
In addition to the local perspective, I place wartime Communist movement of 
Jiangsu in a larger historical context, in which the Party perceived itself as a de facto state 
power. The outbreak of the Resistance War finally forced cooperation between the CCP 
and the GMD, and won the former legitimate status in the latter’s regime. After the 
Nationalist government evacuated from Nanjing, Jiangsu Province entered a de facto 
state of anarchy subject to Japanese invasion. In this sense, the appearance of the 
Communist resistance forces appeared as an extension of the central government in 
people’s minds. Therefore, the Resistance War created an abnormal situation during the 
Chinese Revolution, in which the CCP did not act as a revolutionary force aiming at 
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overthrowing the existing government. Rather it functioned as a part of the state, 
mandated by the second United Front, to exercise power. Hence, the Communist 
movement was not only a mobilization of available local sources, but also a process of 
state building that targeted the transformation of social structures and developed 
substantial control over local society. 
BASE AREAS IN JIANGSU PROVINCE 
The outbreak of the War of Resistance catalyzed the cooperation between the 
GMD and the CCP. Sanctioned by the Nationalist government, in October 1937, the 
Party began to convene its guerrilla forces in the fourteen guerrilla bases of eight 
provinces, including Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, Hunan, Hubei, Henan, Zhejiang and 
Anhui, and reorganized them into four guerrilla detachments (ten regiments), and one 
intelligence battalion. 6  To best contain the Communist influence in this newly 
established army, Chiang Kai-shek insisted on a non-Party commander. Eventually the 
two parties agreed on Ye Ting, a former GMD and CCP member during the first United 
Front (1924-1927) but had withdrawn his CCP membership due to the failure of the 
Guangzhou Uprising (1927). This resulting army of these guerrilla forces was named as 
the New Fourth Army (NFA). Its headquarters was officially established on December 
25, 1937 in Hankou, Hubei Province and soon transferred to Nanchang, Jiangxi Province 
in January 1938. Meanwhile, the Nationalist government confined the activities of the 
NFA to the rear areas of the Japanese front in the south of the Yangtze River.  
                                                 
6 Most Chinese historians believe that there were altogether around 10,300 soldiers when these guerrilla 
forces were assembled. Another estimation claims the number of the whole roster to be around 8,000. 
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Disregarding GMD’s restrictions, the NFA began to expand its spheres of 
influence eastward and northward toward Jiangsu Province under the guidance of the 
Party Central Committee. In April 1938, a pioneer division composed of part of the first 
and second detachments led by Chen Yi and Su Yu headed for Maoshan, the rear area of 
the Japanese occupied region, in southern Jiangsu Province. In the year that followed, 
relying on the military presence of the NFA, the Party successfully expanded and 
strengthened its political influence among the masses and established base areas in 
Zhenjiang, Jurong, Danyang, Jintang, Dangtu, and Yangzhong. Meanwhile, it strove to 
contact existing resistance forces and tried to assimilate them into its own military 
echelon. All these activities deeply worried the Nationalist government, which was alert 
to the possibility of the CCP’s political and military expansion in the name of the ongoing 
warfare and the United Front. As a result, in January 1939, the Fifth Central Committee 
meeting of the GMD passed a proposal, entitled “Ways to confine the activities of the 
other party” (xianzhi yidang huodong banfa), to contain the CCP’s further development. 
To avoid direct confrontation with the GMD and maintain a favorable stance within the 
United Front, the Party ordered the Sixth Regiment of the NFA to continue using the 
name “voluntary resistance army of Jiangnan,” the badge of an existing local resistance 
force that had been reorganized into the NFA roster, when they launched forward into 
Cheng-Xi-Yu and Su-Chang-Tai areas (the rural areas around Wuxi, Suzhou, Changshu, 
Changzhou).  
In contrast to their northern counterpart, namely the Eighth Route Army, which 
was almost free from the interference of the GMD, the NFA was besieged by the 
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Japanese and their collaborationist troops as well as the Nationalist forces in central 
China. Having been adjusted to independent guerrilla warfare between 1934 to1937, NFA 
high-ranking leaders did not always comply with the Party Central Committee’s orders. 
Instead, it oscillated between the priority of the United Front and the development of the 
Party and the NFA. In order to secure the survival of this newly established army, the 
Party Central Committee eventually decided to disregard GMD’s restriction that confined 
their activities to the south of the Yangtze River, and crossed the River to found the Subei 
Regional Base at the end of 1939. Meanwhile, in May 1940 the Central Committee 
ordered Huang Kecheng to lead five regiments of the Second Column of the Eighth 
Route Army, almost 12,000 soldiers, moving southward to support Chen Yi in his 
skirmish against the Nationalist troops in north Jiangsu. This military maneuver 
attempted to strengthen the battle preparedness of the NFA and reinforce the Party’s 
control over it. During this southbound trip, Huang’s force enhanced its strength by 
assimilating with local guerrilla forces. When arriving in the border region of Jiangsu and 
Anhui in August, it was renamed as the Fifth Column of the Eight Route Army. 
In the meantime, the NFA in Jiangsu was actively expanding the area under its 
control. After establishing the Subei regional headquarters of the NFA, Chen Yi and Su 
Yu launched an offensive attack on the Fourth Brigade of the Nationalist Provincial 
Safety Guard and occupied Huangqiao on July 29, 1940. The GMD found this defeat 
intolerable. Therefore, in the beginning of October, Han Deqin, the Nationalist Jiangsu 
Provincial Governor, assembled twenty-six regiments comprised of almost 34,000 
soldiers to attack the NFA in Huangqiao. Although the NFA had a force of only 7,000, 
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they successfully defended their front and cost Han more than 11,000 casualties. Two 
months later, Chen and Su, supported by the Fifth Column of the Eighth Route Army, 
launched their final offensive on Han’s forces. In these battles, the NFA achieved 
unprecedented victories against the Nationalist army. Han’s forces were completely 
driven out of northern Jiangsu and Han himself was captured by the NFA. After this 
battle, the Nationalist political and military influence in north Jiangsu significantly 
withered and Communist resistance forces, replacing those of the GMD, became the 
major target of the Japanese and the collaborationist government. 
The rapid military expansion of the NFA eventually led to the New Fourth Army 
Incident, in which the besieging Nationalist forces killed and captured nearly 7,000 of 
9,000 soldiers in south Anhui in early January, 1941. The commissar, Xiang Ying, was 
killed, and the commander, Ye Ting, remained under arrest until 1946. Although the 
incident was a great loss for the NFA at the time, in the long run it actually put an end to 
military decentralization in central China. Aligning with Mao’s major opponent, Wang 
Ming, Xiang openly refused Mao Zedong’s instruction of “strengthening southward, 
fighting eastward, and expediting northward,” regarding the development of the NFA. 
Due to the NFA’s distance from Yan’an and Xiang’s personal prestige in the prewar 
guerrilla warfare, Mao and his cult had much less control over the NFA than the Eight 
Route Army before 1941. In this sense, the death of Xiang and the capture of Ye 
provided a timely opportunity for Mao to replace the existing NFA leadership with his 
appointees. 
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This trend of decentralization also existed outside the leadership of the NFA. In 
reality, there was no single centralized party organ that had the authority to direct the 
Communist movement in central China. Before the NFA pioneer team entered the 
Maoshan area, the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee was rebuilt in Shanghai and began 
to dispatch party members and cadres to south and central Jiangsu to recruit new party 
members and organize local resistance forces. Before May 1940, the East Route (dong lu) 
District in southern Jiangsu was subordinate to the Jiangsu Provincial Committee while 
the Party Committee of Su-Wan District (border area between Jiangsu and Anhui 
provinces) was under the jurisdictions of the Southeast Bureau (Dongnan ju). Since the 
establishment of the Subei Regional Base relied on the NFA troops that had once built the 
Suzhong Regional Base, these two bases both reported to the Party Committee of the 
Suzhong Region. This Party Committee was closely associated with the NFA and 
reported to the Central Plain Bureau (Zhongyuan ju). In other words, there were 
altogether three paralleling party organs that had the authority to decide the path of 
development in their own jurisdictions. Such a complicated administrative system 
hindered the growth of a cohesive agenda of the Communist movement in Jiangsu 
Province. 
The issue of military decentralization was solved after the New Fourth Army 
Incident. A new headquarters was reestablished, despite Chiang’s order to dismiss the 
NFA, in Yancheng (north Jiangsu) on January 25, 1941. Mao’s loyal supporters, Chen Yi 
and Su Yu, were promoted to the de facto positions of commander and deputy. To ensure 
his absolute control, Mao designated Liu Shaoqi, his closest partner in Yan’an, to be the 
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new commissar. By that point, Mao had successfully removes any reminisce of the four-
year guerrilla warfare that could potentially hinder his attempt of military centralization. 
The CCP Central Committee reorganized the NFA, together with Fifth Column of the 
Eight Route Army, into seven divisions, which was stationed in the seven Communist 
regional bases in central China. Until then, the size of the NFA had grown more than nine 
folds compared with the time of its establishment, reaching 90,000 soldiers. 
Meanwhile, political centralization was also underway. In May of 1941 the Party 
Central Committee merged the Southeast Bureau and the Central Plain Bureau into the 
Central China Bureau (Huazhong ju), whose jurisdictions covered the NFA’s entire 
sphere of influence. Liu Shaoqi became the secretary of the Central China Bureau, and 
the committee members included Chen Yi, Rao Shushi and Zeng Shan. Liu, Chen and 
Rao were respectively the commissar, the commander and the chief director of political 
department of the NFA. The leaders of the seven NFA divisions comprised the 
corresponding regional party committees in the bases where their troops were stationed. 
Eventually, the military and party joint institution was enforced, duplicating the model of 
the CCP’s northern border regions. 
Military and political centralization significantly strengthened Communist power 
in the Jiangsu base areas. Even under the Japanese and collaborationist government’s 
frequent political and military attacks, the three major regional bases—Sunan, Suzhong 
and Subei—still achieved substantial development when the Resistance War came to an 
end. When the Japanese surrendered in August of 1945, the Sunan Regional Base had 
reached an administrative sphere of approximately 25,000 K㎡with a controlled 
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population of almost six million people. The Sixth Division of the NFA, stationed in 
Sunan, and its subordinate local forces had grown to 50,000 soldiers (Zhonggong Jiangsu 
sheng dangshi gongzuo weiyuanhui 1987, 16). According to statistic data about local 
party organs, the number of party members there had increased to more than 10,000 
(Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei zuzhibu 2001, 107). Meanwhile, the Suzhong Regional 
Base developed a jurisdictions of 23,000 K㎡ land and more than 5.1 million people. 
Party member enrollment in this region had reached the size of 31,135 (108-109).7 In the 
case of Subei Regional Base, it covered an area of 42,000 K㎡ and controlled a 
population of 4.5 million. As the site of the NFA headquarters, this region had a much 
larger party member echelon. It was as large as 55,144 members including 2,587 females 
(119-120). In central China the size of the NFA and its directly subordinate local forces 
grew to seven divisions of around 310,000 soldiers at the end of the War of Resistance. 
Such an unprecedented development would not have been possible without a thorough 
mobilization and deep penetration into local society. 
 
The main body of this dissertation is divided into five thematic chapters. Chapter 
two investigates the process of how the Party gradually deepened its penetration into 
local society in the base areas of Jiangsu. Upon its arrival, the Party established various 
mass associations to nurture its own power networks. It also instituted residency councils 
                                                 
7 Another report claimed the population of the Suzhong Regional Base was about eight million at the time 
(zhonggong Jiangsu sheng dangshi gongzuo weiyuanhui 1989, 1). According to other relevant materials, I 
estimate that this number might include the entire population of both Communist base areas and Japanese 
occupied regions in Suzhong area. Therefore, I used the number of 5.1 million in the text. 
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to offset resistance from local elites. Near the end of the War, it launched the “New 
Township Renovation” to replace the existing elite class with its own local power, which 
enhanced its control of local society. Chapter three focuses on Communist propaganda 
activities. After exploring the Party’s different propaganda strategies towards various 
groups including ordinary peasants and collaborationist personnel, I argue that the key to 
its success lay in an effective combination of propaganda and organization. In chapter 
four, I detail how the Party utilized educational institutions as another channel of mass 
mobilization and further reinforced its penetration into various social groups. Chapter 
five uses Grain Tax, conscription and mobilization of anti-pacification campaign, all of 
which required personal sacrifice from the masses, as three instances to examine how 
effective the Communist mobilization was in local communities. The unprecedented 
development during the wartime also brought the Party inevitable problems, such as party 
members’ undesirable tendencies and misconduct and a gradually lessening control over 
lower administrators. How did the CCP deal with these issues? Chapter six explores the 
programs the Party launched to contain the undesirable tendencies and reinforce 
ideological indoctrination towards local cadres. On the basis of these investigations, I 
argue that the CCP had achieved considerable control over local society of the base areas 
in Jiangsu, which largely stemmed from its accommodation with preexisting cultural and 
social nexuses. Such accommodation facilitated the Communist mobilization for 
revenues, manpower and deconstruction of existing power networks in local 
communities. The Jiangsu experience thereby provided the Party with an alternate way of 
penetrating into local society in a moderate manner.  
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Chapter Two Penetrating Local Society: from Economic to Political 
Struggle 
When China entered its Republican era, the government’s attempt to build a 
modern state required a much larger amount of revenue, which pushed forward the state’s 
institutional penetration to the lower level of administrations, especially below the county 
level. However, neither the Nanjing Nationalist government nor its Beiyang predecessor 
seemed successful on this issue. Previous scholarships show that quotidian administrative 
operations at lower levels, such as tax collection and civil dispute settlement, still largely 
relied on cooperation between government and influential elites in local communities. Li 
Huaiyin’s study on Huailu County in the south-central Hebei plain, a core area of the 
North China “macroregion,” 1  convincingly argues for a cooperative model of 
government and autonomous local elite, in which the latter gradually formalized their 
roles in officialdom before the Resistance War. Such cooperation was achieved on the 
basis of common ends, shared identity and moral ethics, which further reinforced the 
solidarity of the communities (Li 2005). As for peripheral areas, Prasenjit Duara proposes 
the model of “state involution” arguing that the Republican government failed to develop 
a series of political and economic institutions that meshed with its aggressive local 
penetration, and thus had to rely on traditional measures of governance to fulfill its 
responsibilities in local communities. The state’s incompetent control over its lower 
                                                 
1 William Skinner proposes a paradigm of “macroregion” to discuss the socioeconomic development in 
imperial China (Skinner 1964-1965). He divides the China proper into eight macroregions: North China, 
Northwest China, Lower Yangzi, Middle Yangzi, and Upper Yangzi, Southeast Coast, Lingnan, and Yun-
Gui. According to Skinner, each macroregion includes core and peripheral areas. The core areas usually 
have dense population, more arable lands, stable and friendly natural environment and commercialized 
economy; the periphery is quite the opposite. 
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administrations thus created a group of people, known as “local bullies”, who partly 
replaced the role of traditional local gentry to function as the coordinator between the 
state and local communities. Excluded from the state payroll list, they exploited ordinary 
people to maximize their profits and thus, aroused public indignation against the state, 
which further weakened the authority of the state in local society (Duara 1988). In both 
cases, the quotidian administration at lower levels was realized by local powers, elite or 
bullies, both of which were not fully controlled by the state. How did the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) enforce the penetration when encountering influential social 
powers in local communities in the base areas in Jiangsu? 
Jiangsu Province is usually treated as the periphery of the Chinese Revolution for 
its better-off economic situation. Elizabeth Perry argues that rebellion or revolution more 
likely occurs in ecologically instable, poverty-stricken and economically undeveloped 
areas (Perry 1980). According to recent studies, however, better-off regions were not 
entirely revolution-proof in term of preexisting socioeconomic conditions. Philip Huang 
argues for the phenomenon of economic involution that had already begun in the Yangtze 
Delta even earlier than the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644).2 Therefore, people’s lives were 
not really improved because the output of agricultural and household handcraft 
production increased at the expense of incremental labor input, which meant the per 
capita income virtually shrank, regardless of the gross growth of economy, in this region 
(Philiph Huang 1990, 11-16). The political segregation and frequent warfare prevented 
                                                 
2 Huang defines three types of economic growths: 1) involution, in which the pace of input, including 
money and labors, outweighs that of output; 2) intensification, in which the pace of input and output 
matches; 3) development, in which the marginal return of each workday increases. 
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the central government from paying too much attention to the issue of economic 
involution in local society. How did the CCP adjust its revolutionary agenda to 
accommodate such local settings? 
Although scholars of China propose various explanations to the CCP’s victory 
over the Nationalist government, they almost unanimously agree on the Party’s 
controlling ability over local society. How was such control achieved during the War of 
Resistance? Chalmers Johnson asserts that the CCP took advantage of “peasant 
nationalism” aroused by the Japanese atrocities, responding to peasants’ aspiration of 
resistance, and thereby, received cooperation from the latter to facilitate its penetration 
into local society (Johnson 1962). Tetsuya Kataoka attributed it to the optimum timing 
that the Communist troops were almost the only organized force in the north for the first 
two years of the War, which had saved the Party enough time to outcompete its 
opponents (Kataoka 1974, 9). Most importantly, the land program implemented before 
the outbreak of the War had nurtured plenty of Communist followers to strengthen the 
penetration when necessary, which has been highlighted by most studies about 
Communist base areas in north and northwest China (Selden 1971; 1995; Wou 1994; 
Keating 1997; Goodman 2000). Based on his research on central China, Chen Yung-fa 
uses the “controlled polarization” model to show how the Party stratified people into 
basic masses and feudal forces to maximize potential public support, and reformulated its 
class theory into an acceptable expression (Chen 1986, 11-13). How did the CCP 
approach the masses, deconstruct existing social power networks, penetrate into local 
communities and establish its own power basis in the base areas in Jiangsu? 
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While interested in the Party’s strategies of mobilizing the masses, I also intend to 
highlight the significance of local settings in shaping the course of the Communist 
movement. Ralph Thaxton argues that peasants responded to the Party’s call of the 
Resistance War because they regarded it as an opportunity for “survival that posed a 
direct threat to all outside political authority” (Thaxton 1983, 191). I concur with Thaxton 
in regard to the agency of the peasantry. Moreover, I show that the Party nurtured 
massive support, reinforced the penetration and built the political structure via 
negotiating with the existing cultural framework, including common values, popular 
habits, moral codes, and indigenous social networks of local communities. This was the 
essential reason that accounted for the success of the Communist mobilization.  
In this chapter, I will first demonstrate how the Party designed specific strategies 
for specific targets. On the one hand, when faced with ordinary peasants, the mass 
workers (minyun gongzuozhe) initiated rent reduction movement to meet their desires of 
tangible benefits.3 Thus, various resistance associations, especially the peasant resistance 
association, were widely organized as the Party’s basic cells of later mobilization and 
control. On the other hand, the Party established local residency councils (canyihui) to 
promote its democratic image, and furthered to lubricate the relation with local gentry. 
Meanwhile, due to the widespread secret societies in this area, the mass workers 
attempted to infiltrate such organizations in order to bring them into the resistance cause. 
The Communist penetration was deepened and strengthened by the New Township 
                                                 
3 “Mass worker” is the term that the CCP used to refer to its members and cadres whose duties concerned 
with mobilizing and organizing the masses. 
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Renovation, which aimed at weakening traditional elite’s political influence. Lastly, I will 
examine the effectiveness of the Party’s infiltration by bringing up several issues that 
both local cadres and ordinary peasants encountered during the Party’s penetration. 
ESTABLISHING THE PEASANT RESISTANCE ASSOCIATION 
Although Shanghai was the birth place of the CCP, the Communist movement 
was thoroughly eradicated during the purge in 1927 and had little spillover effect on the 
neighboring areas afterwards. Assuming that the plain-and-river topography of Jiangsu 
province was not suitable for guerrilla warfare that the Communist forces were good at, 
the New Fourth Army (NFA) entered this area with intense uncertainty. Relying on their 
experiences in the north and Jiangxi Province, the Communist mass workers decided to 
begin their mobilization with two major facets: on the one hand, they initiated campaigns 
that focused on peasants’ most imminent economic requests; on the other hand, they tried 
to establish mass organizations as the basic cell of mobilization. 
In the base areas of northern China, the Party usually relied on its existing 
administrative channel to register the masses and organize them into various associations. 
The advantage of this method resided in its efficiency of including and organizing people 
in favor of the Party’s control over local society. However, in most cases the mass 
associations established under such stiff administrative interference only kept superficial 
frames while lacking internal motivation for further development (Rao Shushi 1942). 
Most importantly, administrative interference required pre-mobilization, such as the land 
reform in the north, as a prerequisite, which made it impossible to be imitated in Jiangsu 
Province. 
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There were basically two patterns of preliminary mobilization adopted in Jiangsu 
Province. One was a “top-down” pattern, which was pervasive in Huainan, Route East 
(ludong), and Route West (luxi) areas. 4  It usually began with the rent reduction 
campaign. Lacking wide-scale penetration, the Party and NFA authorities had to assign 
mass work teams or rent-judging committees (pingzu weiyuanhui) to take the initiative 
among peasants. Therefore, ordinary peasants were only followers and largely relied on 
the authority borrowed from the NFA for success. Through the campaign, peasant 
activists were discovered and mass associations were established in small scale. The 
Party’s experience in Anle Town was a good example of this type (Rao Shushi 1944). 
The NFA firstly entered the Route East area in May 1939 and several mass 
workers were sent to Anle for preliminary mobilization in secret shortly thereafter. On 
January 10, 1940 they called a public gathering for publicizing the principle of “three to 
seven rent distribution” among ordinary peasants.5 The next day the guerrillas arrested 
the biggest local landlord, Yuan Junhan, and accused him of collaboration with the 
Japanese. Although Yuan was released several days later, the masses certainly saw the 
hope of rent redistribution through the guerrilla’s tough attitude towards landlords and 
began to view the NFA as their powerful patron. In February the mass workers mobilized 
about 3,000 peasants to borrow grains from the biggest local landlords, Yuan and Zhu. 
                                                 
4 These areas were mainly located in the west Jiangsu and east Anhui province. Here “Route” means the 
Tianjin-Pukou railway that was open to traffic on 1912. Pukou is now a part of Nanjing, located in the 
north of the Yangtze River. The Tianjin-Pukou railway was the earliest part of the current Jinghu (Beijing 
to Shanghai) Railway. 
5 Here January refers to Chinese lunar calendar. 
 “Three to seven rent distribution” refers to the ratio of grain products that tenants and landlords 
received—30% for landlords and 70% for tenants. 
 34 
Relying on the support of a NFA company stationed in town, the peasants successfully 
borrowed 1,000 dan grains.6 The authority of the NFA was reinforced by their victory 
over the Nationalist force led by Qin Qingsen and Zhao Qiguo at the end of the same 
month. The peasants’ hesitation that stemmed from the worry that the Nationalists would 
return was temporarily relieved. Mass associations and local military forces gradually 
came to form in this region (Rao Shushi 1944, 27-29). 
The biggest disadvantage of the “top-down” pattern resided in its contingence on 
external military guarantee and outside cadres. Although the peasant, women, and youth 
resistance associations were established two years after the NFA entered the Route East, 
most of them were simply organizational frame without substantial activities. Some 
landlords and bullies took opportunities to obtain leadership of the mass associations and 
a few local party branches even became older clubs (laoren julebu)7. Rent redistribution 
had to be implemented by outside mass workers because of the lack of local cadres. 
However, since outside cadres usually were unfamiliar with local situations, their orders 
encountered indirect resistance from both tenants and landlords (Zhonggong ludong qu 
dangwei 1941). The outside cadres typically wore different clothes and had a different 
accent, which local peasants could hardly ignore. Besides, mass workers usually lived in 
the houses of rich peasants or even landlords upon their first arrival because of financial 
reasons. To some extent, this created an illusion to the public that they were closer to the 
local upper class than to the masses. Both facts reminded ordinary peasants that the mass 
                                                 
6 1 dan = 75kg. 
7 It’s a Chinese expression, which means a places where older people enjoy their lives. 
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workers were outsiders who represented another higher authority. Thus, the Party’s 
mobilization only exerted superficial effect and its penetration experienced resilient 
resistance from the local community. The influence of the Party would soon vanish once 
the military guarantee was withdrawn. 
The other was the “bottom-up” pattern based on the Party’s successful 
experiences in north Jiangsu. Later the Huazhong Bureau tried to spread this pattern to 
other bases in central China. The “bottom-up” pattern emphasized the significance of 
mass organizations and insisted on their leading role in mass movement. First, a large 
amount of cadres composed of university graduates, guiding-team members from the 
NFA, and students of local party training classes were assigned to counties and districts 
as backbones of local peasant resistance associations. After arriving in their assigned 
places, they mobilized indigenes for attendance and initiated mass movements that were 
most closely related to the peasants’ economic demands, such as rent reduction and grain 
borrowing, under the flag of the Peasant Resistance Association (Rao Shushi 1942, 19-
20). The advantage of the “bottom-up” pattern stemmed from its insistence on the 
symbolic leading role of the Peasant Resistance Association, which caused the masses to 
easily identify themselves with it, and thus weakened potential resistance. Furthermore, 
functioning as the coordinator between the local government and the military force, the 
peasant association was able to most efficiently arrange resources. However, reliance on 
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the peasant association also led to blurring identification of local cadres, which caused 
institutional defects in the party administration.8 
The success of this pattern relied on the success in a “key locality” (mofan dian), 
to which most manpower and supplies were invested. Typically a county required a 
working unit of thirty to forty cadres for initial mobilization. First of all, these cadres 
would rent a big building in the market town and hang a board on which “Preparation 
Committee of the County Peasant Resistance Association” was boldly written. They then 
would hang a billboard in the hall, on which the resolutions of the association, such as 
25% rent reduction, half interest reduction, and improving wage workers’ living 
standards, were articulated. Meanwhile an investigative team was sent out for collecting 
information from the county's subordinative sub-districts, towns, and baos, based on 
which one or two key sub-districts would be selected. 9  Participating cadres were 
arranged in this way: four to five were left in the County Preparation Committee; each 
ordinary sub-district got a quota of three or four persons; twenty-three to four cadres were 
assigned to the key sub-district, where the working pattern and proportion of personnel 
arrangement were duplicated based on those at the county level. This model was also 
followed at township level. Usually each key sub-district had one or two key towns and 
each key town had two to three key baos, which usually consisted of big landlords and 
the largest number of tenants.  
                                                 
8 See later discussion in this chapter. 
9 Bao was an administrative unit of traditional Chinese government. It was also used in the Republican 
period for a couple of decades. Usually each bao consisted of fifty households. 
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The cadres who were assigned to the key baos interviewed each family 
individually and singled out tenants and wage workers as the major targets of potential 
members of the Bao Peasant Resistance Association and further mobilization. Then, the 
cadres came to the houses of these major targets, detailing the ideas of rent reduction for 
tenants and salary increment for wage workers. Meanwhile a bao-wide public gathering 
was convened to pass the resolutions that were discussed in the individual meetings 
beforehand, and elect syndics (lishi) of the Bao Peasant Associations. Ideally, cadres 
selected a landlord's house upon which the mobilized peasants would march in order to 
petition for rent reduction. Once succeeded, a bao-wide celebration would be held and 
people were asked to bring and knock on everything that could make sound. Thus, people 
of other baos would come to ask for details about what was happening and made 
resolution on their own to take action also. In the ordinary baos, only one cadre was left 
in the Preparation Committee Office. The rest conducted a ceremony, in which they 
would parade around the village carrying billboards on their shoulders. The whole 
process imitated the local ritual of “welcoming gods”, only except what was written on 
the billboards was the resolutions of the Peasant Association, not conventional warnings 
of “silence” (sujing) and “distance” (huibi). Their purpose was to familiarize peasants 
with these resolutions and await the success of the initial mobilization from the key bao 
for further action (Rao Shushi 1942, 20-25; Cao Diqiu 1942, 256-257). This strategy 
worked effectively in Yancheng. One sub-district established twenty-seven bao and five 
township peasants associations, and another did forty-three and eight respectively in 
twenty days (Cao, 257-258).  
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The above description was the most ideal process of mobilization. Yet, the reality 
was not always as planned. In the “top-down” pattern, the NFA’s military strength 
convinced most peasants to implement the rent reduction program; while in the “bottom-
up” pattern, the Communist troops and party authorities hid behind the peasant resistance 
association for stimulating the peasants’ spontaneous struggle fervor to the most extent. 
The latter did provide a better solution to the estrangement between local and outside 
cadres. For lacking support from higher authorities, however, the masses felt less secure 
and were reluctant to play tough card when facing the landlords. In Tuofeng Village 
(north Jiangsu) the masses did not dare to directly challenge the landlords in public 
struggle meetings; even the party members kept silent at party routine meetings (Zou 
Ping 1944b, 12). In Funing County, although the assigned mass workers successfully 
mobilized quite a few activists, these activists encountered indifference when they 
returned to their fellows for further mobilization (Liu Bin 1942, 130). Under such 
circumstances, the success of translating the Party’s political agenda into the masses’ 
economic requests played a key role in deciding whether the Party was able to penetrate 
local society through mass movements. Two campaigns that focused on grains—rent 
reduction and grain borrowing—were usually the most appealing ones to ordinary 
peasants, which functioned as the cut-in point for mass organization development. 
FOCUSING ON ECONOMIC REDISTRIBUTION: RENT REDUCTION AND GRAIN 
BORROWING 
Rent reduction program was a compromise under the second United Front 
between the GMD and the CCP that technically provided the latter with a legitimate 
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space of further development.10 It was firstly proposed in the “ten principles of anti-
Japanese and salvaging the country” (kangri jiuguo shida gangling) on Luochuan 
meeting in August 1937 but was not implemented until two years later. This program was 
a much more moderate version of the land reform that was enforced in Jiangxi Province 
and northern China before the outbreak of the War. It functioned as a valve of balance 
and control that kept the promise of material benefits to peasants on the one hand, and 
contained the landlords’ loss to their tolerable limit and secured their resistant stance 
against Japan on the other. To legitimize the rent reduction and minimize resistance from 
landlords, the Party traced its origin to the claims of Sun Yat-sen and the Chongqing 
Nationalist government’s wartime policy. They further equalized support for rent 
reduction to patriotic resistance against the Japanese, which turned the Party’s own 
agenda to the request of the whole country (Zeng Ruqing 1983, 147-148). Such 
propaganda helped the Party to establish its patriotic image in public. The actual process 
of mass mobilization, nevertheless, involved a much more complex negotiation and 
compromise. 
First of all, the Party needed to help ordinary peasants break their psychological 
inferiority to landlords and convince them that they would be the biggest beneficiary of 
the rent reduction program at no cost. The most frequently adopted method was public 
struggle meetings (douzheng dahui) that pulled landlords down from the sacred niche in 
                                                 
10 It was also called 25% rent reduction, which required landlords to take 25% off from the rent of 1937. 
Meanwhile the highest rent rate could not exceed 37.5% of total output of the land. However, worrying 
such reduction would be too radical and push landlords to the side of Japanese and the GMD, the Party 
adopted 3-7 or 4-6 rent distribution (30% or 40% of output to landlords and 70% or 60% to tenants) in 
Jiangsu Province. 
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tenants’ minds and used public humiliation, sometimes even violence, to force them to 
comply with the rent reduction policy and cooperate with the government. For instance, 
there was a landlord, Siye, in Sanzhuang Sub-district of Sishu County (north Jiangsu), 
who used to be an official in the Legal Department of the local government before the 
War, and thus, acted as the coordinator between the ordinary people and the authorities. 
After the NFA entered Sishu County, in the first year Siye successfully evaded rent 
reduction by relying on his previous prestige among the tenants. However, he was made a 
major target by the mass workers in the fall of 1943. On the day of the public struggle 
meeting, more than five hundred peasants convened on the village playground. Once the 
pre-arranged tenants took the leading role to expose Siye’s plots against reduction, 
numerous attacks from the masses that used to be suppressed by his power erupted. 
Intimidated by the public rage showed by the participants, Siye recognized his violation 
against rent reduction and promised to compensate the tenants.11  
Once the masses was agitated, even current residency council members could be 
the target of such meetings. In the fall of 1944, Wang Jiying, one of the biggest landlords 
in Sheyang County (north Jiangsu) and the deputy president of the local Residency 
Council (canyihui), was required to attend a public meeting which meant to solve the 
conflicts between him and his seventeen tenant families. Surprisingly, almost three 
thousand people came to the gathering. The tenants accused Wang of cheating the 
government on rent reduction and exploiting them as free labors. Wang’s defense was 
                                                 
11 Dongliu, “Sishu sanzhuang qu shiyan xiang de jianzu douzheng” (The rent reduction struggle in Shiyan 
Town of Sanzhuang Sub-district in Sishu), Huaihai bao, 25 November 1943. 
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interrupted several times by the tenants, who enumerated their complaints one by one. 
Finally even the town chief had to step out, apologizing for his negligence on Wang’s 
perfunctory attitude toward the rent reduction policy. The public gathering ended with the 
compromise that Wang refunded the rent that should have been deducted in the previous 
years and paid the tenants for their extra labor. For the sake of the United Front, the 
chairman of the meeting contained tenants’ rage and avoided further assault against 
Wang (Liu Bochao 1984).12 
Public gatherings created an environment of collective action, in which the 
participants were less responsible for the aftermath of their behaviors and once agitated, 
blindly followed others. It was also the most effective way to build ordinary peasants' 
self-confidence vis-à-vis the landlord class. Besides public gatherings, small-scale 
colloquia and training classes targeting on specific objectives were also widely adopted. 
Although the general guideline of mass mobilization was to translate political agenda into 
economic request, meeting organizers took advantage of the relatively closed 
environment to perpetuate their ideological education. The local cadres started with the 
question of “who fed whom” to introduce the Party’s class principle, then the current 
warfare with Japan which, they insisted, would end in favor of China, and the ultimate 
victory of the CCP over the GMD (Cao Diqiu 1944b, 231). It was wise for the Party to 
limit intensive ideological infiltration to small scale meetings for better controlled effect 
and manipulation, and focus on economic benefits at public gatherings because this 
                                                 
12 Also in Ping, “Ji zhudian jianzu jiufen zhongcai dahui” (Report on the judgment meeting of landlord-
tenant rent conflicts), Yanfu bao, 28 September 1944. 
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deployment easily aroused collective hatred in the masses and helped the Party achieve 
its goals. 
In addition to a great number of meetings that the CCP was famous for, personal 
relationships were another way in which peasants were mobilized in the fight for rent 
reduction. In terms of the landlord-tenant relationship, the worse the landlords treated 
their tenants, the more resolute the tenants were when implementing rent reduction; the 
less land one rented, the more indifferent he showed towards the reduction policy. 
Generally speaking, bigger tenants inclined to firmly support rent reduction since they 
benefited more once the campaign succeed (Zou Ping 1944c, 26-28). It also explained 
that the mass workers of Subei Regional Base usually regarded the ratio of tenants to 
landlords as the key standard to select “key locality” for initial mobilization. 
Furthermore, mass workers often reported and took advantage of conflicting opinions on 
rent reduction within a family. In some cases, such a divergence occurred in tenant 
families that did not dare to request decreased rent from their landlords but begrudged 
others who had benefited from the campaign. Usually it was the elder generation who 
opposed reduction while their children were in favor of it. The local cadres thus 
encouraged the children to convene all family members and struggle against their parents. 
The higher authorities regarded it as a good way to minimize resistance of tenants and 
push forward the rent reduction program (Cao Diqiu 1944b, 232). Here one can find that 
the Party also utilized various kinds of conflicts among neighbors and families to 
encourage mutual struggle and surveillance in the communities, through which it 
obtained the first-hand knowledge of the movement's development. As such the 
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traditional values of a peaceful reciprocal relationship within a neighborhood and respect 
towards elders within family were gradually weakened. People were encouraged to be 
loyal only to the social organizations to which they belonged. This was a new value that 
the Party intended to implant into people’s mindsets and further facilitated its penetration. 
The rent reduction campaign not only endangered the landlords’ economic 
interest but more importantly, it challenged the authority of the traditional elite in local 
communities, which survived the vicissitude of dynasties and the 1911 Revolution. 
Therefore, the resistance from landlords was much more intense. Some landlords 
threatened their tenants: “cloudy days are not as many as sunny ones, and west wind will 
come after east wind;” “the NFA will leave ultimately and I will clear our debt once the 
Nationalist troops returns;” “if you insist on reduction, I will report to the Japanese.” 
Some intimidated the tenants with rumors, “those families who benefited from rent 
reduction would have to join the NFA and the government is going to implement the 3-3-
4 (30% for tenants, 30% for the government and 40% for landlords) distribution on land 
outputs.” Other landlords pretended to withdraw the leased lands by excuses of selling 
out or impawning them, or insisted the tenants write reduction certification as evidence 
for their future revenge (Cao Diqiu 1944b, 233-234). 
Indirect soft persuasion was another widely adopted resistance of the landlords 
who kept good relationships with their tenants. They offered various benefits for not 
decreasing rent: some suggested half-half distribution and volunteered to take the 
responsibility to pay the Grain Tax; some promised help during famine seasons; and 
some renewed ten-year, twenty-year, or lifetime leases with tenants, which included extra 
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labor fees. They also tried to avoid rent reduction by noting previous favors they had 
provided: “we have kept our landlord-tenant relation for years, and let us be honest and 
fair: how many years have your family depended on me? You will not be able to make a 
living without me” (Cao, 233-234; Chen Pixian 1942, 114-115)! The most pervasive 
solution to evade reduction was to force tenants to temporarily increase rent at the rate 
that exactly compensated the landlords’ loss in the movement. 
The landlords’ soft persuasion targeted local cadres as well. They took advantage 
of the Party’s urge to develop local Peasant Resistance Associations, hiring poor tenants 
to pretend to be activists and attend the association. Some tried to bribe local cadres by 
gifts, money, inviting them to dinner or even offering marriage proposal to their families 
(Liu Shaoqi 1941a). For instance, a landlord in Shapugang (north Jiangsu) tried to marry 
his daughter to a local cadre, Hu, and use the in-law relation to evade rent reduction. 
However, Hu refused his request. Such bribery was so prevalent in Jiangsu that some 
local authorities, such as the Fudong County committee, ordered that cadres were not 
allowed to have meals at landlords’ homes or accept any gifts (Hong Haiquan 1984a). 
Although the rent reduction movement was an economic issue on the surface, it 
actually functioned as the first nail to breach the balanced societal order that had kept the 
peace of local society for centuries. Such an order was so stable that both landlords and 
tenants considered it unchangeable regardless of its fairness. Therefore, what landlords 
lost was not merely 25% of the rent, but more importantly the social authority, privileges 
and resources they enjoyed. There was no doubt that they manipulated all possible 
channels to resist the movement. In addition, ordinary people’s inertia for life, fear of 
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change, and lack of confidence towards the CCP made the Party suffer from a joint 
resistance from both landlords and tenants. This was not a rare phenomenon. Some social 
scientists have shown the quotidian operations in a moral economic entity in premodern 
agricultural society, in which landlords and tenants formed a benevolent, humane and 
reliable patron-client relationship based on mutual aids, obligations and shared moral 
codes, especially the subsistence ethics (Scott 1976). In a stable ecological environment 
like places in Jiangsu, this bond between landlords and tenants was not easily broken if 
patron’s guarantee for subsistence of peasants was not withdrawn. Hence, the rent 
reduction was a continuous routine movement that was mobilized during each harvest 
throughout the War of Resistance. Although suitable strategies were important, a long-
lasting Communist government provided the most stability in tenants’ minds. Here is the 
data of the rent reduction result during the War (Table 1). 
Table 1： Rent reduction date of Yejing village (Suzhong Regional Base) 
Year 1941 1942 1943 1944 
Harvest percentage 
(household) 
75% 8 6 6 20 
80% 3 12 12 2 
85% 2 5 7 4 
90% 5 2 2 2 
95% 0 0 1 1 
Not deducted (household) 15 8 5 4 
Gained from reduction (dan) * 8.98 15.4 16.2 19.1 
Source: Wang, Jun et al. “Yejing cun de jianzu diaocha” (Rent reduction investigation of Yejing village), Suzhong Bao, 
10 August 1945. 
*1 dan = 75kg 
 
The five-year mass movement and the stable governance of the CCP in the bases of 
Jiangsu made the landlord class fall from the patron status in the minds of local peasants. 
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A peaceful and harmonious patron-client relationship between landlords and tenants was 
no longer like it used to be before the War. 
Instead of completely destroying the patron-client relationship, the Party 
strenuously attempted to replace landlords in local communities to become the new 
benevolent patron who offered philanthropic assistance to maintain the subsistence of 
ordinary peasants. The grain borrowing campaign was implemented to fulfill this 
function and publicize the Party’s image of representing the masses. In order to minimize 
discontent from landlords and rich peasants, which might endanger their support to the 
NFA and resistance against Japan, the Party intended to limit its scale and avoided 
pervasive mobilization. The local Peasant Resistance Association was responsible for the 
campaign and the local government merely played a coordinating role between the lender 
and the borrower. The Party further prescribed that there should not be specifically 
targeted landlords or preset grain amounts of the campaign and the borrowed grain should 
be returned before the agreed due date with affordable interest. One internal party 
document suggested that the mass workers should conduct a detailed investigation before 
the campaign and the poorest families who were absolutely incapable of repayment 
should be excluded from the borrowers (Xu Bu 1942). However, what actually occurred 
in local communities sometimes turned out to be the very opposite of the Party’s 
guidelines. Here is the story of a grain borrowing campaign in Huaibao County (north 
Jiangsu) in the spring of 1942. 
The town of Suijing experienced a severe famine that year and the Peasant 
Association estimated a shortage of at least 1,000 dan of grain for the relevant families. 
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However, the landlords and rich peasants only volunteered to provide around one fourth 
of the needed food. Some were not willing to lend out their stock without official permit, 
afraid to be accused of usury later during interest reduction movement. Under such 
circumstances, the local Peasant Association turned to the masses to collect information 
about the four big landlords’ stocks and organized activists into a representative group to 
spy on the objectives. The group then visited the four landlords to inquire about the 
amount they could afford to lend out. After a two-day negotiation, the biggest landlord, 
Zhang Ruhe, was willing to raise the amount from 25 to 100 dans, and the other three 
from 20 to 80 dans, which they thought would meet the request of the Peasant 
Association. However, the representatives claimed, “we do not dare to say yes, you tell 
the masses tomorrow yourselves!” 
On the third day, a small-scale public meeting was held for further negotiation 
and the four landlords were forced to attend under the supervision of the Peasant 
Association. They promised to increase the lending amount to 350 dans under public 
pressure, which yet met the participants’ anticipation. The negotiation reached an impasse 
and the Peasant Association thus announced a town-wide struggle meeting the next day. 
In the afternoon, the association cadres held a meeting to discuss the process of the next 
day gathering. They got the message that the four landlords should have around 600 dans 
grain in stock at home and a couple of hundreds in other grain storages. In order to collect 
evidence, they came to a small landlord, Liu Quanfu, and asked him to pretend to send 
his grains into the storage where the big four landlords hid their stocks. As a returned 
favor, Liu was allowed to lend out only 10 dans of grain. 
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The town-wide public gathering was held in the morning of the fourth day but the 
impasse continued until noon. Someone suggested, “We had to treat these landlords with 
meat and wine when they came to us for debt in previous harvest seasons. Today they 
should treat us in return!” This suggestion was echoed by the masses. The director of the 
Peasant Association thus called the masses to eat at the four landlords’ home and soon the 
parade flooded into Zhang Ruhe’s grain storage. Zhang rushed to the government for help 
but was declined. Under such circumstances, the big four landlords were forced to agree 
on the amount proposed by the Peasant Association. After that, the association cadres 
revealed their grain stocks outside their home and the director thus decided to confiscate 
these hidden stocks. Deterred by the four landlords’ experiences, families that had 
surpluses volunteered to offer whatever the Peasant Association requested. Eventually 
1,600 dans were borrowed in the whole town, which was 60% more than the original 
target, and 500 dans were thus turned in to the sub-district for other use (Huang Xuming 
1984). 
The campaign of Suijin was far from an extreme case and at least nobody got 
hurt. In the Town of Hebei (central Jiangsu) physical conflict occurred between the 
landlords and the peasant association cadres, and the Sub-district Committee had to step 
out to suppress the conflict by arresting the landlords’ followers (Gu Naiyu and Zhou 
Xiyuan 1983). Such deviation from the Party’s original guidelines aroused the vigilance 
of the Huazhong Bureau. In the report on the grain borrowing campaign of Yanfu 
District, it criticized the local trend of turning individual negotiation into pervasive mass 
campaign. It recorded the decreased output of rich peasants and the unease of middle 
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peasants, both of which stemmed from the borrowing campaign that endangered the 
security of private properties. Even badly, the campaign betrayed the Party’s basic 
principle of minimizing enemy groups and enlarged the scale of attacked objectives to 
rich peasants or better-off middle peasants, causing their uncertainty towards the CCP 
(Huazhong ju 1942b). This phenomenon was not confined to Jiangsu. In northern China 
both landlords and peasants ran into the Japanese occupied areas for unsecure property 
protection and personal persecution led by the Party’s over-leftist policies on rent and 
grain (Kataoka 1974, 134-135). The deviation apparently resulted from the local cadres’ 
misunderstanding of the policy of higher authorities and their lack of overarching 
conceptual framework of the Communist movement. For local cadres, the grain 
borrowing campaign was an assigned task that needed to be fulfilled and would 
negatively impact their career otherwise. It was also an opportunity for them to establish 
their personal authority and increase their social status in local communities. Since they 
were the executants who actually turned the Party’s abstract policies into realities, the 
local cadres played a deciding role in the result of the Party’s control over the society. 
Regardless of the various methods that local cadres adopted in the rent reduction 
and grain borrowing movements, a general framework of the basic cell of mass 





Table 2： Peasant Associations in Yanfu District (till July 1941) 
County Yancheng Funing Liandong Huai’an Sum 
Number of association 
members 





NA NA NA NA 200 
Town 184 109 22 8 423 
Bao 1,000 639 170 36 1,846 
Group 5,257 3,050 846 300 9,462 
1. Source: Based on Liu, Bing, “Yanfu qu gongzuo baogao” (Working report of yanfu district), in Subei kangri genjudi 
(Subei anti-Japanese base), Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng dangshi gongzuo weiyuanhui, and Jiangsu sheng dang’an guan 
ed. (Beijing: Zhongguo dangshi ziliao press, 1989), 125-126. 
2. Among the peasant association members, 70% came from poor peasants, 15% from middle peasants, 5% from wage 
workers, 5% from rich peasants, and 5% from others (Ibid.). 
 


















No. of CCP 
members 
1,232 339 730 477 795 687 283 118 




72 30 39 44 45 37 NA NA 
No. of Party 
groups (village 
level) 
255 NA 116 112 116 NA NA NA 
1. Source: Based on Liu, Bing, “Yanfu qu gongzuo baogao” (Working report of yanfu district), in Subei kangri genjudi 
(Subei anti-Japanese base), Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng dangshi gongzuo weiyuanhui, and Jiangsu sheng dang’an guan 
ed. (Beijing: Zhongguo dangshi ziliao press, 1989), 133-135. 
2. Professional background of these party members: 15 factory workers, 119 handcraft workers, 189 hired hands, 2,738 
poor peasants, 724 middle peasants, 48 rich peasants, 5 landlords, 10 independent labors, 4 store assistants, 18 free 
professionals, 71 school teachers, 23 merchants.  
Educational background: 16 college students, 11 advanced normal school students, 24 normal school students, 174 
high and middle school, 150 senior and junior elementary school students, 23 educated from other channels (Ibid.). 
 
Besides Peasant Association, workers, youngsters, students, women, and teachers 
followed the peasants and formed their own organizations. A rapid increasing 
membership in the first couple of years was, however, more a growing number than an 
indication of substantial control over the masses. The working report on the mass 
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associations of Yanfu District recorded that only 20% of the local Peasant Association 
could fulfill their routine organizational responsibilities; about 50% relied on the town 
and bao cadres to take initiative and the subordinate executive groups (gongzuo xiaozhu) 
did not function at all; and the other 30% existed merely as frameworks (Liu Bin 1942, 
125-133). Some local cadres tried to establish their personal authority by relying on the 
new identity. One bao head in Sishu County convened a public gathering to condemn the 
masses simply because he was challenged by the peasants in public for his unfairness in 
assigning corvee obligation several days before.13 These phenomena suggested that 
although higher party authorities endeavored to build new institutions to facilitate its 
penetration, the local cadres and party member recruited for this task viewed their 
responsibilities differently. As shown in the case in Sishu, the bao head took advantage of 
his official position to reinforce personal authority when faced with challenges. These 
local cadres considered their new identity merely as a replacement of the traditional elites 
and appeared to be more interested in building their personal prestige. The entire course 
of the wartime Communist movement in Jiangsu was full of such tension of disaccordant 
perceptions between the Party’s higher authorities and the local cadres. The CCP’s 
control over them and their effectiveness of implementing the party policies decided the 
result of the wartime Communist movement. 
                                                 
13 Yimin, “Zhangxu de gongzuo weishenme laoshi gaobuhao ne?” (Why could not the mass work in 
Zhangxu be developed?), Huaihai bao, 1 September 1944. 
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RESIDENCY COUNCIL—A PLACEBO FOR THE LOCAL GENTRY 
When the NFA and the CCP first entered Jiangsu, they intentionally encouraged 
leftist policies, such as rent-interest reduction, to win over massive support, and more 
importantly, to deconstruct the prestige of local gentry and traditional power 
infrastructure. However, as the last section shows, the misunderstanding of the local 
cadres and the weak link between county and lower administrations demonstrated the 
Party’s inability to contain the over-leftist inclination during mass mobilization. The 
Jiangxi experiences in the early 1930s had taught the CCP leaders a lesson that support 
from peasants alone was far from enough to contest state power with the GMD. The 
decision of the intermediate elements, i.e. petty and national bourgeoisie, rich peasants, 
and small landlords, was of significance for the ultimate victory (Kui-Kwong Shum 1988, 
13-14). Hence, the CCP issued various policies in the name of the United Front to 
appease the traditional elite while attacking their power networks. 
It was in March 1940 that the “three third” principle was proposed within the 
Party and four months later Mao Zedong announced it nationwide. In order to 
institutionally realize the United Front policy and minimize potential opposition, the 
“three third” principle prescribed the compositions of Party’s administrative and 
consultative organs: one third from party members, one third from non-party leftists, and 
the other one third from intermediate elements (Mao Zedong 1940). It was not until the 
April of next year that the Huazhong Bureau began to implement this policy in Jiangsu. 
The first step was to create local residency council (canyihui) as a consultative organ that 
invited local elites’ participation in administrative affairs of the Communist government 
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at all levels. Though claimed to be democratic, the council members were mostly 
assigned or hired by the corresponding government. In the front areas where local gentry 
were influential, the residency council also functioned as a semi-administrative organ 
(Liu Ruilong 1942, 299-300). 
For those landlords who were attacked as the major target of the first round of 
leftist movement upon the NFA’s arrival, the establishment of the local residency council 
served as a timely opportunity for them to regain the lost authority under the Communist 
governance. When the First Residency Council of Tai County commenced, a picture of 
Sun Yat-sen was hung in the meeting hall, which implied the Party’s legitimacy as Sun’s 
heir and weakened its Communist image. Landlords and petty intellectuals, such as local 
middle and elementary school principals, became the major forces that the Party intended 
to win over (Xu Guanbo 1985). At the residency council meeting at county level, local 
gentry thus found a platform to express their opinions and complaints on local issues, 
such as rent-interest reduction, conscription, great production movement, military-
dependent aid program, Grain Tax collection, and so on (Sun Yanfeng and Chen 
Qingquan 1985; Shi Chao 1991). In this sense, the Party considered the “three-third” 
principle and Residency Council as a placebo to alleviate doubts and uncertainty of 
landlords aroused by some ultra-leftist actions of the local cadres.  
More importantly, this institution provided a legitimate channel through which 
party cadres were able to get in touch with powerful local gentry and indoctrinate their 
ideology to them. The first Provisional Residency Council of Yanfu District was held in 
October 1942 when most subordinate counties had established their councils. It thus was 
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able to convene most prestigious gentry of north Jiangsu, such as Pang Youlan, Ji Yuting, 
Wang Jiying, etc., in its presence.14 Before the District Council actually commenced, a 
two-day symposium was held for opinion exchange and mutual understanding between 
the two parties. Pang accused the Peasant Association cadres of their disrespectful 
attitude toward him simply due to his landlord identity. One landlord from Huai’an 
County complained about the ultra-leftist actions in the rent reduction and wage 
increasing movements and further revealed that some peasants even use their raised wage 
and exempted rent to gamble. Some small landlords, who suffered the most in the rent 
reduction movement, took this opportunity to plead for a moderate reduction rate. The 
grain borrowing campaign received the most intensive scrutinies from the gentry. They 
grumbled that the local cadres disregarded peasants’ actual demands and landlords’ 
affordability. Some participants even incisively accused the creation of residency council 
of a puppet that was manipulated by the local government (Yanfu qu canyihui choubei 
qian de yici ge jieceng renshi zuotanhui 1986).  
The participants from the mass associations firmly denied these accusations by 
charging the landlords as the very spark that ignited the ultra-leftist actions. As the 
highest-ranking Party official who participated in the sumposium, Chen Yi wisely evaded 
any judgment over the conflicts between local peasant cadres and gentry, and redirected 
the participants’ focus from mutual accusations to this unprecedented occasion, in which 
the participants from various backgrounds were able to freely express their opinions 
                                                 
14 Pang was over seventy by then and a juren (one who passed the provincial civil service exam and 
qualified for official position) of the Qing dynasty; Ji and Wang were the biggest landlords in Funing 
County. And this Wang Jiying was the one who later was struggled in public for landlord-tenant dispute 
(mentioned in the last section). 
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(Chen Yi 1942b). His citation from Confucian classics and self-calling of “brother” 
(xiongdi) further shortened the psychological distance between him and the present 
gentry, and changed their conventional impressions of Communist cadres as rude and 
illiterate. Gregor Benton’s study on the NFA convincingly demonstrates that Chen Yi’s 
personal charisma is an imperative reason for the success of the United Front policy in 
central China (Benton 1999). 
In his research of the United Front based on north China, Tetsuya Kataoka argues 
that the “three third” principle and the residency council institution functioned differently 
in the Communist base areas and the GMD controlled regions. In the latter the Party 
intentionally promoted its “democratic” image by propagandizing these policies in 
contrast to the GMD’s “dictatorship” while in the base areas the policies pushed land 
revolution to a new stage (Kataoka 1974, 242-244). The situations in Jiangsu were 
convincing to demonstrate that the propagandistic function was widely spread and 
effective also in the Communist bases. However, the most important effect of the 
residency council institution did not reside in the redistribution of land, as Kataoko 
claims, but that of political power. It eradicated the power base of local gentry while 
confining their discontent to a controllable spectrum. It further smoothed the transition 
from the traditional bao-jia system to the Party’s later New Township institution. 
When the residency council institution first took effect in 1941, higher authorities 
and the local government assigned most participating members. Paralleling the Party’s 
deepening penetration, relevant articles that prescribed the electoral process, 
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responsibilities, functions and jurisdiction gradually came to a mature form at local level. 
The Election Articles of the Suzhong Regional Base stipulated: 
The ratio of representatives to residents is about 1 to 60 in town and each 
township residency council should consist of 20-40 representatives; sub-district 
representatives should be elected from the subordinate township representatives 
and the number should be confined to 40-70; the county residency council 
members come from its subordinate sub-district ones and range from 120 to 180 
depending on the population of the county. 
Three to five members (including the president and the deputy of the council) are 
elected to comprise the Standing Committee (changzhu weiyuanhui), taking care 
of routine responsibilities when the county residency council is closed. 
According to the stipulations, the residency council was entitled to: 
1) Elect and dismiss the administrative committee and the president of the same 
level, and council members of the superior ranking;  
2) Discuss, supervise and approve the working reports and plans, policies and 
budget of the administrative organs;  
3) Discuss and implement all the orders and directions of the higher authorities;  
4) Act as surveillance on the administrative organs and staff at the same level; 
5) Supervise and discuss the proposals of the mass associations; 
6) Compose working report to the masses on a regular basis. 
 
Meanwhile, “the township council members were elected every half year, and the sub-
district and county ones once a year.” The regular meeting system stipulated that the 
“township residency council convened routine meetings once a month, sub-district one 
once every two months, and county one once every half year.” Most importantly, the 
Residency Council was responsible for electing an Administrative Committee (zhixing 
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weiyuanhui), the members of whom held official positions in the Communist government 
(Suzhong qu xingzheng weiyuanhui 1943).  
The Administrative Committee was an important organ for the Party to establish 
close coordinative relation with influential gentry and expand its political impact on the 
upper class. However, most targeted gentry evaded positions of the Administrative 
Committee and would rather be elected in the Standing Committee since they intended to 
keep certain distance from the CCP in case the Nationalist government would return to 
power in the future while retaining their influence on the Communist government at the 
same time. As a result, the local administrative committee members were usually middle 
or small landlords and intellectuals who hardly met the Party’s expectation of expanding 
and strengthening its political influence. In this sense, the Residency Council provided a 
suitable platform for the local gentry to find their own ways of maintaining status quo and 
resisting the Communist penetration. 
Although previous studies view the residency council institution as a concession 
to neutral powers, my research on Jiangsu province convinces me that the Party was still 
capable of manipulating the council through internal educations and detailed plans. In the 
instance of the Second Residency Council of Huaihai District held in 1942, there were 
229 participants covering most social classes, among which about 40% (90 members) 
were party members, much higher than the “three third” principle stipulated.15 For this 
                                                 
15 Among them, 25 came from military force, 48 came from landlords and gentry, 15 were merchants, and 
6 came from middle and higher schools. In addition, there were 16 elementary school teachers, 16 
youngsters, 16 women, 16 workers, 40 peasants, and 2 fishermen. Altogether, 29 of them were invited by 
the government. Among the 29 invited, 13 people came from landlords and gentry group (Li Yimang 1942, 
221). 
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violation, the Party reasoned in its working report that some party members’ identities 
were hidden in secret, and thus there was no way to precisely control the percentage in 
the local election (Li Yimang 1942, 221-222). During the meeting, the Party tried to win 
middle and elementary school teachers’ supports through proposals that raised their 
salaries and welfares, significantly higher than their expectations, and promoted social 
and civic education programs. In return, the Party gained their unanimous support on the 
financial and grain proposals, and all the votes in the later election (227). 
When it came to the phase of election, detailed and sophiscated arrangements 
were much more decisive. According to the election rules of Huaihai District, one group 
of party members, one of gentry and merchants, and one of workers, peasants, youth, 
women and students respectively nominated one third of the candidates. Half of them 
would be assigned as Standing or Administrative Committee members through final 
election. To avoid redundant nomination and compose a candidate list that ostensibly 
covered all social groups while actually favoring the CCP, the Party usually proposed its 
list after the gentry group had turned in theirs. Furthermore, to ensure that party members 
would have at least one third of the positions on the two committees, the Party 
deliberately disregarded the number set by the “three third” principle when composing 
the list. They preferred to later resign if the elected party members exceeded the one third 
limit. In addition, since a significant fraction of the workers, peasants, and party members 
were illiterates, the Party would select several leaders among the two groups and the 
members only needed to follow whatever the leaders circled on the votes. Finally, in 
order to maintain its democratic image and cover the traces of manipulation, the Party 
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carefully arranged the distribution of the votes, avoiding concentration on the candidates 
who they supported. Pro-party votes were given to those candidates who were unpopular 
among the gentry but had to be elected in favor of the Party’s penetration. Those who 
might get supports from all three groups received less assistance of such. Or the Party 
focused their votes on the most important three fourths of the candidates and kept the rest 
one fourth unattended (229-231). It thus is safe to conclude that the Party still had enough 
channels to control the Residency Council even if the “three third” principle was 
reinforced. 
To sum up, I have outlined four functions of the residency council institution, 
which contributed to the Party’s penetration in Jiangsu. First of all, it created a platform 
on which the local gentry were willing to communicate and keep a corporative 
relationship with the CCP, and gradually accepted it as a legitimate administration. One 
landlord of Yanfu even bluffed, “Nowadays the county magistrate and I would sit 
together and talk” (Liu Bin 1942, 131). Second, it publicized the Party’s democratic 
image in contrast to the GMD’s dictatorship, and embedded it into people’s minds. One 
landlord in Anle cheerfully stated, “Now [the CCP] implemented democratic [policies], 
and we [landlords] have a share of the ‘three third’ government” (Rao Shushi 1944, 31). 
Third, it restrained the ultra-leftist inclination of the peasant movement and largely 
mitigated the landlords’ panic that otherwise might have harmed the resistance activities 
against Japan. Li Yimang, the Party Committee Deputy of Huaihai District, admitted that 
it was hard to make local peasant cadres follow what they were arranged on the meetings 
in daily operations (Li Yimang 1942, 226). Thus, the residency council to some extent 
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curtailed the peasants’ radical fanaticism by re-offering the local gentry partial power of 
speech in local administration. Last, it undermined the power base of the local gentry in a 
moderate way that they were barely aware of. Their authority in local society no longer 
relied on their wealth, prestige, or coordinative function between the government and the 
masses, but on the patronage of the Party. It thus was reasonable to find that Wang Jiying, 
the former Deputy of the County Residency Council in 1942, was struggled in public for 
landlord-tenants disputes in 1944. 
EXTENDING CONNECTION IN THE SECRET SOCIETIES: PAROCHIAL MOBILIZATION  
Perry observes that a stable and solidary community spontaneously formed local 
protective force in the form of militia, guild or secret society when encountering 
instabilities and outside invasions in Huaibei plain. Such local power sometimes served 
as mediation between the state and the society to sustain a power balance (Perry 1980, 
80-94). This observation was equally valid when applied to the wartime Jiangsu. The 
existence of secret societies, for local security or business conveniences, was quite 
pervasive upon the CCP’s arrival. To take Huaihai District as an example, almost all the 
counties had Big Sword Association (dadao hui), whose members ranged from 300 to 
1,000 people. In a sum, there were about 4,000 people currently engaging in secret 
societies (Jin Ming 1942, 164). This was just the number of the registered members, not 
including the disciples they recruited. Besides Big Sword Association, popular religious 
associations, such as yiguan dao and xiantian dao, were also a powerful force which had 
at least hundreds of members in one county (Zhang Weicheng 1945). They consisted of 
the third kind of social force that the Party had to face during their penetration.  
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Although China had entered its third decade of the Republic, traditional values 
and daily rituals did not change as rapidly as political institutions. Confucian thoughts 
that embraced the ideas of loyalty (zhong) and righteousness (yi) was still deeply 
embedded in people’s minds.16 The local cadres understood that a mechanical transplant 
of Communist ideology would not take effect and they had to rely on their local 
knowledge to gradually transform the society. Hence, they sometimes resorted to 
traditional rituals in the preliminary mobilization even for ordinary peasants. For 
instance, the mass workers of the Taixing-Dongtai-Xinghua area organized a ritual of 
killing chicks and drinking blood wine to reinforce the fraternal connection among the 
members of the mass associations (Liankang diqu dang zuzhi de jianshe he qunzhong 
gongzuo 1988). For quite a long time peasants of Rudong County misunderstood the 
Peasant Resistance Association as the “dragon king association” (longwang hui, a local 
popular gathering) and brought joss sticks each time when attending the meeting (Cui 
Zhengping et al. 1984). 
When the local cadres attempted to approach members of the secret societies, 
their reliance on traditional cultural norms and rituals was even more pervasive. The 
Party generally regarded most secret societies as peasants’ self-defendant associations 
against assaults from the Japanese and bandits. Although local gentry, especially big 
landlords, took the leading role in such forces, the majorities were still ordinary peasants 
                                                 
16 To promot a new culture in accordance with the republican institution, Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu (they both 
were Beijing University faculty then) and other new fashioned intellectuals initiated the May Fourth new 
culture movement from 1919, which severely criticized Confucianism and classical Chinese and 
encouraged using vernacular in favor of popular education. However, the influence of the new culture 
movement was limited to urban areas, especially big cities like Beijing and Shanghai, and hardly touched 
rural regions. 
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who could be persuaded to involve into the Communist movement (Hua Yang 1985; 
Jiang Weiqing 1985). Thus, according to the United Front policy, the local cadres began 
the probing communications with the secret society leaders. They openly affirmed their 
support for the Big Sword Association’s claim of protecting hometown against bandits, 
and encouraged a mutual intelligence exchange. The head of Xiangbei Sub-district 
(central Jiangsu), Yang Ming, took the initiative to make friends with some local secret 
society leaders and helped to recover their organizations. Such friendly gestures earned 
the supports from these local leaders, who opened their monthly meeting to propaganda 
of the Party’s policies and ideologies (Shi Sheng 1983). In addition, the Party kept an 
open mind to the religious conventions and rituals of the secret societies and helped to 
solve their living hardships (Fan Zhengfu 1987b). Meanwhile, the Party also took the 
chance to transform their parochial ideology to nationalist resistance against Japan. Once 
entering the Jiangdu-Gaoyou-Baoying area, the NFA officers paid visits to the leaders of 
Lianzhuang Association and Big Sword Association, reaffirming their welcome if they 
were willing to join the NFA for the resistance cause against Japan. All the different 
ideological claims between the two parties were put aside and only collaboration with 
Japan was firmly prohibited (Jiang Weiqing 1985). 
Another method of penetration was to join local secret societies in a secret or 
open manner and expand Communist influence through recruiting disciples. For instance, 
in the Subei Regional Base, the district committee arranged two mass workers to become 
the disciples of the eldest generation of the Anqing Association, the most powerful local 
secret society, through special social connections. Carrying the double identities of the 
 63 
elder generation secret society leaders and the CCP cadres, they set out for the front areas 
and the Japanese occupied regions to recruit disciples. Many collaborationist town and 
bao heads volunteered to worship them as the master since the master-disciple 
relationship served as a perfect cover for their communications with the CCP (Li Wenda 
1982). Such penetration was so successful that the Party was able to control the middle 
and lower infrastructure of the secret societies. Tens of the biao heads of Xiantiandao 
were party members or activists till 1945 (Bao Houchang and Zhang Zhuoru 1988).17 
To establish the party patronized associations on the basis of local secret society 
customs was the creation of the Party’s United Front work in Jiangsu. The Xinsheng 
Association in the Suzhong Regional Base, the Huzhu Association in the Sunan Regional 
Base and the Zhongyi Association north of the Yangtze River were all of this kind. It was 
regarded as an alternate method of organizing mass associations in the front areas or the 
Japanese occupied regions. Its recruiting objectives included gangsters, hooligans, 
collaborationist military and administrative personnel, landlords and gentry, and the next 
generation of the secret society leaders of the occupied regions (Chen Yutian 1987). In 
those places where the Japanese surveillance was not strict, the Party divided their 
members into groups on the basis of village, assigned one or two group leaders and 
announced secret routine meeting once every one or two months. In order to conform to 
the secret society conventions, the local cadres attended the meetings under the identity 
of “uncle” (yeshu) or “little boss” (xiao laoda) (Wang Yunlong 1983). In the Party’s own 
                                                 
17 Xiantiandao was an influential secret society featured with popular religion in south Jiangsu, and biao 
was its basic unit. 
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secret societies, the mass workers did not have to act in the secret society fashion while 
the recruited members were still forced to behave themselves by the conventional master-
disciple relation of this culture. After being educated and observed for months, some 
activists would be admitted to the Party. 
The policy towards the secret society was accordant with the principle of the 
United Front, i.e. to appeal to various classes and minimize the number of enemies. Its 
most pragmatic purpose was to weaken resistance from the collaborationist forces. 
Thanks to its moderation and flexibility, the Party was able to get intelligence reports 
from the collaborationist town and bao heads who wished to keep options open for their 
future. More importantly, viewing the GMD as its ultimate opponent, the Party regarded 
its communications with the secret societies as an imperative channel to penetrating into 
the social group that its other policies were not able to attend. Thus, the Party was more 
interested in gaining their support by embracing parochialism and traditional secret 
society culture instead of actually converting them to communism.  
When infiltrating inside Xiantiandao, the mass workers merely proposed 
“protecting villages, making peace, and fighting the Japs and bandits” as a slogan, which 
fit the concept of parochial protection (Bao Houchang and Zhang Zhuoru 1988). When 
establishing its own secret associations, the Party complied to the ritual of drinking blood 
wine and the pledge words were to “share happiness, hardship and disasters; unite 
together to fight the Japanese; [we’d rather] be killed than retreat; [we’d rather] die than 
be slaved” (Zou Shiyu 1985). Although the CCP compromised its ideological 
embracement with peasant popular culture, such a culture actually helped to explain its 
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legitimacy to the ordinary society members. When infiltrating the Small Sword 
Association (xiaodao hui) in Huaibao (north Jiangsu), the mass workers set up a scene, in 
which a pro-party member pretended to be possessed by god, predicting that Zhu (De) 
and Mao (Zedong) would take over the sovereign and asked others to look to the 
farmland for sacred signs.18 When other members flocked into the pre-arranged place, 
they found pig hair all over, which had already been buried in the land beforehand (Hua 
Yang 1985). This was a typical plot that appeared almost every time when a new dynasty 
came to power in the urban legends and it still worked for the CCP among peasants. 
The Party’s tolerance of traditional popular culture and reliance on parochialism 
reflected its flexibility and pragmatism in competing popular support with the GMD and 
the Japanese. In the Suzhong Regional Base, however, this spirit of flexibility and 
pragmatism was over-emphasized to an inclination of equaling secret society work to 
ordinary mass works, which to some extent resulted in a reverse course of infiltration 
from the secret society to the Party (Chen Pixian 1942, 121). Such intertwined infiltration 
was not a single incident in Jiangsu. Joseph Esherick observes the similar problem that 
the local party branch suffered from the influence of Gelaohui in his study on Gulin 
County in Shan-Gan-Ning Boarder Region. His data shows that 64 of 115 Gelaohui 
members were party members and there were 34 persons who actually joined Gelaohui 
after they had become party members (Esherick 1994). Thus, the Party had to face the 
side effect of its pragmatism that won it expanded influence at the same time—the 
uncertainty of the quality of the recruited, their unsure ideological inclination and unclear 
                                                 
18 Pig has the same pronunciation as the surname of Zhu De, and hair as that of Mao Zedong. 
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identification toward the Party. How to solve the dilemma of rapid development and 
uncontrollable quality of the recruits remained to be a major issue for the CCP during the 
War. 
BACK TO POLITICS: THE NEW TOWNSHIP RENOVATION 
In order to prevent intensive resistance from local gentry for the Communist 
penetration, the CCP advised its mass workers to confine mobilization to the economic 
realm and avoid direct attack on the local gentry’s political power basis when they first 
arrived in Jiangsu in 1939. Due to limited sources of qualified cadres and lack of control 
over local communities, the Party was only able to found its own administrative organs at 
district and county levels and had to rely on the heads of bao and jia hired by the 
Nationalist government for routine administration below the township level. Not 
surprisingly, quite a few of these people took a wait-and-see attitude towards the 
Communist government. The rent and interest reduction, the great production campaign, 
the grain tax collection and other party policies and movements thereby faced more 
resistance at lower levels. However, with the pervasive establishment of various mass 
associations and the moderate “three third” principle that united non-party resistance 
powers, the CCP gradually managed to weaken the power basis of the local gentry 
through economic methods. Now the existing political institution had become the rein 
that contained further development of the CCP and therefore, had to be renovated to 
facilitate its deepened penetration. Meanwhile, various Communist movements had 
nurtured plenty of activists who were ready to replace the traditional local gentry to take 
charge in the Communist offices. Hence, the two problems that the Party faced in earlier 
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period were no longer obstacles, and it was time to shift the focus back to the political 
arena. 
In the middle of 1943, four years after the NFA entered Jiangsu Province, the 
Party announced the program of New Township Renovation (Xinxiang zhi). The program 
prescribed three sets of arrangements on the basis of specific local situations: in the 
central areas each sub-district selected a couple of model town to implement a general 
election; in the less stable areas where the prerequisites of democratic election were not 
mature enough, the heads of town, bao and jia were directly assigned by the supervior 
county government; in the front areas adjacent to the Japanese sphere, the current heads 
were retained and deputies were appointed by higher authorities for a de facto supervising 
purpose (Zhonggong Suzhong er diwei 1943a). In response to this call, Tai County 
eradicated the traditional bao-jia system within its jurisdictions and finished the 
renovation in more than fifty towns by the end of the year (Zeng Ruqing 1983). In the 
418 towns of the Fourth District of Suzhong Regional Base which suffered the most in 
the Pacification Campaign, 47 town chiefs were replaced by the assigned party members 
and the number of the towns where a new party member deputy was appointed had 
reached 126 by the fall (Liang Lingguang 1983). In the following year, Xinghua County 
Committee requested that 80% of its jurisdictions should accomplish the New Township 
election and the rest 20% should at least form semi-elected administrative offices by fall. 
Eventually, 48 of the 59 towns in Xinghua conducted township election, six praticed 
semi-election and only five town administrative offices remained unchanged (Zhonggong 
xinghua xianwei 1944b, 36-37). To further its stringent control over families and even 
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individuals, from 1945 the Party began to divide big sub-district and towns (over 5,000 
residents) into small ones in the areas where local cadres were suitable in both quality and 
quantity, and prescribed each administrative village of 600-800 residents, in which the 
distance between each natural villages should be within two li (Zou Ping 1945d). 
The nature of the New Township Renovation was a power struggle between the 
traditional local elites and the peasant activists patronized by the Party. To smooth the 
power transition in a reasonable manner and maintain its public democratic image, the 
Party ignited anti-corruption campaign that focused on the persons who it intended to 
expell. Some bao or jia heads who used to embezzle a considerable amount of Grain Tax 
or public funds ran away to the Japanese or GMD spheres once the Party announced the 
initiative of anti-corruption. For those who did not have serious trace of embezzlement 
but still were subject to replacement, the Party created a public opinion that accused them 
of malfeasance. Then a meeting of local gentry and party cadres was summoned to 
enhance the significance of the township administration for the resistance cause, which 
indirectly forced the targeted person to resign (Zhonggong wunan xianwei 1945a, 16-17). 
After such preparations, the mobilization of the township election began. 
The first step was to establish the township election committee (xiangxuan 
weiyuanhui), which was elected by the representatives from local administrative offices, 
mass resistance associations, militias, and gentry and landlords. Usually the elected 
committee members covered all active organs engaging in local affairs and all social 
classes. For instance, in the nine committee members of Anle, three came from the local 
administrative office, two from the Peasant Association, and the rest four from the 
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Worker Association, the Woman association, the Grain Tax committee and the local 
gentry (Rao Shushi 1944, 123-124). When it came to the class background, members 
from the landlords and rich peasants usually did not exceed two if we consider nine to ten 
people as the average size of a committee (in the case of Anle, only one). As far as the 
political inclination was concerned, half of the committee members originated from the 
mass associations and at least one third from the administrative office. Neither complied 
to the “three third” principle. In this sense, it is safe to conclude that the New Township 
Renovation was a much more aggressive step that implied the Party’s ambition for a 
revolution on the local political institution. 
The next came the registration of citizenship, which provided the Party with a 
legitimate channel to collect personal informations of local residents and a perfect arena 
to demonstrate its authority as the state vis-à-vis the society. It was stipulated that “all 
residents who were over eighteen years old were qualified for citizenship regardless of 
religion, party, sex, and property except for those who were mentally disordered, 
deprived of citizenship for crimes, and kept connection with the collaborators and 
Japanese” (Rao Shushi 1944, 124). Based on the stipulation, resident meetings (cunmin 
dahui) were held to discuss the qualification of each individual and registered the 
qualified ones on site. There were basically two ways to organize the resident meetings: 
on the basis of natural village, which was convenient to inclusively collect public 
opinions; or in the form of citizen group, which was suitable for a detailed discussion on 
each resident in small scale (Yanfu qu xingzheng gongshu 1942). To increase people’s 
attendance of the resident meetings, the local cadres of Wanyin Town (Dongtai County, 
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central Jiangsu) prescribed that people who participated in the registration would be 
issued a citizen identification card, and those without the identification card would be 
deprived of the right to travel and had to stay in their hometown (Xiangxuan gongzuo 
chubu yanjiu 1943, 18-19). 
The resident meeting focused on deciding the qualification of citizenship of each 
village. In order to extend the propagandistic effect, the election committee prepared 
three types of posters to make red, yellow and white billboards, on which the names of 
the citizens, non-citizen for younger than eighteen years old, and those deprived of 
citizenship would be written correspondingly during the meeting. To prevent rush 
judgment on borderline persons and strive for the widest support to the renovation, some 
county committees, such as Rudong (central Jiangsu), added a green billboard that 
differentiated the people who had conducted minor crimes but did not endanger the 
resistance activities from those on the white billboards. These people were given another 
opportunity of regaining their citizenship if they behaved properly in the future. In 
addition, a dark red billboard was created to promote those who actively participated in 
the mass movements and behaved bravely in the resistance activities in the Japanese 
pacification areas (Xiangxuan gongzuo chubu yanjiu 1943, 20-21, 24-25; Rao Shushi 
1944, 124-126). The billboards were posted in public after the resident meetings in 
villages for second opinions and impeachment. The portion of citizens to the whole 
population was kept at 70% to 80% to minimize aversion and guarantee advantage in 
favor of the peasant activists at the same time. 
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The billboard display took advantage of ordinary peasants’ conventional care of 
face (mianzi) and psychological characteristics of timidity and circumspection to 
reinforce the authority of the Party. The discussion of individual qualification in a public 
gathering created an environment of surveillance, which encouraged mutual 
impeachment and created a sense of insecurity among the participants. Such insecurity 
could not be released unless one was able to assure his reliance on the authority, i.e. the 
CCP, through his pledge of compliance. In such a public setting, mutual support among 
family members, kins or community peers was of no use to alleviate the anxiety of public 
humiliation but only unconditional loyalty to the Party worked. Therefore, in Dianfa 
(central Jiangsu) one ordinary peasant waited an entire night to make sure that his omitted 
name was added in the red billboard in the same brush pen handwriting as others; one 
small landlord went to the township office to express his penitence once his name was 
written on the white billboard (Rao Shushi 1944, 125-126). 
Once the citizen list was confirmed, each town should decide on the 
representatives who would, on behalf of the whole town, elect the town chief and the 
administrative committee.19 First, the election committee summoned the meetings of the 
administrative office, mass associations and local party members to compose a candidate 
list of the representatives. This list was discussed on the basis of natural village, got 
approval from the corresponding villager meetings, and then was exhibited on the major 
roads of the village for second opinions. The candidates were usually twice as many as 
                                                 
19 The candidates of the town chief and the administrative committee should be nominated by the 
residency council of the corresponding level (See discussion about the residency council). I make this 
estimation according to the election articles, working reports and memoirs. This point is not clearly stated 
in the cited references. 
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the finally elected members. Finally the town citizen meeting (xiangmin dahui) elected 
the representatives from the list. 
The result of the representative election demonstrated the Party’s overwhelming 
victory over the traditional local elites. As far as the candidates’ backgrounds were 
concerned, in the 73 candidates of Anle, 36 came from the administrative offices, 22 from 
the Peasant Association, 5 from the Women Association, 2 from the Worker Association, 
5 from local militia and 3 from landlord and gentry. Among the 81 candidates of Dianfa, 
only two were from the landlords and gentry (Rao Shushi 1944, 126). Compared with the 
composition of the election committee, the percentage of landlords and gentry 
significantly decreased from 15% to 2-4%. Such a decrease almost eradicated the 
landlords’ chance of being elected as the town chief or the committee members, and 
deprived them of the chance to materialize, or even express, their interests in the new 
government. 
Certainly, comprehensive control over the local government did not mean to the 
annulment of the United Front policy. After all, the Party was in urgent need of munitions 
and fiscal supplies from the local gentry. Hence, in the final twenty-eight representatives 
of Anle, there were two workers, two poor peasants, twelve middle peasants, ten rich 
peasants and two landlords. The survival ratio of the landlords and gentry was two thirds, 
much higher than those of other groups (Rao Shushi 1944, 128-129). One can find that 
the majority of the representatives came from the middle and rich peasants, who 
composed the majority of the population in local communities. Such overwhelming 
proportion of rich and middle peasants continued in the elected administrative committee, 
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which was composed of three rich peasants, two middle peasants, one poor peasant and 
one middle landlord (130). One fact worth mentioning was that all three rich peasants 
recently upgraded from middle peasants. In this sense, this composition was in 
accordance with the social reality, and thus, strengthened the Party’s democratic image in 
public opinions. Meanwhile, these two groups were also the ones who benefited the most 
from the Party’s wartime policies, and thereby, were most willing to cooperate with the 
Party on the election and local administrative affairs to maintain their advantageous 
status. 
A technically democratic election did not prevent the Party from manipulating its 
existing resources to keep the course of the election under control. First of all, general 
elections were only held in the central areas where the Party had established firm control 
through the mass associations. For those places where the election results could not be 
guaranteed, the Party simply assigned the preferred cadre or promoted a deputy to check 
the chief’s jurisdiction. After all, the ultimate goal of the New Township Renovation was 
to replace the unfavorable officials with party members or peasant activists and 
substantially control lower-level administrations. Second, the local mass associations held 
a series of member meetings to reinforce the significance of electing the masses’ own 
leaders. Slogans, such as “democracy, democracy, the masses in charge”, “if one wants 
fairness, officers have to come from the masses”, “bao-jia system was not democratic, 
and the masses have suffered so much from it”, and so on were posted on the walls of the 
central public spaces (Xiangxuan gongzuo chubu yanjiu 1943, 13). In addition, except for 
the activists of the mass associations, the local cadres also set their focuses on those who 
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held complaints towards the current town chiefs or had been refused for help by them. 
Meanwhile the party branch sponsored its favored candidates for election campaigns and 
helped them prepare speeches. To confine such manipulation to an acceptable limit, the 
party branch was ordered to only secure the control over several key positions. However, 
overt deployment was not rare in the local elections. In the election of Xiaohai Sub-
district (Taibei County, central Jiangsu), once the Party nominated candidates came to the 
stage, the arranged masses chanted slogans, hit drums, flocked to give him red and green 
paper flowers and carried him around the stage. Such ceremonial reactions convinced 
other candidates that the result has already been set up in advance and the election was 
merely a puppet play controlled by the Party. In a town of Taibei-Dongtai area (central 
Jiangsu), the party branch refused to end its subordinate village meeting until its preferred 
candidate was eventually elected as the village head (37-41). All these farces resulted 
from the absurd understanding of democracy by the local cadres. On the one hand, their 
low education level and traditional conception of the official-subject relationship 
determined their superficial perception of “democracy”. On the other hand, the systematic 
discordance between the Party’s public democratic image and its internal authoritarian 
institution further confused its local agents. 
Faced with the Party’s aggressive attacks for political power, the landlords and 
gentry sought ways to resist. First, they tried to achieve consensus within people of the 
same social status and chose suitable candidates to represent their class interests. For 
instance, the electoral slogan of the Rudong gentry candidate was “if the peasant 
association cadre becomes the town chief, we could not live; if the poor becomes the 
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town chief, [private] property would be shared in future”. In addition, they endeavored to 
draw supports from the intermediate power. They asserted, “If the mass cadres are 
elected, people will have to turn in more Grain Tax”. Taking advantage of peasants’ 
conventional conception of mianzi, they further joked about the low education level of 
the peasant candidates, “How shameful to elect an illiterate to be the town chief”. 
Certainly they would not forget to borrow authority from the Chongqing Nationalist 
government, “the NFA will leave soon, and the Central Army is coming back” (33). In 
addition, the landlords also tried to create a stir during the public gatherings. In Huai’an 
County (north Jiangsu), one landlord from Zhaoshe village, Zhang, arranged his 
followers to make speeches against the peasant cadres during the villager meetings, 
nominated his candidates against the Peasant Association, and argued for the voting 
procedures. When the presider blamed them for making noises, they accused him of 
dictatorship in return. In Zhangdun Village, the candidate patronized by the landlords 
successfully won the most votes since the Party’s candidate was attacked for illiteracy. In 
Wangyanshe Village, when their preferred candidates lost in the election, the landlords 
and their followers instigated villagers to demonstrate their dissatisfaction by leaving 
immediately (Zou Ping, 1945d, 80-81). These actions revealed the deeply embedded 
political influence of the gentry class in local communities and the uncertainty towards 
the Communist authorities hovering in ordinary people’s mind. 
The response of ordinary peasants to the New Township Renovation varied as 
well. Generally speaking, they were supportive of the idea that they were entitled to 
select their own village heads. However, their understanding about “democracy” was 
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quite superficial and absurd. What cheered them the most was not the rights they enjoyed 
as citizens, but the possible upward social mobility that had been prohibited for their lack 
of education and wealth. Since some local cadres arbitrarily highlighted the connection 
between citizenship and travel passports to improve attendance of village meetings, most 
ordinary peasants simply equated citizen rights to that of free travel. In addition, the 
upward social status of the mass association cadres unconsciously created a coersive 
tendancy and they barely kept a democratic image. One middle peasant complained about 
the local Women Resistance Association, “[The association cadres] expressed [negative] 
opinions [on you] once they disagreed with you on one word; you had to be present if the 
women association head, Yang, called for a meeting; [our] citizen right would be 
deprived of otherwise” (81). A considerable portion of peasants were unaware of the 
power struggle between the Party and the local gentry behind the New Township 
Renovation. They either did not understand the difference between an elected or assigned 
village/town head—“the new government is doing well, why do we need to elect a new 
town chief”; or showed indifference towards the election—“I will vote for whoever I am 
asked to” (Zouping 1945d, 82-83; Rao Shushi 1944, 131). Some simply conceptualized 
“democracy” as absolute freedom by which they were entitled to do whatever they liked. 
For instance, they did not have to perform corvee service when the local cadres required 
them to. 
The New Township Renovation was launched in Jiangsu in the middle of 1943 
when the Communist movement had entered a mature phase and the Party had won 
considerable support from peasants. Its purpose was to challenge the existing political 
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institution that had contained the Party’s further penetration. Therefore, the renovation 
was at first a power struggle that intended to deconstruct the political authority of the 
local gentry and landlords, and replace them with the Party personnel. To realize this 
target, the traditional compliance to the local elite in ordinary peasants’ mindsets had to 
be thoroughly eradicated. In this sense, the renovation was also an ideological struggle 
that was aimed at “feudalist thoughts of hierarchy, prerogatives, bureaucracy, and 
paternalism” (Xiangxuan gongzuo chubu yanjiu 1943, 69). If we translate these party 
jargons into understandable language, the Party’s intention was to break peasants’ 
consistent dread that stemmed from the long-lasting partial status vis-à-vis the landlords 
and terminate their dominant standing under its leadership. Hence, when the Party 
promoted “democracy” in the movement, we should not conceptualize it as a contract 
between people and the represented government, but a convenience that could convince 
the masses of the feasibility of revolution. The extrinsic claim of “democracy” and the 
intrinsic authoritarian institution created the first conflict between rhetorics and realities. 
Meanwhile, the wartime situations forced the Party to downgrade its revolution to 
renovation, which was “to weaken not eliminate the feudal power, to deconstruct the 
landlords’ dictatorship but not yet to establish peasant-worker’s… to destroy the bao-jia 
system not insist on democracy, to appeal to the enlightened gentlemen to participate but 
not guarantee the absolute advantage of party members in the government” (69-75). 
These moderate guidelines restricted the radical actions against the landlords and gentry, 
and thus, created another rhetoric-reality conflict in the movement. Although they were 
clear about the goal of the renovation, the local cadres were confused by these conflicts 
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and had to rely on their conventional understandings of official-subject relationship, 
which further reinforced the authoritarian inclination in their routine works. Therefore, in 
terms of the result, the Party generally accomplished the replacement of landlords’ agents 
at the basic administrative level. However, conceptualizing the renovation as a pure 
power struggle, most local cadres, even party members, hardly could tell the differences 
between them and their predecessors. The discrepancy between the theoretical guidance 
and pragmatic goals actually created most of the problems in the Communist movement 
in Jiangsu. 
THE PUZZLE OF THE TRIANGLE RELATIONSHIP: THE GOVERNMENT, THE PARTY AND 
THE MASS ASSOCIATIONS 
As the key for local penetration, the mass resistance associations played a 
significant role in connecting ordinary peasants with the Party, and developing activists, 
local cadres and party members. In the ideal relationship between the government and the 
mass associations, the latter should be the firmest social reliance for the former. They 
should be the most activist participant to the government and make themselves the 
biggest personnel resources for the local administration. Meanwhile the mass associations 
should also be the surveillance power for the government, and criticize and impeach 
against the disqualified and corrupted officials. At the same time, the government should 
respect the jurisdiction of the mass associations and protect their activities instead of 
regarding them as its extended organs, subordinate to its management. In addition, it 
should value the criticisms and suggestions from the mass associations and adjust its 
working plan accordingly (Rao Shushi 1942, 53-55). As far as the ideal party-mass-
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association relationship was concerned, the party members should become the leaders 
and vanguards of the mass associations relying on “their correct policies and guidances, 
unyielding faith on revolution, fearlessness towards hardships and the unbreakable 
struggling spirit” (58-59). However, the status of the mass associations was far more 
confusing and awkward vis-à-vis the government and the Party in reality. 
Theoretically, the mass associations were localized autonomous organs 
independent from either the government or the Party. Nevertheless, even the most 
influential peasant association could not afford independence, not to mention the smaller 
ones. First of all, although the mass associations charged a membership fee, this sort of 
revenue was far from enough to sustain routine activities due to the limited amount per 
person. The membership fee had to be kept at a low rate to encourage massive 
participation. After all, the mass associations were not really as voluntary as they claimed 
to be. Hence, they largely relied on financial allocation from the local government, and 
became de facto subordinate organs. Second, none of the mass associations could afford 
separated offices for routine works. To take the Peasant Resistance Association of the 
Route East area as an instance, the presidents and syndics (lishi) of the township level 
hardly had offices in town. At the sub-district and higher levels, there was only a joint 
office of the various resistance associations. However, the persons sitting there were not 
cadres from the associations but the party cadres in charge of the mass association affairs. 
In addition, the office had guards standing in front of the entrance (Rao Shushi 1942, 87-
88). Therefore, the joint office was a de facto party branch. How could an association 
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without financial resource or physical office maintain its autonomy either in people’s 
minds or in reality? 
The overlap among the Party, the government, and the mass associations was 
even more pervasive as far as personnel and responsibilities were concerned. Since the 
peasant resistance association was to some extent the Party’s local agent in charge of the 
mobilization of mass movements and recruitments, its cadres were usually also party 
members. This resulted in an invasive personnel overlapping: in a considerable amount of 
the township peasant associations, their councils equaled to the same level party 
branches, and the council presidents were usually the branch secretaries (zhishu) (Cai 
Yun and Zhu Shida 1984; Luxibei tewei 1941; Rao Shushi 1944, 68-69). The personnel 
overlapping further caused the confusion of the jurisdiction and responsibilities of the 
three parts. For instance, in the Route East area, the government staff shouldered the 
responsibility of the peasant association cadres to mobilize for rent reduction while the 
peasant association cadres represented the government to collect the Grain Tax (Rao 
Shushi 1942, 96-97). As a result, neither was able to concentrate on their major 
responsibilities. In Nantong County, the party branch within the government took full 
charge of all the administrative affairs while the Taidong County government 
implemented all its policies through party branch meetings and neglected the Party’s 
comprehensive leading role in policy making. The government completely lost its 
independence in administrative operations to the county party committee, which made the 
county chief feel inferiority in daily works and highly constrained his initiatives. There 
was also another extreme instance in Qihai County where the government took full 
 81 
charge and kept the county party committee as a puppet (Zhonggong suzhong qu dangwei 
1942d, 170). 
Such confusions and overlappings of responsibilities among the three parts 
blurred the understandings towards them in the minds of party members as well as 
ordinary people. The mass associations regarded themselves as another form of the Party 
and set a set of similarly strict recruitment procedures. For instance, one peasant resistant 
association stipulated that one had to have two referees and pass investigation before 
getting membership in the Route East area. Some even required an observation period 
(yubei qi) before officially admitted one. Such complex procedures departed from the 
Party’s original goals to establish mass associations, which were aimed at incorporating 
ordinary peasants into the Party’s framework and nurturing their identification toward the 
Party. Consequently, such restrict procedures discouraged mass participation (Rao Shushi 
1942, 80-81). In the minds of ordinary peasants, the authority of the peasant association 
was much higher than the government and the Party since it led most mass movements, 
such as the grain borrowing, the rent-interest reduction and the great production, which 
provided the most pragmatic benefits on their lives. The president of the Peasant 
Association in Anle was engaged in daily administrative affairs and held unrestrained 
jurisdiction. Once a peasant was expelled from the peasant association, he told his fellow 
peasants that he was scared to death, much more scared than the time when the landlord 
threatened to withdraw his rented land (Rao Shushi 1944, 99-100). The peasants’ dread 
was no different from the one they had held towards the landlord class. In this sense, the 
increasing authority that the peasant association enjoyed was merely a power transition 
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from one to another; and the ordinary people were incapable of conceptualizing the 
different roles of the Party, the government or the mass associations. 
In places where there was a relatively clear borderline between the three parts, the 
party members’ arbitrary order towards the peasant cadres became a pervasive issue that 
deterred massive participation, especially the landlords and gentry, in the administration. 
The government and mass associations were degraded to dependent organs only in charge 
of details (Rao Shushi 1942, 55-57; Su Yu 1943b, 143). Some higher-ranking party 
cadres even equated keeping the autonomy of the mass associations to tolerating the 
backward thoughts among peasants, claiming that it would further endanger the NFA’s 
military mobilization and the Communist revolution (Zhonggong ludong qu dangwei 
1941, 119-120). The price the Party had to pay for such arbitrary gestures was the 
decreasing popularity of the local government. For instance, the county chief of Tai 
County, Hui Yuyu, was much more capable of dealing with administrative works than his 
counterpart of Ruxi County, Ji Kaiqiang. However, the Ruxi county government enjoyed 
a much higher popularity and wider recognition among the local people than the Tai 
county government since the former was relatively independent from the local CCP 
branch and its personnel covered most classes including the landlords and gentry, while 
the latter was almost exclusively controlled by party members (Zhonggong suzhong qu 
dangwei 1942d, 165-166). The arbitrary attitude of local party branches sometimes led to 
another extreme that the party members refused to take responsibility for mass work and 
left the mass associations completely unattended. The poor communications between the 
two parts thus created misunderstandings about the implementation of the Party’s 
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policies, or further made the Party lose control over the mass movement (Luxibei tewei 
1941, 4-5). The ultra-leftist inclination in the rent reduction and grain borrowing 
movements usually resulted from this problem. 
The ultimate reason that caused puzzle of the triangle relationship resided in the 
shortage of qualified cadres, which revealed the unsolvable conflict between the Party’s 
rapid penetration into local communities and the affordable personnel resources that 
could sustain and consolidate such development. The Party had to wisely allocate its core 
cadres into localities and relied on their leading roles in exploring potential local cadre 
resources. As a result, there was always a clear borderline in the cadre echelon of each 
place between the locals and the outsiders.  
In order to achieve pervasive control over local communities, the Party had to 
sacrifice quality for quantity in the earlier period. Its endorsed ideology and the status as 
an opposition party determined that the CCP’s major target had to be the suppressed 
peasants, most of whom were illiterates or with little education. Therefore, corruption, 
dereliction, absurd knowledge of the Communist movement, oscillating stance, parochial 
and conservative inclinations were pervasive among local cadres. However, they also had 
their irreplaceable advantages compared with the outside cadres, on which the Party had 
to depend for further development. First, as indigenes who were familiar with native 
comprehensive circumstances, the local cadres knew the best way to incorporate the 
abstract policies into concrete indigenous rituals, customs and conventions to win the 
most popularity among their fellows, and thereby would also be easily recognized as the 
convincing leaders in their communities. Second, their native social networks largely 
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facilitated the Party’s interference with daily operations of local society. Their local 
identities also served as perfect camouflage against the Japanese mopping-up and 
pacification campaigns. Therefore, the CCP had to rely on them as the agents to 
materialize its control over local society, especially below the township level. As such, 
the local cadres became a considerable strength that was able to counter the outside 
cadres when disagreement occurred.  
Although special attention was paid to their reeducation within the Party, the 
working capacity of the local cadres varied significantly, compared with the relatively 
high quality of the outside cadres who were marked by their standard mandarin, well 
education, discipline, and firm faiths. Such a distinction of the two groups developed the 
psychological advantage of the outside cadres vis-à-vis the local ones. It also encouraged 
the more capable ones to take full charge of local affairs under the Party’s pragmatic 
working style, which emphasized concrete results of development, such as the number of 
the party members, mass associations, draftees and deducted rent, and neglected the 
corresponding jurisdictions of the Party, the government and the mass associations. This 
phenomenon reflected the inconsistency between the CCP’s democratic claims in rhetoric 
and the authoritarian characteristics in reality. The puzzle of the triangle relationship was 
the intensive explosion of this issue. Although the Party promoted its democratic 
institutions, a new downward hierarchical sequence of outside cadres, local cadres, and 
the masses was gradually formed in local communities. Lacking enough knowledge to 
conceptualize democracy and confused by the Party’s claims and deeds, the local cadres 
 85 
and the masses had to resort to their conventional wisdoms to understand the official-
mass relation under the Communist governance. 
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Chapter Three Organizing Propaganda 
There is no doubt that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) expertly manipulated 
public opinion to induce support for their struggle against the Nationalists (Guomindang, 
abbreviated as GMD). Before the War of Resistance, the CCP had already taken 
advantage of its status as the opposition party to call for a truce with the Nationalists and 
blame the GMD government for insisting on civil war and making the country vulnerable 
to the Japanese imperialist threat. It successfully organized student and intellectual 
demonstrations against the regime, enabling them to create public condemnation of the 
Nationalist government and establish itself as firm source of public resistance. The 
Party’s progressive image was so influential among students and intellectuals that many 
migrated to Yan’an or other communist base areas in order to participate in the wartime 
resistance against the Japanese. 
A good example of the Party’s expert manipulation was its successful handling of 
the crisis associated with the New Fourth Army Incident in January 1941. 1  The 
Communist attack in the media against the Nationalist government convincingly 
portrayed the Party as an innocent victim that was betrayed by “the elder brother” it had 
deeply trusted. This scenario earned at least sympathy, if not support, among the public. 
                                                 
1 On January 7, 1941, the New Fourth Army (NFA) headquarters and its direct subordinate detachment, 
which were retreating northward in accordance with the agreement between the GMD and the CCP, were 
besieged by 80,000 Nationalist soldiers. The commissar, Xiang Ying, was killed on the battlefield, and the 
commander, Ye Ting, was captured. Only about 2,000 NFA soldiers survived the Nationalist offensive. The 
CCP later charged the GMD of deliberately exterminating the NFA headquarters. Shortly after the incident 
happened, Zhou Enlai, the chief representative of the CCP in Chongqing, published a poem in the New 
China Daily (Xinhua Ribao), which claimed that the NFA and the Commander Ye suffered “unprecedented 
injustice.” This poem related the incident to a popular historical story from the Three Kingdom period 
(220-280), in which the elder son of Cao Cao attempted to kill his brother, who survived by relying on his 
talent. 
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Both the domestic and international press sided almost unanimously with the CCP and 
criticized the GMD and Chiang Kai-shek for sabotaging the anti-Japanese coalition. 
Hardly anyone considered this incident retaliation for the CCP-GMD skirmish a couple 
of months earlier in Huangqiao of Jiangsu Province, in which Chen Yi and his NFA 
drove the provincial governor, Han Deqin, and his Nationalist force out of their power 
base in north Jiangsu (Benton 1999, 511-514). After the New Fourth Army incident, the 
second United Front inevitably slid into a de facto breaking state. On the one hand, the 
Nationalist government stopped ammunition supplies to the Communist troops and 
enacted economic blockades targeting the Communist border regions in the northwest. 
On the other hand, the Party got rid of the restrictive adherence to the United Front that 
had legitimized the Eighth Route Army and the NFA. The NFA and the base areas began 
their unprecedented development north of the Yangtze River and received considerable 
manpower and ammunition support in this area. Although both parties got what they 
wanted from the incident, the CCP obtained moral advantage and public sympathy among 
both ordinary people and the mass media due to its skillful propaganda. 
Historians of the GMD who have investigated the causes of the Nationalist defeat 
on the mainland have been particularly interested in analyzing the propaganda strategies 
of the CCP. In a typical study, historian Jin Dakai attributes the success of the 
Communist propaganda to the clear focus of each developing phase of the Party. Jin 
argues that the CCP cleverly established connections between the Nationalist government 
and foreign intrusions—first western imperialism in the first civil war period (1927-1937) 
and then Japanese during the Resistance War. By equating anti-foreign intrusion to anti-
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Nationalists, the Party further legitimized its opposition. He claimed that the CCP began 
to publicize its democratic image during the postwar period (1946-1949) to win massive 
support (Jin 1954). Blinded by ideological bias, Jin failed to recognize that propaganda 
strategies alone were a far less convincing explanation of why people were persuaded. He 
also neglects to examine how the public received Communist propaganda. 
Although historians of China agree on the Party’s adroit manipulation of 
propaganda and agitation, this topic has received little scholarly attention in studies of the 
Chinese Revolution. John Fitzgerald examines Mao Zedong’s years as the head of the 
Nationalist Propaganda Bureau during the first United Front period (1924-1927) and 
treats him as a master of propaganda and discipline.2 He argues that Mao laid the 
foundation for the propaganda program for the GMD and further established the principle 
of “one party, one leader” for both the Communists and the Nationalists (Fitzgerald 1996, 
214-260). However, Fitzgerald’s emphasis on Mao as a master of propaganda 
overshadowed his other identity in this period as a peasant movement activist, a more 
important role in the development of the Chinese Revolution. This problem reveals a 
possible explanation for the dearth of research on propaganda. Alone, propaganda cannot 
explain the Communist triumph in 1949. Moreover, interested scholars have faced a 
scarcity in primary sources: most local party newspapers, wall posters, and pamphlets 
were lost during the War. Moreover, there was no way to record or take photos of the 
local dramas and yangge that were played for propaganda purpose during the war, and it 
is even more difficult to evaluate the audience’s reception. 
                                                 
2 Mao was head of the Nationalist Propaganda Bureau between 1925-1926. 
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Current research has stopped searching for the singular reason for the Communist 
victory or the Nationalist failure. More and more scholars have begun to consider the 
development of the Chinese Revolution as a complicated and contingent course that was 
highly influenced by several factors, including the local environment and communities, 
revolutionary leadership, economy and international context. In this sense, an 
investigation focusing on the Party’s propaganda activities illuminates the different facets 
of the communist movement. In this chapter, I explore Communist propaganda in base 
areas in wartime Jiangsu. First, I introduce the guidelines and principles of the Party’s 
propaganda strategies and explore how high-ranking leaders conceptualized the 
significance of this issue. Second, I examine various channels, including newspapers and 
mass drama associations, through which local cadres and mass workers created a new 
cultural environment in favor of Communist mass mobilization. Last, I analyze the 
Communist propaganda that targeted collaborating personnel. Based on this investigation, 
I argue the Party’s propaganda was successful not only because of the specific strategies 
for corresponding targets and the improvising ability of responsible cadres, but more 
importantly, because it relied on the Party’s organizational channels, through which 
abstract advantages of a positive public image were converted into concrete 
developments for the Communist movement. 
WHAT IS PROPAGANDA? 
In English, the concept of propaganda comes from the Christian Sacred 
Congregation’s de Propaganda Fide, which was established to persuade men and women 
all over world to believe in Christianity (Robert Jackall 1995). In spite of its original 
 90 
religious implications, propaganda gradually came to be regarded as a frequent method 
employed by modern states to mobilize people, attack opponents and justify political 
projects. Z.A.B Zeman defines “propaganda” as a highly intellectual activity that seeks to 
convince the masses of the virtues and benefits of some policy or organization. The effect 
of such “propaganda” is usually determined by whether specific slogans and strategies 
are successfully integrated into public vocabularies and social requisites (Zeman 1995). 
Psychologist, Harold Lasswell, further outlines several characteristics of successful 
propaganda activity: first of all, it should intensify favorable public opinions to persuade 
neutral attitudes and overshadow opposition; second, it must be made in coordination 
with tangible self-positioning and a comprehensive understanding of the opponent so that 
enough information can be supplied to practitioners to create a responding agenda 
(Harold D. Lasswell 1995). On the basis of a theoretical structure framed by these 
studies, it is reasonable to posit that “propaganda” mobilizes possible social resources to 
create a distorted but attractive ideology for the masses and block the opponent’s 
influence in every aspect of society. 
The negative connotation of “propaganda” in English literature once made me 
hesitate to adopt it to translate the term “xuanchuan,” which is a neutral expression in 
Chinese. Although lacking better options, I eventually decided to stick to this translation, 
I hope to highlight the inclusive meaning of “propaganda” in the Party’s dictionary and 
deemphasize its “distorted” aspects. Actually, the concept of “distortion” itself is 
problematic since it requires a comparative reference that is supposed to be objective 
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reality. However, because reality can never be completely reconstructed in people’s 
narrative, its objectivity remains a relative degree subject to the narrator. 
In the political structure of the CCP, the Department of Propaganda was not 
merely responsible for issues related to media and the press. It was a regular department 
within each administrative level, including the central committee and its branch bureaus 
(such as Huazhong Bureau), regional, provincial, district and county party committees, 
and the political apparatus of both the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army.  
Each propaganda department at the regional or provincial levels had six (or seven) 
subordinated offices: 
1) Propaganda office—responsible for propaganda and instigation outside the 
Party and research on the relevant policies of the Japanese, the collaborationist 
government and the GMD; 
2) Education office—responsible for regular and cadre education inside the Party; 
3) Civil education office—responsible for civil education; 
4) Publication and distribution office—responsible for publications and 
distributions; 
5) Editing and censor committee—responsible for management and censorship; 
6) Culture committee—responsible for cultural activities; 
7) Party newspaper committee (optional) (Zhongyang xuanchuan bu 1940b). 
In the propaganda departments at the district and county levels, the subordinated offices 
were cut down to just two: propaganda and education. The latter was in charge of both 
inner-party and civil education; all other relevant responsibilities fell under the 
jurisdiction of the former (Zhongyang xuanchuan bu 1940b). Zhang Wentian, the 
minister of the Department of Propaganda in the Communist Central government, once 
defined the spectrum of the Communist wartime propaganda as targeting all the activities 
related to people’s minds, such as politics, education, culture and literature (Zhang 
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Wentian 1941). Both the responsibilities of the propaganda departments and Minister 
Zhang’s explanation of the coverage of propaganda indicate that wartime propaganda 
activities aimed not merely at indoctrinating the masses with ideological messages and 
perceptions, but more importantly, sought to induce people to internalize these messages 
and perceptions. Such internalization would gradually revise people’s preexisting 
understanding of their lives, careers, current situations, local communities and the 
ongoing warfare. The ultimate goal was to make people view everything from a 
Communist perspective. 
Technically speaking, the CCP’s propaganda activities were composed of two 
major aspects—to propagandize (xuanchuan) and to instigate (gudong). Xuanchuan 
referred to publicizing revolutionary policies and theories, including “refuting hostile 
policies and theories from opponents, and cultural and educational activities (Zhongyang 
xuanchuan bu 1940b).” In this sense, xuanchuan targeted people with a higher literacy 
level through written methods. Gudong aimed at instigating specific collective emotions, 
such as rage, sympathy, sorrow or hostility, on the masses. The Central Government’s 
Department of Propaganda defined its responsibilities in detail: 
1) To lead and conduct all propaganda and instigation activities outside the Party, 
including those focusing on anti-Japanese and anti-collaborating themes; 
2) To lead and conduct regular party member education and cadre education, 
including different levels of party schools and cadre training classes; 
3) To offer guidance and promote civil education; 
4) To offer directions and promote cultural, entertainment and academic activities; 
5) To lead and organize the publication and distribution of party newspapers and 
to edit, censor and publish various kinds of books, textbooks and other 
propaganda products; 
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6) To keep under surveillance and study the political moves and propaganda 
strategies of the enemy and the alliance, and provide corresponding 
counteractions;3 
7) To influence and direct non-party cultural, educational, propaganda and 
instigation apparatuses and organizations (Zhongyang xuanchuan bu 1940b). 
 
According to the principles of Communist propaganda, xuanchuan and gudong should 
fulfill their own separate tasks while maintaining cohesive consistency. Xuanchuan 
activities offered a small group of people the theoretical explanation of a specific issue in 
order to provide them with a comprehensive understanding of the cause, result, future and 
underlying rules of development. While Communist mass workers usually designed their 
xuanchuan activities in written form, Gudong activities were less about education and 
focused on a much larger audience. Mass workers took advantage of well-known facts or 
events in public speeches and improvisation to agitate the apathetic masses. Gudong laid 
a broader foundation for further xuanchuan, and xuanchuan helped to reinforce the 
favorable public opinions that the previous gudong works had won over (Zhongyang 
xuanchuan bu 1941b). In short, xuanchuan and gudong emphasized the qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of propaganda activities, respectively. 
Although each propaganda activity had a specific theme and purpose, mass 
workers were required to adjust their intonations, speeches, and attitudes to accommodate 
audiences and physical environments. Due to the low literacy level of the majority of the 
population in base areas, most propagandists from the county level or below conducted 
more gudong activities in their daily works. Gudong speeches were characterized by their 
                                                 
3 The document did not specify the “enemy” and the “alliance”. They refer to the Japanese/collaborationist 
and the Nationalists forces respectively. 
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concise language, short length and concrete examples. They often revealed conspiracies 
or the crimes of collaborators, heroic feats of local militia, and achievements under the 
Party leadership. In order to increase the frequency of gudong activities, and thus to 
envelop communities in a Communist cultural environment, mass workers took 
advantage of local institutions and customs. The market days of nearby towns, tea houses, 
guild clubs, and ancestral halls (citang) were regular occasions for Communist 
propaganda. In addition to public speeches, propagandists relied on folk songs, local 
plays, story-telling and etc. to convey their messages (Zhongyang xuanchuan bu 1941d). 
In this sense, propaganda became a part of the daily life of communities as it became 
closely linked to local culture and entertainment. 
In the base areas of Jiangsu, propaganda activities were generally launched 
through the following vehicles. First were conventional print publications. The Sunan 
Regional Base provides an ideal example. The Party established the Jiangnan Press, 
which published a bi-monthly magazine, Jiangnan, a newspaper called Dazhong Bao, a 
professional magazine called Jiaoyu Yanjiu (Education research), and several series of 
books on the constitution and politics. There were also local newspapers at the county 
and subdistrict levels. However, such newspapers usually did not last long for lack of 
manpower, and technical and financial support. Second, local propaganda cadres helped 
to establish a wide-scale wall poster network in each village, which served as a 
supplementary channel to regular prints. Wall posters included news reports, hot topic 
discussions, letters from readers, common knowledge, vocabulary lessons, short novels, 
folk songs, and cartoons. They were usually posted every two or three days and circulated 
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among nearby villages. Third, small libraries and the national salvation rooms (jiuwang 
shi) sponsored by local youth, women’s and children’s resistance associations were set up 
to share cultural resources. These places made newspapers, magazines and books, 
published in the regional bases, available to the masses. They also organized various 
seminars, colloquiums, and lectures where people at different levels of literacy could read 
newspapers or Communist books collectively. Finally, propaganda teams, working teams, 
drama groups, folk music groups and battlefield service groups (zhandi fuwu tuan) 
provided communist entertainment in their local neighborhoods. Places that were suitable 
for public gatherings, such as tea houses, clubs and playgrounds, provided the stages for 
their performances (Wu Baokang 1940). These propaganda activities helped the Party 
create a cultural environment favorable to the development of the Communist movement. 
Their success relied on the combination of the Party’s propaganda methods and the 
organizational channels that helped the community internalize favorable public opinions 
and facilitated further Communist penetration. 
A MASS LINE IN NEWSPAPER PUBLICATION 
Newspaper was conventionally regarded as the primary method of propaganda 
due to its large-scale circulation and easy accessibility to the masses. It no doubt became 
one of the most important propaganda channels in Jiangsu’s base areas. Confined by 
geography and the Japanese military threat, there was no newspaper that could be 
distributed in all the regional bases in the province. Generally speaking, the wartime 
Communist newspapers could be categorized into two types as far as the targeted readers 
were concerned. One was the official newspapers sponsored by party committees at 
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district or higher levels. Yanfu Bao of the Yanfu District, Jiangnan of the East Route, 
Suzhong Bao of the Suzhong Regional Base, and Fuxiao Bao of the Huaibei Regional 
Base were typical of this type.  
These newspapers targeted higher-ranking party cadres and local intellectuals, 
such as elementary and middle school teachers and educated youth. Therefore, articles 
published in these newspapers were at least 1,000 words long, eloquently written and 
logically coherent. These newspapers covered new developments in the ongoing warfare, 
domestic and international politics, important editorials reprinted from party newspapers 
of the Yan’an and other boarder regions, and most importantly, local news. As the 
mouthpiece of the local party committee, these newspapers were responsible for reporting 
ongoing mass movements. Meanwhile, they also served as a platform through which new 
decrees and rules were conveyed to the public. In addition, they provided a discussion 
forum in which party cadres exchanged different or even conflicting views of local 
situations and future plans. These party newspapers perfectly fit the xuanchuan aspect of 
Communist propaganda. However, these papers targeted a very small group that made up 
only a minority of the local population. 
The other type, popular newspapers, targeted at a much larger readership. To 
access semi-literate or illiterate peasants, the propagandists creatively incorporated mass 
line policy into the publication process of the newspapers, which significantly enlarged 
the involvement of the ordinary masses in this conventional propaganda arena. Although 
also funded by local offices, these newspapers had a much larger, mostly amateur, staff. 
The number of popular newspapers was small compared with the official newspapers. 
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Nevertheless, they enjoyed great popularity among the masses. More importantly, the 
popular newspapers functioned as an organizational channel for Communist mobilization. 
The publication and circulation of Yanfu Dazhong exemplifies this function. 
Yanfu Dazhong was established in April 1943 in response to Mao Zedong’s 
famous speech on the colloquium of culture and art in 1942. It was the first popular 
newspaper that regarded the ordinary masses not only as potential readers, but also as 
reporters and writers in Jiangsu as well as in central China. This new strategy 
significantly expanded the coverage of conventional news publications and facilitated the 
mass mobilization of the Communist movement in the Yanfu district. The first proprietor 
of the newspaper office was Wang Lanxi (1912-1996), who was also the deputy of the 
propaganda department of Yanfu District, and the first chief editor was Zhao Pingsheng 
(1903-1990, under the pseudonym as Huang Zemin at the time). Both were experienced 
Communist propagandists, and their personal experiences largely influenced the style of 
Yanfu Dazhong. 
As the proprietor, Wang Lanxi was a sophisticated dealer of cultural propaganda 
activities inside and outside of China. He was born in Lanfeng County in Henan Province 
and attended college in Shanghai in the 1930s. It was during the same period that he 
joined the association of Chinese Left-wing Writers (Zhongguo Zuoyi Zuojia Lianmeng). 
Wang became a CCP member in 1932 and took an active part in organizing the student 
movement in Shanghai afterwards. He was admitted by Waseda University in Japan and 
became an international student in 1934. The new social and scholarly environment did 
not obstruct Wang’s passion for spreading his leftist beliefs. With his classmates, he 
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established a magazine called East Stream (Dongliu) that promoted leftist culture and art, 
and soon after arriving in Tokyo, he organized an alliance of nature scientists. Two years 
later, Wang helped organize the general alliance of the new culture movement 
(xinwenhua yundong zongtongmeng) and became one of its leaders. Meanwhile, he joined 
the World Editing and Translating Press in Tokyo and edited for World Trend (Shijie 
Dongxiang), a magazine that introduced new western thoughts to Chinese students 
overseas in Japan. When the War broke out, he returned to his native place and became 
responsible for propaganda and culture works in the Henan provincial committee of the 
CCP before coming to the Subei Regional base in 1941. Wang had a great deal of 
experience with initiating student movements and mobilizing intellectuals. However, he 
lacked direct knowledge for dealing with ordinary peasants. His status as an outsider with 
a northern accent further hindered his attempts to connect to the masses. Wang’s 
disadvantage was not obvious for the proprietor of an official party newspaper. However, 
for a popular newspaper targeted at the masses, like Yanfu Dazhong, this problem had to 
be fixed. 
The newspaper’s chief editor, Zhao Pingsheng, was as an excellent solution to 
Wang’s disconnection from the masses. Zhang was born to a poor peasant family of 
Yiwu in Zhejiang Province. He was admitted to the First Normal School in the provincial 
capital, Hangzhou, in 1924 and joined the Communist Youth League one year later. 
Zhang officially became a party member when he graduated in 1926 and was sent back to 
Yiwu to establish a secret agent spot for the CCP under the name of the Nationalist party 
branch. After the first United Front broke up in 1927, the Party shifted its mobilizing 
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focus from urban workers to peasants in rural areas. Considering his class background, 
Zhao was appointed head of the Department of Peasant Work in Yiwu and organized 
peasant associations in rural villages. It was from this experience that he got an intimate 
look at peasant life and its problems. Zhao was arrested for mobilizing on behalf of the 
Communist movement three times before the War and eventually lost connection with the 
party branch. By 1942, when he reestablished his affiliation to the Party and was assigned 
to the Subei Regional Base, Zhao had accumulated plenty of experiences communicating 
with peasants. Furthermore, as a native of the Yangtze delta, he was more easily 
identified as an indigen by local peasants, which enabled him to tailor the content of 
Yanfu Dazhong to popular interest. Zhao’s appointment was an ideal addition to Wang’s 
ability to detail nuances in party policies and provide general guidelines of reports. 
Yanfu Dazhong was a 4K four-page newspaper published every three or four days. 
It was mostly distributed in the Yanfu District, but had considerable influence in the 
entire Subei Regional Base. Since the NFA headquarters were located in this district and 
the Japanese mopping-up campaigns were relatively mild in the area, the newspaper 
enjoyed ample financial support, plentiful staff, and a relatively stable target group and 
environment. As its inaugural statement clearly indicated, Yanfu Dazhong mainly 
“reported local news and events in Yanfu District as well as other domestic and 
international political and military developments” in order to make more people aware of 
“the current situations in China and the world and the most up-to-date information on the 
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progress of the anti-mopping-up campaign.”4 As a popular newspaper, it endeavored to 
keep its reports short and easy to understand. In order to appeal to ordinary peasants, 
every two or three issues, it devoted one page to agricultural production tips. Practical 
strategies such as these expanded the readership beyond literate party members and local 
cadres and improved its popularity among the masses. 
The editors tried to enrich the content and expand the coverage of Yanfu 
Dazhong’s reports while keeping a stable framework and establishing a unique style. The 
two pictures below are excerpts from Yanfu Dazhong and roughly depict the arrangement 
of each page. The front page usually covered the most current local news, such as the 
victories of the NFA or militia against the collaborationist forces, and ongoing 
mobilizations. This section was usually composed by professional writers or featured 
shortened versions of longer reports from official newspapers. The second and third 
pages were reserved for short pieces about daily life in rural communities, local events 
and personal reflections. These pieces were not significant enough to be published on the 
front page, but functioned as Communist indoctrination and appealed to the masses. If a  
Illustration 1: Yanfu Dazhong (Source: 1944.5.13, p.1, p.4) 
                                                 
4 On Yanfu Dazhong, April 1943.  
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Illustration 2: Yanfu Dazhong (Source: 1945.11.30, p.2-3) 
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feature section, such as the agricultural production tips, appeared in an issue, it usually 
would have been on these two pages. The fourth page was the entertainment section in 
each issue. It included jokes, lyrics of folk songs, stories, wall poems, cartoons, and 
scripts of local plays. The content of this section provided the information local 
propaganda cadres used to fill in their wall posters, which formed an indirect channel for 
enhancing the accessibility and popularity of Yanfu Dazhong. The newspaper’s layout 
addressed almost all aspects of quotidian rural life and maintained a balance between 
Communist doctrines and popular interests. 
The most important strategy that guaranteed the success of Yanfu Dazhong was its 
adherence to the mass line policy. The editors creatively expanded their staff of reporters 
to include semi-literate local cadres, party members, activists and even ordinary peasants, 
and encouraged them to write down reflections from their daily lives and thoughts in 
informal language. This new form of writing style was named “colloquial writing” 
(xiehua). Although such articles did not have much esthetic value in terms of literature, it 
significantly lowered the entry level of news reporters and facilitated an unprecedented 
increase in mass involvement. Newspaper publication, a highly intellectual activity that 
used to be confined to the elite, was transformed into a mass movement. Newspaper 
reporting was an esteemed occupation that enjoyed considerable prestige in the local 
communities. This image inspired ordinary peasants to pick up a pen and envision writing 
as a channel for prosperity and social mobility. As a result, illiterate people would be 
motivated to attend basic writing training, which would be provided by Communist 
administrators. Moreover, in order to get their words published, peasants had to adopt 
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Communist news report styles, which functioned as a spontaneous indoctrinating process 
that taught a Communist perception of the world and helped the writer to internalize such 
perceptions. This process simultaneously enhanced the writer’s identity as a newspaper 
reporter as well as improved their understanding of Communist ideology. It was much 
like Benedict Anderson’s interpretation of the formation of nationalism: the prosperity of 
print production created an imagined community through the circulation of newspapers, 
magazines and books, in which people shared common interests, values, knowledge and 
identities (Anderson 1991). The entire publication of Yanfu Dazhong, from the 
composition of articles and reports, to the type-setting, distribution, and reception of the 
newspaper, actually created an imagined community for the participants, in which the 
underlying Communist ideology became the common value. In this sense, this newspaper 
not only served as propaganda platform, but also played the role of a transcendental 
organizational apparatus for local Communist movements. 
STAGE PLAY ASSOCIATIONS: ITINERANT PROPAGANDA STAGE 
By the outbreak of the War, stage plays (huaju/wutaiju) had become a major form 
of popular entertainment in urban culture as well as a propaganda channel to convey 
political message. It was especially popular among urban youth and students. When the 
Resistance War broke out in 1937, instability forced numerous schools to dismiss their 
students or relocate to the hinterland to continue recruitment. Losing the opportunity for 
further study and outraged by Japanese atrocities, these students decided to dedicate their 
efforts to the anti-Japanese cause and many participated in the stage play associations for 
resistance propaganda. The Nationalist government encouraged such action. After 1937, 
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it began authorizing local governments to organize these drama associations and send 
them to rural areas to educate the masses about their patriotic duties. Meanwhile, it 
required all the existing drama associations to register at the central government’s Social 
Ministry or the Third Office of the Political Ministry, which were in charge of cultural 
issues. The ministries would then review the participants’ curriculum vitae so that the 
government could screen out Communists or pro-leftists, who might take advantage of 
this opportunity to disseminate Communist or anti-Nationalist ideas. According to the 
GMD’s investigation of cultural activities in 1941, there were altogether 1,013 such 
associations performing in most of China’s territory including, Xinjiang and Tibet 
(Zhongguo di’er lishi dang’an guan 1991).5 The CCP certainly would not give up their 
control over this arena. In fact, stage play associations had become one of the most 
efficient channels of spreading Communist ideology in base areas of Jiangsu. 
Wartime Communist drama associations developed in three stages. The first stage 
paralleled the beginning of the War when the CCP and its New Fourth Army were still 
engaged in expanding their sphere of influence and territories, and therefore, could not 
spare enough manpower to organize drama associations directly. However, thanks to the 
Party’s successful anti-Japanese propaganda, which associated the Party with the 
resistance in the mind of the public and especially among the educated youth, a 
considerable portion of association members were leftists or held pro-Communist 
attitudes. This situation largely facilitated the Party’s later penetration and control. For 
                                                 
5 Although it is not specified in the document, I believe this figure does not include the drama associations 
in the Communist base areas. 
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instance, when the Japanese invaded Jiangsu from Xuzhou in the winter of 1937, the 
principal of Hecun Elementary School (located in Tongshan County, the greater Xuzhou 
area of Jiangsu) organized young teachers and staff to form the “Hecun salvage stage 
play group.” This drama group was composed of eleven male and seven female members 
and mobilized resistance in the border area of Jiangsu, Anhui and Henan (Zhang Qixiu 
1987). In Donghai County (north Jiangsu), local educated youngsters initiated a 
resistance association called “youth salvation group” in the spring of 1938. Their 
activities included teaching resistance theories and songs, posting slogans, and convening 
conferences and military training classes. They received financial support from the local 
Nationalist government. Participants were required to explain their understanding of the 
United Front when registering for the group. Due to its openly Communist inclination, 
the local government dismissed the “youth salvation group.” In response, the core 
members organized the “salvage stage play group” to continue their resistance 
propaganda in the local community (Pan Ying 1985). Although not directly led by the 
Party, these spontaneously developing drama groups showed a clear preference for 
Communist theories. Their considerable influence further enticed the Party to include 
them in its political agenda. 
In the early 1940s, the Party began to take a leading role in organizing stage play 
associations. In the spring of 1939, the NFA entered Jiangsu province and established the 
first base area in Maoshan (south Jiangsu) and set up a drama office under the 
propaganda team of the Susan Special Committee, which was in charge of composing 
drama scripts and arranging public performances. Once the NFA arrived in a newly 
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opened area, the drama office would set up a stage play performance for the local people, 
vividly enumerating the Party’s principles and shortening its psychological distance with 
the masses (Li Jian 1984). At the end of 1940, the NFA launched its East Expedition and 
established the Suzhong Regional Base. At the same time the party branch of Nantong 
County Middle School was assigned to organize a performing team under the guise of 
winter vocation training classes. Activist students responded enthusiastically (Chen Jun 
1993). Finally, the local party recruited about fifty members ranging in age from fourteen 
to nineteen, most of whom were local youth and students. Educated youth from Shanghai 
wished to devote themselves to the Communist resistance cause made up a small portion 
of the group as well (Xu Ke 1993). After Chen Yi and his NFA troops reunited with the 
Eighth Route Army column led by Huang Kecheng in Yancheng (north Jiangsu) in 
October 1940, the NFA established the Subei Regional Base. This military reunion was 
strategically significant because it connected the northern Communist border regions with 
the base areas in central China. During this time, high-ranking leaders paid special 
attention to cultural and artistic activities. For example, the central China branch of 
Luxun Art College was established in February 1941. This college later became a major 
center of human resources for the Subei Cultural Work Group founded in 1942, and other 
official and semi-official, lower level, drama associations. Like other regional bases in 
Jiangsu, these organizations also recruited educated youth from the Yangtze Delta. In the 
following two years, the nine counties of the Yanfu District gradually established their 
own cultural work groups, each of which reached about thirty members (Liu Zexian 
1987b). 
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As part of the third phase in the development of the drama associations, the Party 
paralleled its deep penetration into local communities and people’s daily lives by 
reinforcing the mass line policy through popular entertainment near the end of the War. 
The Party encouraged mass participation in the drama associations and helped peasants to 
found their own centers for local performances in towns and villages. In Baoying County 
(central Jiangsu), the propagandists began to teach folk songs and local operas, which had 
set conventional tunes to new lyrics, to youngsters in winter schools in 1943. These songs 
soon became popular among young people, who spread them to their families and sang 
them in daily life. Under such circumstances, the winter school teachers and 
propagandists selected qualified youngsters who were fond of cultural activities and 
organized them into entertaining groups in Baishu, Lijia, Guhe, Yijia and Qiaotou 
villages. These entertaining groups began regularly performing in festivals, public 
gatherings and even the fields and the streets, and received enthusiastic responses from 
villagers. Later, these groups gradually transformed into larger-scale peasant drama 
associations and began to perform skits that reflected peasants’ daily life and thoughts. 
Youngsters in nearby villages and towns, such as Shuangxi, Lanting, Wanglu, Gaoxia, 
and Guangyang, volunteered to establish their own drama associations in the local 
communities. The party leaders of Shenan Sub-district selected the leaders in the peasant 
drama associations in subordinate towns and formed the county association in 1944. Due 
to its expanding influence and well-received performances, this association was upgraded 
to the county level and renamed “Baoying County Peasant Drama Corps.” The county 
administration assigned some drama activists from other sub-districts to strengthen the 
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corps and established a party branch among its members. Under the supervision of the 
party branch, the drama corps set up a regular schedule for political study and democratic 
colloquiums in which members exchanged their thoughts and conducted self and mutual 
criticism (Cai Jiaju 1987). Through these studies and colloquiums the Party intended to 
reinforce the principle that all propaganda and cultural activities should serve workers, 
peasants, soldiers and the ongoing warfare. 
These drama associations did more than stage plays. In an attempt to ensure good 
local receptions, their performances included various local operas, such as Huai tunes, 
Subei folk tunes, Yangzhou talk shows and etc. Actors and actresses spoke in local 
dialects when performing in communities and in mandarin Chinese for the NFA. The 
plays generally fell into two categories. The first category included works that revised 
classical plays. The Dazhong Drama Corps of Fourth District of Suzhong Regional Base 
revised one traditional Beijing opera play, originally titled “Hitting Drum and Cursing 
Cao Cao (Jigu Ma Cao).” Renamed “Hitting Drum and Cursing Wang Jingwei (Dagu Ma 
Wang),” the new version attacked Wang’s collaborationist government and called for 
people to resist the Japanese. Another popular play, The Heroin (Jinguo Yingxiong), was 
a revised version of a Beijing opera, Hua Mulan.6 The play told a story of a family that 
was patriotic and progressive. The parents were outraged by the Japanese atrocities and 
hoped to contribute to the resistance cause. However, they did not have sons to send to 
the battle against the Japanese. Knowing her parents’ regret, the eldest daughter decided 
                                                 
6 Hua Mulan is a fictional figure in a long poem written in the Southern and Northern Dynasties (420-589). 
It tells a story of a girl who joined the army under her father’s name. 
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to join the army and shoulder the responsibility for defending her country (Shen Qian 
1993). Although all the actors and actresses were amateurs and the lyrics were not as well 
polished as traditional Beijing operas, these plays were still met with enthusiastic 
responses from the audience because they so closely reflected ordinary life. 
The other category of plays consisted of newly composed scripts reflecting the 
status of the Resistance War. “Sorrow of the Blind and Deaf (Mang Ya Hen)” was a play 
that the Dazhong Drama Group of the Sunan Regional Base prepared especially for the 
third anniversary of the “8.13” incident and the establishment of the People’s Self-
defense Team in Changshu County.7 In this play, a family with a blind father, and a deaf 
son and a daughter escape from their hometown during the Japanese invasion. Despite 
extraordinarily miserable life experiences, they survive by singing on the street. Their 
hardships reminded the audience of their own sufferings after the Japanese intrusion. The 
performance always ended with the audiences’ recitation of anti-Japanese slogans (Jiang 
Xu 1984). When the New Fourth Army Incident occurred, the Jiangnan Drama Corps 
immediately produced a dancing play named “Doomsday of the Puppet” (kuilei de mori). 
The play accused the Nationalist government of attempting to collaborate with Japan and 
scheming to annihilate the NFA in Anhui. In the middle of the play, it began to rain. The 
actors took advantage of the weather condition claiming that the sudden rain showed the 
sympathy of the heavenly god towards the unjustly treated NFA. The audience was so 
moved by the play that they stood in the rain until the end of the performance (Jiang Xu 
1984). 
                                                 
7 On August 13, 1937, the Japanese army attacked Shanghai and began its offensive on the Yangtze Delta. 
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The most popular play was “Lay down Your Whip” (Fangxia ni de bianzi), which 
appeared in the catalogue of almost every drama association. In 1931, an elementary 
school teacher, Chen Liting, composed the script to attack the corrupt Nationalist 
government. The story was about two refugees, an old man and his daughter, who are 
driven from their hometown by the oppression of covetous landlords and a tyrannical 
government. To make a living, the old man forces his daughter to perform acrobatics. 
One day, he is outraged by her poor performance and wants to beat her. A younger 
worker stops the old man by shouting “lay down your whip!” Surprisingly, the daughter 
defends her father and attributes their miserable lives to the exploitation of the landlord 
class supported by the corrupt government. The play did not really become a hit among 
the public until Chen revised his script, setting his protagonists’ hometown in Manchuria 
and indirectly shifting the theme from anti-Nationalists to anti-Japanese. The old man and 
his daughter then flee their hometown not because of an oppressive government, but 
because of the brutal Japanese invasion. The confrontation between the two classes—
ordinary peasants and landlords, the oppressed and the oppressors—was converted to that 
between two nations: Japan and China. The play conveyed its thematic message via one 
of the protagonist’s lines: “If we do not unite quickly to defend ourselves against 
Japanese aggression, we will soon meet the same fate as our countrymen in Manchuria 
(Hung Chang-tai 1994, 60).”  
The climax usually occurred at the moment when the old man swung the whip to 
hit his daughter and was stopped by the young worker. Usually, the audience was totally 
outraged by the old man’s brutality. Because this play sometimes was performed on the 
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street, the old man would at times be stopped not only by the young worker, but also by 
angry audience members. The younger worker soon revealed that they were actually 
daughter and father: “Don’t blame him, he is Xiangjie’s (the girl) father. They have run 
away from Manchuria and barely had enough to eat. They cannot live on…” The 
audience was deeply surprised by the relationship between the beater and the beaten, and 
then realized that it was the Japanese intrusion that caused such a distorted relationship. 
As a person remarked after watching the performance of the students of Qiushen Middle 
School (Rudong County, Suzhong regional base), “what if the Japanese occupied our 
town (Gu Bin 1993)!” This was the exact reaction these plays intended to arouse in hopes 
that fear would strengthen their resolution against the Japanese. 
Another important characteristic of the stage play associations’ performances was 
its ability to instantly tailor its plays to the movements and messages the Party planned to 
propagandize in local communities. When rent and interest reduction was launched, plays 
such as “Reducing Rent Anyway” (Zhaojian buwu) and “Fake Reduction” (Mingjian 
anbujian) were continuously performed all over villages and towns. These plays revealed 
the tricks that some landlords played during the movement to evade rent reduction. They 
also served as typical lessons to help local cadres identify similar plots.  In order to 
publicize the benefits of rent reduction, the members of the peasant drama association of 
Baoying County composed new lyrics for the popular folk tune “Oil Peddler” (Baiyou 
lang), which became “Rent Reduction Is Good” (Jianzu hao). It sang： 
I have a word, for you gentlemen; rent reduction is a law, which has to be obeyed; 
you have to know, rent reduction is not merely for tenants; it is for resistance 
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against the Japs, to unite tenants and landlords; [if] tenants are doing well, they 
fight the Japs more bravely; your rent would be guaranteed; you should 
remember, the Two Yellow fleeced a lot; thanks to local militia, we can enjoy the 
peace… (Cai Jiaju 1987)8  
 
During the annual season of conscription, local drama associations performed “Go Join 
the Army” (Qu canjun), “Red Nose Joining the Army” (Hong bizi canjun), “Model 
Father” (Mofan Fuqin) and “Granny Cui Sending Sons for Conscription” (Cui da nainai 
songzi canjun) to encourage young people to join the NFA. The local cadres of the Yanfu 
District admitted that people were easier to mobilize in places where the masses had 
watched such plays. Several youngsters of Xinhe Town, Dong Liangwen and his fellows, 
volunteered to register for conscription on the site where the cultural work group 
performed “Model Father” (Liu Zexian 1987b). 
Drama associations also made efforts to undermine conventional stereotypes of 
women and tried to increase their domestic and social status. Stage performance needed 
both actors and actresses. However, the latter were not easy to recruit. Sometimes actors 
had to play female roles because of the shortage of actresses. Actresses faced criticism 
from both their own families and the local communities. The majority of people 
considered it a disgrace for women to perform under the gaze of male audience members. 
When the Dazhong Drama Corps of Juzhen prepared to put “Female Heroes” on stage, 
they found that the actress, Ji Zhongyin, who played the leading role, had disappeared. It 
was soon discovered that her father had locked her up, refusing to allow her to perform in 
public. Finally, she escaped, rejoined the corps and left her family and hometown. 
                                                 
8 “Two Yellow” was the nick name of the collaborating force in the local communities of Jiangsu. 
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Although the higher authority openly praised Ji for her revolutionary behavior, she never 
obtained her family’s forgiveness (Shen Qian 1993). This was by no means a rare 
incident. In Guanyun County (north Jiangsu), when a local drama association was putting 
on “Angry Shout of an Ancient Town” (Gucheng de nuhou), a woman suddenly cried out 
during the performance. She was the mother of the female actress, Tang Shuhong, on the 
stage, who was playing the role of a middle-age widow who had a son. Tang’s mother 
cried and shouted, “You damned! You have not even married yet and now you let people 
call you ‘Mom’? How disgraceful it is! I am not doing well and you are cursing your 
mom on the stage. Do you want me to die early?” Tang’s neighbors called her “night fox” 
(yehu), a derogatory term for women. Under such circumstances, her father and 
grandfather ordered her to stay at home, but this revolutionary young woman ignored 
their wishes (Tang Mingxia 1984). Criticizing gender discrimination and promoting 
equality, the Subei Cultural Work Group composed a script called “Liu Guiying Is a Big 
Red Flower” and put it on stage in 1944. The protagonist, Liu Guiying, is a female model 
worker and plans to join the local dancing team to take part in Communist cultural 
activities. However, her mother-in-law regards her participation in these activities as a 
humiliation to the family and forbids it. With the help of the local women resistance 
association and other young women in her village, she eventually frees herself from her 
family’s control and joins the dancing team (Liu Zexian 1987b). This play was widely 
influential in the Subei Regional Base and received enthusiastic applauses from young 
people. Nevertheless, the older generation continued their prejudice against women’s 
participation outside the domestic arena. 
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By encouraging amateur participation, these drama associations transformed stage 
plays from a form of urban elitist art into a folk entertainment. According to the registers 
of the official-sponsored drama associations, more than ninety percent of the participants 
did not have professional training before acting in the association’s dramas (Zhongguo 
di’er lishi dang’an guan 1991, 33-146).9  In order to survive in a tough wartime 
environment, stage plays adopted a simpler style of performance that was more accessible 
to the public. First of all, plays were no longer performed in theatres. Instead, actors 
began to perform in teahouses, on festival stages, or even on the street. Actors and their 
audience were no longer separated by the conventional form, in which costumed actors 
and actresses performed on a backlit stage. The intermingling of actors and audience 
created a friendly and intimate atmosphere that permitted actors and playwrights to 
convey their ideas more effectively. This explains why some audience members often 
spontaneously blocked the father’s hand when he wanted to hit his daughter during the 
playing of “Lay down Your Whip.”  
In 1939, a script writer on Rudong’s political works team (later the Suzhong 
Regional Base), Shi Bai, wrote a five-scene drama named “The Growth of the Guerrilla.” 
It told the story of a people’s spontaneous resistance against Japan: the Japanese set up 
Xu Er to make him an opium-smoker and use the continuing supply of opium to 
exchange Xu’s loyalty as head of the local collaborationist association. They further 
threaten to kill Xu’s own daughter, who had dared to offend the Japanese. Under these 
circumstances, Xu agrees to collaborate and he helps the Japanese ruthlessly exploit the 
                                                 
9 This statistics is an estimation based on these registration documents. 
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masses. Meanwhile, during the Japanese atrocities, Grandpa Cao and his family, 
including his thirteen-year-old grandson “little rabbit”, have volunteered to help organize 
a guerrilla force to defend their local community against the Japanese. They set up a trap 
to poison Xu and contact the collaborationist forces’ pro-resistance soldiers for 
intelligence on the Japanese troops’ military maneuvers. Eventually, the guerrillas 
successfully ambush the Japanese, but “little rabbit” dies in the fight. The play ended in 
the masses’ resolution to expand the guerrilla force to revenge “little rabbit.” The vivid 
images of the characters--the brutality of the Japanese, the bravery of “little rabbit” and 
Grandpa Cao’s care for his grandson and resolute resistance--particularly appealed to the 
audience. The team performed in the district and received an overwhelming welcome 
from the local people. They had to consecutively perform the play for almost a week to 
meet the audience’s demands.  
In the first scene, a Japanese military head sexually harassed Xu’s daughter and 
the girl refused him. Consequently, he ordered Xu to shoot his own daughter. Xu 
certainly did not have the heart to kill her, but, since he had received a direct order from 
the Japanese, he could do nothing but tremblingly raise the gun. The scene ended at that 
moment, when the audience could not help shouting “kill the Japs!” and “down with 
Japanese imperialism!” Another climax occurred near the end of the last scene when the 
seriously wounded “little rabbit” murmured “we won…” and his hand slowly slid down 
with an unfinished cookie. Once Grandpa Cao tremblingly fell on little rabbit’s body and 
cried out “my…little…rabbit…,” female audience could not hold back their tears and the 
masses shouted “revenge for little rabbit!” and “fight the Japs to the end (Gu Bin 1993)!” 
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At this moment, there was no line between on and off stage; the audience had internalized 
the writer’s intentions and underlying message. In this sense, the drama associations 
linked propagandists and the masses via the plays, which created a smooth channel 
through which the latter’s emotions could be efficiently manipulated. 
Meanwhile, costumes and stage settings were largely simplified. Actresses put 
white and red color powder on their faces as make-up. When the itinerant propaganda 
group of the First District of Sunan played Zheng Chenggong in the local communities, 
the group members had to use the clothes on the temple statues and adjusted them to fit 
the play’s costumes (Jiang Xu 1984). When the Fuxiao Drama Group was going to 
perform “The Field” (yuanye), a work by the famous playwright Cao Yu, they 
encountered the difficulty of reconstructing a running train scene. After numerous 
experiments and consultations with the masses, they moved several strips of discarded 
railway onto the stage and wrapped them with earth colored cloth. Then, covering the 
railway with dirt, they successfully recreated the image of a railway for the audience. 
They were also able to imitate the sound of the train by piling up two empty barrels and 
knocking them with two abacuses in certain rhythms. With the help of the masses, the 
association members recreated the blue sky and white clouds on stage despite poor 
quality lighting equipment (Gao Weijin et al 1983). Although such simple stage settings 
could not compare to those in urban theatres, they actually were more suitable for the role 
that these popular stage plays fulfilled in the agenda of Communist propaganda. The poor 
stage settings and amateur actors shortened the psychological distance between 
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performers and audiences, which made the underlying content of these plays more easily 
accepted and internalized by the masses. 
Drama associations not only served as propaganda apparatus but also functioned 
as an itinerant popular party branch that mobilized and organized the masses. The Xin’an 
Itinerant Drama Group is an ideal example. It was established in the Xin’an Elementary 
School in Huai’an County (north Jiangsu) in October 1935 under the influence of the 
Party and in order to promote anti-Japanese discourse. It originally had fourteen 
members, whose ages ranged from twelve to seventeen years old. Led by their principal, 
Wang Dazhi, the group claimed to practice the education theory of Tao Xingzhi: “life is 
education and society is school”, and toured China publicizing the resistance. Before 
finally settling down in the Subei Regional Base in 1941, they traveled through almost 
half of hinterland, including Yunnan, Guizhou and Gansu. Although Xin’an Group was 
not founded by the Party, its members admired Communist theories, and its activities 
were under the Party’s close supervision. During their trip, some elder members secretly 
sent a representative, Xu Zhiguang, to Qingyang (Shan-Gan-Ning border region) in order 
to establish a party branch within the group. Gradually, most of the original members 
were assimilated into the Party. The Party’s infiltration extended the Xin’an Group’s 
focus from cultural propaganda to organizing children via popular entertainment. When 
the entire Xin’an Group arrived in Subei in January 1942, its members included more 
than sixty people, and the youngest member was less than ten years old. Therefore, they 
became the most suitable candidates to approach local children and spread Communist 
doctrines. When Chen Yi and Liu Shaoqi met the group members in person, in March 
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1942, both Chen and Liu appreciated the significance of such itinerant drama groups for 
propaganda and organization purposes. Chen further encouraged the group members, 
“You should not only be responsible for the organization of the youth and children of 
Subei, but also take charge of that of the entire central China (Zhang Mu 1985).” 
Apparently, Chen cherished the group’s influence more as an organizational apparatus 
than a propaganda team. 
Drama associations were important in the party propaganda framework not 
merely because they provided a new form of popular entertainment to spread the Party’s 
political influence. More importantly, they created a platform for mass participation in 
Communist cultural activities, through which the party personnel and the masses were 
closely intertwined, just like the “colloquial writing” of Yanfu Dazhong. The Party 
successfully infiltrated the leisure time of ordinary people by providing Communist 
popular entertainment forms that replaced traditional ones. This effort helped to 
incorporate people’s private lives into the Communist cultural construction, and thus 
expanded the reach of the new party-state. Meanwhile, the participants in these drama 
associations spontaneously nurtured their identities as Communist cultural workers and 
portrayed their understanding of current local, domestic and international events within 
the Party’s ideological framework. This reflected the essence of Communist propaganda 
work, and, the key to its success—it always connected propaganda with organization 
arrangements. Propaganda could not have been transformed into substantial development 
without organizational measures. According to the statistical data from Binhai County 
(Subei Regional Base), there were altogether forty-seven village cultural work teams and 
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965 team members by the end of 1943. These teams had performed 269 times that year 
and the number of audience members had reached more than 162,900 persons (Zhang 
Yabin 1986). The wide-spread village drama associations exemplified the essence of this 
propaganda-organization combination. 
REWARD AND PUNISHMENT: ASSIMILATION OF COLLABORATIONIST PERSONNEL 
Propaganda aimed at the collaborationist forces was another major component in 
the Party’s quotidian struggles. Jiangsu Province was the stronghold of the Nationalists 
before the War and became the political heart of Japan and Wang Jingwei’s 
collaborationist government after the Nationalist authority withdrew to Chongqing. 
Under the order of Chiang Kai-shek, the development of the NFA was confined to the 
south of the Yangtze River before 1940. It was the weakest force in the power 
competition between, the Japanese, the collaborationist forces, and the Nationalists. 
Direct military confrontation with the other three obviously would not have been a wise 
choice. Due to limited military strength, the Japanese had to rely on recruiting 
collaborationist forces to maintain control over the local population. The condescending 
attitude and atrocities of the Japanese made collaborationist soldiers reluctant to side with 
the intruders. Hence, the assimilation of the collaborationist forces became a major 
method for the Party to disintegrate the enemy from within. 
The Party proposed four basic principles of “equal importance” in dealing with 
collaborationist forces. First of all, assimilation was as equally important as 
disintegration. The Party regarded political persuasion the best choice to win over 
collaborationist officers and soldiers. However, when faced with stubborn targets, the 
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party cadres would encourage their subordinates to kill the officers in an uprising. 
Second, political persuasion was as equally important as military offensives. The 
relatively weak strength of the NFA meant the Party had to rely heavily on political 
persuasion to undermine collaborationist forces. However, this did not prevent the NFA 
from engaging in sporadic military maneuvers when reliable intelligence reports could 
guarantee victory in order to highlight their potential power to deter their opponents. 
Third, higher-ranking assimilation was declared to be as equally important as lower 
ranking incorporation. Although assimilation focusing on lower-ranking personnel was 
relatively easy to achieve since they mostly came from the oppressed classes, converting 
higher-ranking officers brought more political, military and financial resources to the 
NFA, and caused more damage to the enemy. Fourth, propaganda was just as important 
as organization (Li Long 1941, 196-200). The effect of political persuasion was largely 
determined by that of propaganda and organizational arrangements, which composed 
another major content of works towards collaborationist forces. 
Compared with propaganda channels that focused on the masses, those channels 
that targeted collaborationist forces were relatively limited and conventional due to the 
smaller chance of accessing the target. There were mainly two methods to encourage the 
soldiers to turn against the Japanese. The first was to directly agitate their emotions by 
shouting slogans in battlefields. Here is a list of such slogans used by the NFA and local 
military forces in the Sunan Regional Base: 
Hey! Do not shoot! 
Shoot your gun to the sky! 
Chinese do not fight Chinese! 
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Do no help the Japanese; do not fight your own fellows! 
Do not trust the Japs! 
Rise up with guns; reward you with benefits! (Li Long 1941, 203)” 
 
In addition, the propaganda workers passed out leaflets, posted them on walls and hung 
them in the streets where the objectives might be passing by. These pamphlets explained 
current public and military affairs and encouraged collaborationist forces to rise against 
the Japanese. The following are some example of such written slogans: 
[if you] follow Wang Jingwei, [you will] be a traitor and slave for your whole 
life! 
The Japs have retreated; do you want to be a free person or a slave? 
Lots of collaborationist soldiers have joined uprisings; do you want to fall behind? 
China and Japan have reached a stalemate; the Japs are going to lose the war! 
We reward all captured soldiers and officers! 
The Japs do not trust you; [they do] not give you enough bullets; [they] only want 
you to be scapegoats! 
Converted forces will not be dismissed or merged. 
The ones who want real peace have to drive the Japs out of China! (Li Long 1941, 
202) 
 
A close examination of these two types of slogans reveals that the national conflict was 
the major issue used to inspire antagonistic emotions among the collaborating soldiers 
against their Japanese superiors. However, such propaganda did not reach the level of 
nationalism, or defending the country. It hovered over the issue of their personal interests 
by emphasizing their difference from the Japanese, who only treated them as scapegoats 
and puppets. This strategy was in accordance with the Party’s evaluation of 
collaborationist personnel, who, it believed, held low political consciousness but were 
sensitive to promises of personal benefits. Such perceptions led to another important 
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characteristic of the propaganda toward collaborationist forces—material rewards for the 
uprising troops. 
In order to achieve the most extensive support, the Party maintained a generous 
attitude towards captives and soldiers and officers who rose against the Japanese. 
Captives were supposed to be treated with respect, similar to one’s own brothers. Those 
who were willing to join the Communist forces were welcome and those who chose to 
return home received transportation fees. Some of the returnees were promoted to 
advantageous positions if they had useful social connections for Communist 
development. Higher-ranking officers were guaranteed that their teams would not be 
disbanded if they exchanged their loyalty to the Party. For those who volunteered to leave 
the collaborationist forces for the NFA, the Party offered considerable rewards. In the 
Sunan Regional Base, collaborationist soldiers who left with one rifle received more than 
thirty yuan, those with one light machine gun received 150 yuan, and those with one 
heavy machine gun were rewarded with 300 yuan. They would not be punished for their 
collaboration with the Japanese as long as no significant crimes had been committed (Li 
Long 1941, 198-200). These policies were attractive for those who collaborated with the 
Japanese because of military threats, especially those with dependents in Communist 
regions. 
Although the Party strenuously strived to break up family attachments and 
reinforce vertical loyalty, it never hesitated to take advantage of familial bonds to 
facilitate its own agenda. In the case of assimilating collaborationist personnel, the 
soldiers’ dependents functioned as a key channel of communication and control for the 
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Party. It indirectly sought to convert collaborationist forces by approaching, educating, 
and organizing their dependents after establishing firm control in the local communities. 
First of all, the Party conducted open or secret investigations to figure out who were the 
dependents of collaborators and registered them accordingly. For instance, in the 
Suzhong Regional Base, the government implemented registration with the assistance of 
local mass associations. The registration form had three copies, which was kept in the 
town, sub-district and county governments respectively for record-keeping purposes 
(Zhonggong suzhong qu dangwei chenggong bu 1945b, 400-401). Meanwhile, the Party 
created an atmosphere that despised any collaborators and mobilized the masses to report 
suspicious behaviors and figures to local authorities. However, such registration 
inevitably aroused doubts and panic among collaborationist dependents, and even large-
scale desertions from the base areas, especially in the early period.  
In order to counteract these negative influences and convince the dependents to 
side with the Party, the local government explained its lenient policies toward voluntary 
returnees and repeatedly described the Japanese atrocities via public and private channels. 
According to the registration list, local cadres ordered the dependents to hold regular 
meetings. During the meetings, converted collaborationist soldiers and officers were 
invited to give speeches to the participants detailing their own miserable experiences 
serving in collaborationist forces. In addition, prestigious figures from the neighborhoods 
also joined in the persuasive efforts, which relied on local authorities to pressure the 
dependents. Meanwhile, local cadres paid personal visits to the dependents who were not 
able to attend regular dependent meetings for medical or other excuses (Zhonggong 
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suzhong qu dangwei chenggong bu 1945b, 401-402). These personal visits created an 
intimacy between the Party and the dependents, which facilitated the latter’s conversion. 
Family attachment, moreover, was used to make emotional appeals to 
collaborationist personnel to join the CCP. The content of posters usually focused on 
mothers or wives missing their sons or husbands who had gone away with the 
collaborationist forces. The Communist propagandists filled anti-Japanese lyrics into 
popular folk tunes in order to make the Chinese soldiers and officers homesick. Here is 
the lyric of a typical revised folk song, “Old Mother Persuades the Collaborationist force 
(laomu quan weijun),” 
The son is serving in the collaborationist force in town, and the mother at home 
was really worried; 
Japs were ruthless animals, holding a knife to kill people without a blink; 
I am hoping my son comes back, and the whole family is waiting; 
You are a good Chinese man, and you should love your home country; 
Make your decision earlier, and there is more glory in returning with your gun 
(Zhang Yabing 1986). 
 
During the mid-autumn festival of 1944, which was celebrated with family reunions, 
Binhai Count’s propaganda team took advantage of the holiday to pass out posters with 
such popular lyrics in places where collaborationist forces were stationed. At midnight, 
the team sent out its most musical members to sing the songs on the posters that were put 
up during the daytime. On Huaihe Bridge, the team creatively organized collaborationist 
dependents to sing the songs to soldiers and officers. Since they easily recognized the 
voices of their family members, there were altogether more than ten collaborationist 
 125 
soldiers who secretly escaped for their homes in the base area that night (Zhang Yabing 
1986). 
Under the emotional persuasion of the Communists and the military threat from 
the Japanese troops, more and more collaborationists began switching sides. These 
conditions propelled the Party to develop the “one-two-one” policy, which allowed 
people to retain their positions in the collaborationist troops and governments but actually 
work for the Party. “One-two-one” was a metaphor that described the psychological path 
these people experienced: from working for the Japanese with one heart, to oscillating 
between two sides, to finally following the Party with their full heart. The success of this 
policy not only depended on the overwhelming propaganda targeting the collaborators 
and the development of the Communist political and military strength, but also resided in 
local cadres’ ability to manipulate and control the converted persons. 
Although the Party worked hard to assimilate collaborationist personnel in order 
to strengthen its influence, it did not really trust these converts. They were derogatorily 
referred to as “double dealers” (liangmianpai) in most internally circulated party 
documents. In a working report of the Suzhong Regional Base, the local party branch 
generally divided them into four categories. The first one was economic-interest-pursuing 
“double dealers,” who did not hold political biases towards the CCP and worked for the 
Japanese merely to pursue economic interests. The Party usually tolerated their 
exploitation as long as they did not significantly endanger the benefits of the masses. 
Meanwhile, it sought to exploit conflicts between such “double dealers” and their 
Japanese superiors, through which they strengthened the reliance and support of the 
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Party. The second category was the “double dealers” with feudal backgrounds, i.e. the 
landlord class. They surrendered to the Japanese to protect their own interests while not 
sincerely favoring collaboration. Relying on the Japanese authorities, they sometimes 
resisted against the Communist policies, such as rent reduction. The Party thereby took 
advantage of their anti-Japanese inclination when both parties had common benefits. The 
last two kinds were generally categorized by their political tendency. One was 
“revolutionary double dealers,” who were deeply influenced by Communist ideology and 
selected by the masses or threatened by the Japanese into working for the collaborationist 
government. The other was called “anti-revolutionary double dealers,” and firmly 
suppressed by the Party if detected because they worked for the Nationalist government, 
even if they shared the common goal of resisting Japan (Hong Ze 1945, 454-457). 
To ensure the success of the assimilation of “double dealers,” the Party relied on 
mass participation to observe and report on the collaborationist personnel. It mobilized 
ordinary peasants to report good deeds or misbehaviors of the collaborators in local 
communities, and recorded them with red and black points respectively. This red-black 
point project, as it was called, was another concrete example of the way that the Party 
transformed its daily work into a mass movement, and further reinforced its influence at 
the organizational level. 
The red-black point project took advantage of the prevailing traditional thought, 
“reward for good deeds and punishment for bad deeds,” among the masses to justify itself 
and win popular support. This project was launched under the name of the NFA or the 
local government near the end of the War, when the resistance military forces began to 
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obtain strategic advantage in the battlefield. By this time, the Communist authorities had 
established firm control over the local communities through years of penetration and had 
obtained a general roster of the local collaborationist personnel, which served as a 
prerequisite for this project. Meanwhile, the NFA and different levels of government sent 
out investigating cadres to collect relevant information about the collaborators on a 
regular basis, lead the surveillance efforts that observed the targeted, and report the red-
black records to the higher military and administrative offices each month. It was 
required that each sub-district and township office and mass association assign a specific 
cadre to take charge of this project. Hence, the Party was able to obtain full knowledge 
and keep up to date with any developments. 
The Party prescribed clear definitions for good and bad deeds. The good ones 
included:  
(1) Preventing Japanese or collaborationist forces from burning, killing, raping 
and plundering, and secretly releasing drafts, corvee; 
(2) Protecting arrested resistance cadres and releasing or covering resistance staff 
and their families; 
(3) Organizing collective conversion or turning over with weapons; 
(4) Shooting towards the sky when one encountered the NFA and the Eighth 
Route Army (ERA) or voluntarily turning over in battlefield; 
(5) Sending true messages to the anti-Japanese government, the NFA or the ERA; 
(6) Assisting the NFA or the ERA to overcome or eradicate the Japanese or 
collaborationist spots; 
(7) Clarifying rumors spread by the Japanese or the collaborators and helping with 
the propaganda of the anti-Japanese government; 
(8) Persuading others to do the above deeds; 
(9) Voluntarily reporting others’ good or bad deeds to the NFA, ERA or their 
local agencies (Zhonggong suzhong qu dangwei chenggong bu 1945a, 394-395). 
 
 
Bad deeds were described as followed: 
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(1) Blackmailing, plundering, kidnapping, raping, burning, killing, and helping 
the Japanese to extort, draft or harass the masses; 
(2) Killing or harassing resistance personnel or their families; 
(3) Fighting the resistance forces or defending the Japanese spots; 
(4) Propagandizing for the Japanese and collaborators, or against the anti-
Japanese government and the NFA; 
(5) Helping the Japanese to mop-up and set up spots, encouraging collaboration 
and endangering the resistance regional bases (393-394). 
Each act of misconduct or good deed would be recorded in detail in the “book of crime” 
or “book of leniency,” and marked with 1 to 3 black or red points depending on its 
significance. The responsible office established a profile for each collaborator. Once 
one’s black points reached thirty points, his name would be added to the “book of death.” 
which symbolized the government’s authority to execute him at any time. 
Correspondingly, when one’s red points reached ten, his name would be written down in 
the “book of birth,” and his citizenship would be retained; if one’s red points reached 
twenty, he would be praised in public or rewarded with some benefits (393-395). 
The long existing traditional knowledge of pay backs and rewards in ordinary 
peasants’ minds and their hatred for the Japanese atrocities made it easy for the Party to 
legitimize the red-black point project in the public eye. Since local party branches 
cooperated with mass associations to implement the project, ordinary peasants soon 
became involved in the surveillance. When faced with collaborationist personnel, the 
Party launched an innovative “chatting and whispering” movement to spread the 
messages of the red-black point project through peddlers and merchants who went back 
and forth between the base areas and the Japanese occupied regions and had regular 
communication with the targets. Such messages included “watch your behaviors; there 
were red-black billboards in the countryside and red-black points on streets;” “now one 
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cannot do bad deeds; [your] head would be removed once [your] black points reach 
thirty;” and “[one can] not live longer than half a year if [one] gets black points (396-
397).” These messages were usually conveyed in daily conversations without arousing 
much Japanese attention. 
This project effectively contained the behaviors of collaborators for the following 
reasons. First of all, the Japanese military forces had fallen into a disadvantageous 
position on the battlefield and its retreat had become inevitable. Meanwhile, the Party had 
obtained substantial control over its base areas after a long period of effective 
penetration. Second, the Party successfully transformed this project into a mass 
movement via the various mass associations in local communities. The expanding scale 
of the movement created an atmosphere of collective surveillance, which largely 
facilitated the Party’s manipulation and control over its targets. Third, this project served 
as an effective system to reinforce the propaganda function on the organizational level. 
The Party assigned specific cadres to investigate, record and supervise the 
implementation of the project and publicized the rewards and punishments collaborators 
received on a regular basis. Such measures turned abstract propaganda into concrete 
organizational results, which helped the masses conceptualize the true intentions of the 
Communist movement. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I examine both the general guidelines of the Communist 
propaganda and how these guidelines resulted in concrete mass movements and projects 
that targeted ordinary people as well as collaborationist personnel in the base areas of 
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Jiangsu. Although the lack of direct evidence makes it difficult to evaluate how the 
propaganda campaigns discussed above were received by ordinary people, one can make 
a reasonable estimation based on the local conditions. Stage plays were the most effective 
method to convey the Party’s messages considering the low literacy level in the base 
areas. Furthermore, they were usually performed in the form of local dramas, such as 
huaiju, which had already been a popular entertainment form before the CCP came. The 
local cadres found that people were easier to mobilize for rent reduction, conscription and 
other movements in places where propaganda stage plays were regularly performed (Liu 
Zexian 1987b). The “colloquial writing” largely inspired youngsters to attend reading 
classes and other Communist campaigns, and some of these amateur reporters later 
became the first generation of PRC journalists. However, confined to the literacy level of 
the peasantry, these writings were less effective compared with stage plays. The 
assimilation of collaborationist personnel might be the least successful project among the 
three. Its results were not only determined by the effectiveness of propaganda activities, 
but also intertwined with personal interests, social status, and the power bargain between 
the CCP and the Japanese. That also explained why the red-black point project exerted a 
more intimidating impact on the “double dealers” near the end of the War. 
On the basis of personal memoirs and the working reports of local cadres, I have 
analyzed the publication of Yanfu Dazhong, the activities of the peasant drama 
associations, and the red-black point project to demonstrate the propagandists’ quotidian 
operation at the village and town levels, which previous studies have hardly touched. 
More importantly, unlike those which view Communist propaganda projects solely as a 
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form of popular culture (Hung Chang-tai 1994) or attribute their success to their skillful 
operations (Jin Dakai 1954), I have conceptualized Communist propaganda activities as 
both a cultural and organizational construction established on the basis of preexisting 
customs, values, kinship and social networks in local communities. Such sophisticated 
accommodation to local knowledge also explains the effectiveness and popularity of 
these propaganda activities. 
In terms of propaganda, the Party’s goal was never limited to spreading its 
indoctrination, but rather it sought much deeper penetration into local communities. First, 
it changed the conventional publicizing pattern of author-reader/player-audience 
relationships by calling for mass participation, as demonstrated by the “colloquial 
writing” in Yanfu Dazhong and efforts to organize peasant performances of stage plays, 
which encouraged the interaction between propagandists and their subjects and the 
internalization of indoctrinated ideas by the latter. Second, the Party wisely reinforced the 
abstract advantages their successful propaganda earned through concrete organizational 
channels. At the same time that newspapers featured “colloquial writing,” the peasant 
drama association staged plays and the red-black point project kept tabs on collaborators, 
the CCP gradually set up its branches and regular meeting system among the participants, 
nurturing their collective identity as members of the Communist movement. In this sense, 
these propaganda activities functioned as another form of organization in the cultural 
arena. Finally, together with other ongoing Communist campaigns (education, 
rectification and so on, see discussions in later chapters), the Party endeavored to build a 
new political culture that immersed itself in almost every aspect of peasants’ quotidian 
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life. It encouraged ordinary people to become accustomed to the propagandized 
ideologies, perceptions, and theories, and use them to interpret their surroundings, 
experiences, the current warfare and the imminent CCP-GMD power struggle. 
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Chapter Four   Education: Another Channel of Mass Mobilization 
As a party whose ultimate goal was a nationwide revolution to overthrow the 
current regime, the CCP placed a high premium on the significance of education. The 
Party’s education system served its wartime mobilization efforts in three aspects. First, it 
provided a stable pool of potential cadres, which was imperative to the rapid development 
and long term maintenance of Communist administrations at different levels. Second, the 
participants, including educators and the educated, were gradually immersed in the 
Party’s revolutionary education, thereby replacing traditional literati’s belief in 
“orthodox” (zhengtong) Nationalist government with the discourse of change in the 
“Mandate of Heaven” (tianming).1 Most importantly, the education system functioned as 
another effective channel of mass organization, for both children and adults. Hence, the 
CCP paid considerable attention to building its education programs from the beginning of 
the Soviet period. 
Despite its profound significance in the building of the party-state, the topic of 
Communist education in base areas has received surprisingly less attention in historical 
scholarships. On the one hand, the sparse elementary and middle schools during Yan’an 
period can hardly appeal to scholars as an effective organizational impetus for 
Communist mobilization. Neither can education be regarded as a convincing 
socioeconomic condition to initiate peasant revolution. Only Keating briefly mentions the 
                                                 
1 “Mandate of Heaven” was advanced by Duke of Zhou to explain to people the reason for the overthrow 
of Shang Dynasty by Zhou. It then was reinforced by Confucian scholars to interpret the legitimacy of 
dynastical cycle in Chinese history. Although the last dynasty, Qing, ended in 1911, this concept was still 
influential among scholars as well as ordinary people during the Republican period. 
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literacy classes and newspaper-reading groups as a part of cultural reconstruction in 
Shan-Gan-Ning Border Region (Keating 1997, 233-234). On the other hand, scholars of 
Chinese educational development simply regard the wartime Communist education as a 
short transitional precedent that partly reflected the origin of “radicalism” in the 
education reform of twentieth century China (Pepper 2000, 118-154). However, my study 
of the Jiangsu experience reveals that the Communist education programs had a much 
more inclusive content than previous studies indicate. Aside from regular schooling 
systems, social education targeting local cadres and the masses comprised another 
imperative component. This chapter suggests that, with more available financial 
resources, the base areas of Jiangsu were able to maintain a large numbers of schools that 
actually served as a convenient channel for Communist mobilization.  
CONVENTIONAL SCHOOLING SYSTEM 
According to the Jiangxi Soviet provincial government report of 1932, there were 
2,277 elementary schools and 82,342 enrolled students in the fourteen counties of Jiangxi 
controlled by the Party. These figures rose to 3,052 and more than 89,700 respectively in 
1934. In Xinguo County, a model soviet county, approximately 12,800 of 20,969 children 
attended elementary schools and the enrollment percentage reached more than 60% of the 
school-aged group.2 This figure was surprisingly high compared with the less than 9% 
enrollment figure in the Nationalist controlled counties of the same province, and 22% as 
                                                 
2 “Model soviet county” refers to a county that most, if not all, of the administrative polities and programs 
run the best and thus, was treated by the Party authority as a model for other counties to follow. Usually, 
such model counties enjoyed more faborable fiscal and political resources than others. 
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national average (Qu Xingui and Qiu Guangwei 1982, 38-39).3 The Jiangxi Soviet 
accused the upper class, i.e. landlords and rich peasants, of monopolizing educational 
resources and insisted on eliminating the upper class, regarding it the prerequisite of 
launch education reform (Pepper 2000, 119-127). Such a radical policy might partly 
explain why the enrollment percentage of the school-aged group remained unchanged 
during the Party’s short stay in Ruijin—it did not really have a chance to put these goals 
in that amount of time. 
Upon arrival in Yan’an after the Long March in 1935, the Party continued its 
mass-line education policy to build new or restore existing elementary schools and 
encourage enrollment among school-aged children. The policy proved to be quite 
successful as the number of elementary school children grew ten-fold from 1935 to 1940. 
In the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, there were 120 elementary schools that 
accommodated 2,000 students in 1935. The numbers increased to 1,341 and 41,458 
respectively by the spring of 1940 (Pepper 2000, 130-131). The average enrollment 
number per school almost doubled in the same period. Such a rapid development, 
however, initiated a shortage of elementary school teachers and a decreased teaching 
quality accordingly. The Central Education Committee thus decided to realign limited 
education resources and merged schools in the same districts. This policy directly 
resulted in a dramatic drop in the number of elementary schools, and a surprising 
                                                 
3 The Nationalist data was conducted in 1930. Suzanne Pepper states that the enrollment percentage of the 
same age-group was 7.2% in Nationalist controlled Jiangxi. Her data comes from League of Nation Report 
(Pepper 2000, 124). 
I highly suspect the reliability of enrollment percentage of the school-age group in Soviet Jiangxi. 
However, there’s no other data to verify or refute it. Data of Yan’an period only shows the overall 
attendance not the percentage. 
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decrease of the number of enrolled students in 1943 (130-131).4 The new policy dictated 
that each elementary school held jurisdiction over children living in a 20 li radius, and 
students who lived farther than 5 li were required to board at school.5 However, a 
considerable number of peasant parents did not intend on having their children, who they 
viewed as a critical part of the labor force, stay away from home for such a long time 
each week. As a consequence, the parents decided to stop sending their children to 
school. When the Central Education Committee realized that their attempts to improve 
educational quality had failed and had actually compromised the enrollment numbers, the 
mass-line policy returned to its initial vision. 
Apart from the slight vacillation in elementary school policies, Yan’an’s stance of 
education was consistently pragmatic throughout the War of Resistance. The Party at first 
conceived education of two categories: in-school education, which generally was 
designed after the Soviet Union’s model, and social education that targeted the vast 
majority of adults. It prescribed the length of elementary and middle schools: four years 
for junior elementary school and two years for senior elementary school, two years for 
junior middle school, two years for high school.6 On the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth 
Central Committee in September, 1938, Mao and his followers decided:  
First, the education system should be revised. Curriculums that are not urgently 
required should be abolished. School management should be reformed. Courses 
                                                 
4 The numbers of elementary school and enrolled students were 752 and 26,826 respectively in Spring 
1943. 
5 1 li=0.5 km. 
6 Most elementary schools then were either junior (chuxiao) or senior (gaoxiao) elementary schools. One 
with both parts was called complete elementary school. In Jiangsu Province, some junior elementary 
schools only required three years for graduation. 
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directly related to the War are mandatory at school and keeping students’ 
motivations for study should be regarded as a primary principle. Second, cadre 
schools and training classes should be widely established and expanded to provide 
personnel resource for the anti-Japanese cause. Third, mass education should be 
widely developed. Mass movements, including after-school classes, literacy-
learning class, skits, singing and sports, should be actively initiated and organized. 
Various local newspapers are encouraged and help to improve literacy level and 
national enlightenment. Fourth, free elementary education is promoted to enhance 
integrity among the new generation (Qu Xingui and Guangwei Qiu 1982, 53-54). 
 
The Party especially emphasized the importance of relying on the masses’ self-
initiatives for self-education. Mao fully recognized that the Party could not develop a 
comprehensive educational institution with its limited administrative and financial 
resources. Therefore, the government should play a role of mentor other than a patron 
(Qu Xingui and Guangwei Qiu 1982, 53-54). After the educated policies shifted back to 
mass line in late 1943, the party enthusiastically promoted a model of “run by people and 
assisted by officials” (minban guanzhu). 
Paralleling the impending closure of the War of Resistance and the Party’s 
growing contention with the GMD, the demand for qualified cadres grew. The 
conventional schooling modeled after the Soviet Union could no longer meet the needs of 
the expanding Communist cadre echelon. A tendency towards deemphasizing the 
importance of conventional in-school education began to emerge in the Party’s 
documents in 1944. It was echoed by Mao’s idea that cadre education was superior to 
mass education, just as adult education was prior to child education. Education therefore 
was redefined as cadre education and mass education in accordance with these new 
guidelines. In addition to cadre schools, curriculums of middle schools and senior 
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elementary schools were modified to accommodate an expanding cadre education. They 
were aimed at training plenty of high-ranking cadres for revolutionary warfare and junior 
cadres for local administration and production. 
Compared with cadre disciplines, mass education was inclined to be more locally 
spontaneous. The Party widely encouraged winter schools, half-day schools, evening 
schools, weekend schools, itinerant schools, various short-term training classes and 
literacy groups for adults in order to overcome labor shortage and wide dispersement of 
the population in rural areas (Qu Xingui and Guangwei Qiu 1982, 60-61). Based on the 
model of “run by people and assisted by officials”, elementary school curriculum enjoyed 
an wide-range autonomy as long as Confucian and Japanese appeasement ideas were 
completely excluded. School teachers varied from government-sent cadres to local 
intellectuals. Enrollment age was no longer restricted to 8-14 years old and the lowest 
requirement of graduation was adjusted to basic needs of reading, writing and arithmetic. 
The Party’s official newspaper, Liberation Daily (Jiefang Ribao), provided further 
explanation of this redefinition in its editorials: 
Mass and cadre educations have different tasks at different stages. People should 
have advanced knowledges of math, physics and chemistry in the future. 
However, it is more urgent that they master the basic skills to participate in 
guerrilla warfare and efficiently organize production. Cadres therefore should be 
capable of offering corresponding guidances…[hence], any courses targeting 
higher-level entrance exam should be partly or solely replaced by those of 
tangible military training and [agricultural] production…the core of curriculums 
should firmly reside in the imperative knowledge of domestic household and rural 
life.”7 
                                                 
7 “Genjudi putong jiaoyu de gaige” (Regular education reform in base areas), Jiefang ribao, 7 April 1944; 
“Lun putong jiaoyu zhong de xuezhi yu kecheng” (A discussion on curriculums and institutions of regular 
education), Jiefang ribao, 27 May 1944. 
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The base areas in Jiangsu tried to follow the Yan’an’s education policies as best it 
could. However, policy-implementation usually had a time-lapse due to its distance from 
Yan’an as well as specific local situations. As a result, the “quality over quantity” policy 
did not really have a chance to be implemented before the local government was 
informed of a shift back. And thus, the number of schools kept increasing throughout the 
war period. The Suzhong Regional Base claimed that the number of elementary schools 
grew three fold compared with the prewar statistic data and the enrollment percentage 
was around 22% by 1942.8 Table 4 shows the number of elementary schools in the 
Table 4： Numbers of Elementary schools in Suzhong Regional Base 
 junior complete others all 
prewar 160 40 38 238 
1940 23 7  30 
1941 spring    109 
1941 fall    358 
1942 summer 532 67  725 
Source: Liu Ruilong 1942, 315-136. 
 
Suzhong Regional Base. If one takes 1940 when the base areas in Suzhong was 
established as a starting point, the number of local elementary schools actually increased 
by more than 2000%. Other regional bases were also very successful in establishing new 
elementary and middle schools. Table 5 and 6 illustrate the numbers of teachers, students, 
and schools in the Yanfu District in the Subei Regional Base. 
 
                                                 
8 Due to the Japanese invasion in this area, the number of schools dropped dramatically during the first 
several years of the War. 
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Table 5： Numbers of Yanfu District Elementary Education (private school excluded) 
 
Year School No. Student No. Teacher No. 
1941 465 21364 83 
1942 773 35265 128 
1943 950 41077 1466 
Till 1944.7   1186 67453 2064 
1. Source: “Yanfu Qu Xuexiao Jiaoyu Fazhan Gaikuang” (An Outline of the Development of School Education in 
Yanfu District), Yanfu bao, 5 August 1944.  
2. When the NFA arrived in Yanfu in 1940, there were more than 500 elementary schools. After the first mopping-up 
campaign shortly after the NFA’s arrival, the number dropped to around 200.  
Table 6: Numbers of Yanfu District Middle School Education 
Year School No. Student No. Teacher No. 
1940 14 >1200 >100 
1941 3 >300 Dramatically decreased due to mopping-up campaigns 
1942 9 (+2 after-school groups) >1200 95 
1943 8 (+2 after-school groups) 1453 115 
1944 13 (+1 after-school group) 1878 207 
Source: “Yanfu Qu Xuexiao Jiaoyu Fazhan Gaikuang” (An Outline of the Development of School Education in Yanfu 
District), Yanfu bao, 5 August 1944. 
 
Due to its relatively well developed economy compared with other areas of China, 
the significance of education in Jiangsu was deeply entrenched in the minds of both the 
gentry class and ordinary people. Middle and elementary schools were quite prevalent 
and the literacy level was notably higher. Faced with frequent changes in authority, 
Jiangsu education professionals kept their distance from politics and insisted on “no 
discussion about politics,” “studying before saving the country,” and “studying is saving 
the country” (Chen Yi 1941a, 51). Such an apolitical atmosphere comprised no more of a 
hindrance to the Party’s education programs than a culturally backward Yan’an or other 
base areas in northern China. To counteract such embedded mindsets, the regional 
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government made specific emphasis on the renovation of private school (sishu) and 
incorporated political, military and production-related contents into basic in-school 
education. The Party painstakingly promoted “anti-Japanese cause” and regarded it as the 
core of its education program (Xu Chongxing 1988). In the rest of this chapter, I detail 
how the education programs was implemented in the regional bases in Jiangsu Province 
and how the Party explored them as a channel for organizational purposes. 
THE EDUCATOR AND THE EDUCATED 
Before the NFA entered Jiangsu Province, various types of education facilities, 
including conventional sishu and modern western style schools, were already quite 
prevalent. To take the Yanfu District (with jurisdiction of nine counties) in the Subei 
Regional Base as an example, there were altogether approximately 1,900 sishu there. 
Lishui County in the Sunan Regional Base accommodated more than 200 sishu, half of 
which were located in the Party controlled area. Hence, the Party’s task in Jiangsu was 
more akin to remodeling a used house than designing a brand-new one, as in other bases. 
It is hard to tell which was more difficult. 
Departing from studies of other base areas, I argue for a strong centralized 
inclination in the Party’s educational institutions in Jiangsu. Peter Seybott suggests a 
decentralized trend in implementing educational policies and programs in the Shan-Gan-
Ning Border Region because teachers kept their autonomy in composing curriculums. He 
further asserts that social and elementary educations were even more flexible and more 
relevant to the communities they served (Seybott 1971). Seybott might be right if 
“decentralization” refers to an accommodation to specific local situations and 
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surroundings. However, my observation of base areas in Jiangsu shows that the Party 
regularly and closely oversaw its educational polities and programs. It also held firm 
control over its educators as well as the contents they taught.  
In order to develop educational institutions that fostered Communist mobilization, 
the Party first reformed existing sishu. Sishu was a kind of conventional single-class 
schoolhouse, which taught Confucian texts, classic poetry, composing poetic couplets and 
practicing calligraphy. Ordinary textbooks included Three Character Classic, the Book of 
Family Names, Thousand Character Article, Daughter’s Classic (for girls only), Four 
Books and Five Classics and other historical texts. Students usually began by recognizing 
characters and then recited the whole texts. Shushi (teachers of sishu, I will refer to them 
by “private school teachers” in the following text) were also responsible for explaining 
the texts. Besides conventional sishu, there was also a kind of renovated sishu that taught 
practical writings and mathematics in addition to Confucian texts (Zhu Ping 1984). 
Private school teachers usually were composed of old-fashion local intellectuals, middle 
school or elementary school graduates, sometimes even vagrants with literacy, and thus 
their teaching quality varied.  
To convert sishus into modern style elementary schools, the Party began by 
establishing control over teachers. Local party authorities required private school teachers 
to register in their district governments. The government kept surveillance over them, 
demanding that they meet the Party’s standards of a qualified teacher, which entailed 
advocating anti-Japanese democracy and the new democratic education policies, 
enthusiasm about the educational cause, and high level of literacy. Any actions that could 
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be read as an attack on the Communist authorities constituted the reason for suspending 
the offender’s teaching certification. For instance, a private school teacher, Rui, 
instructed students write a composition using the idiom “gentlemen are outside the 
government while villains are in.” Soon local officials accused Rui of using this 
homework to incite dissents. The county government eventually revoked his teaching 
certification (Yang Zhimin 1990). 
Besides surveilling private school teachers, the Party also provided various 
training classes for them during winter or summer vacations through local Cultural and 
Education Section. Such classes usually lasted from two weeks to twenty days, and 
participants convened in a relatively safe place, such as a village ancestral hall, for 
special trainings. Such training typically included political education, which publicized 
the Party’s educational policies, the ongoing warfare, and the significance of the United 
Front. It also demonstrated model teaching methods and displayed party-recommended 
textbooks. Local party cadres were the main force to teach in these classes and county or 
higher-ranking cadres usually made appearances for keynote speeches. The training 
classes were held at least every year at the cost of the local government. Local officials 
sometimes asked participants to prepare their own rations if the budget was tight or the 
Japanese attacks were frequently in the area. There was even an annual theme for the 
training classes in some places. For instance, in Tongshan County (northern Jiangsu) the 
theme was “to overcome the idea of employer-employee relationships and serve for the 
people’s education cause” in 1942. The following year it was “to dispel the influence of 
feudal landlordism and serve the classes of workers and peasants.” Finally, “to 
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incorporate production into course works and encourage students’ industrious mindsets” 
became the theme in 1944 (Wang Ke 1985). Such training classes served as an important 
channel for the Party to integrate politics into ordinary education while simultaneously 
rejuvenating its teaching echelon. They also helped to contain the influences of both 
Japanese appeasements, which aimed at pacifying the masses, and “feudal residues” that 
strengthened loyalty toward the Nationalist government by presenting the GMD as the 
nation’s legitimate leader, among teachers.  
As the War came near the end, the training classes acted as more than a method of 
professional disciplines. They served as a forum that reinforced the Party’s national 
leadership for both teachers and ordinary peasants. In May 1945, more than 130 
elementary school teachers of Xinhua Sub-district (central Jiangsu) were assembled in 
Beiwei village for a training class. The major purpose of this training class was to clarify 
several basic points among rural intellectuals. The trainees were asked: first, who was the 
leader of the ongoing war, the “progressive” CCP or the “reactive” GMD? Second, was 
the democratic government led by the legitimate party—a question concerning the 
concept of “zhengtong” (orthodox)? The third question was how to run good elementary 
schools in the stance of anti-Japanese democracy. The participants were divided into ten 
groups for debate and discussion on each of the three issues. In addition, higher-ranking 
cadres came and gave speeches that indoctrinated the trainees with the Party’s answers to 
these questions. In that sense, the so-called “group debate and discussion” virtually lost 
its spontaneity and autonomy, but served to help the trainees to internalize outside 
doctrines into their own beliefs. Meanwhile, the trainees were required to serve turns as 
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night guards to protect the safety of the class. The imminent image of the enemy—both 
the Japanese and the Nationalists—materialized a group of “us, the Communists” versus 
“the others” and further legitimized the Party’s leadership. At the end of the training 
days, a large party was organized and the trainees were encouraged to prepare 
entertainment, such as Beijing opera, low comedy, yangge dancing, etc., which were 
supposed to reflect their own digestions about the training class. Around 2,000 villagers 
shared this party with the trainees (Zhu Ping 1984). As a result, the idea that the Party 
intended to convey through the training class was no longer confined to the elementary 
school teachers, but spread to ordinary peasants as well. Professional training thus turned 
to a channel of organizational propaganda. 
The Party’s emphasis on the professional training class actually revealed its 
expectations that teachers, especially elementary school teachers, would be able to 
shoulder a dual responsibility as both educators and mass workers (minyun gongzuo zhe), 
in charge of mobilizing the masses, due to a cadre shortage in Communist bases. The 
Party had good reason to hope so as peasants held high regard for intellectuals, including 
elementary school teachers, in rural area and were more likely to follow their instructions 
than those from outside mass workers. For instance, Xinhua sub-district government 
collected the Grain Tax in kind for the first time in September 1945. Although no 
precedential experience could be followed, the tax collection went smoothly, partially 
because the teachers in this area enthusiastically engaged in the propaganda ahead of time 
as well as in the actual collection process. The local peasants reflected that their 
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participation to some extent offset the peasants’ misgivings on the new move of Grain 
Tax collection (Zhu Ping 1984).  
The teachers’ efficiency in promoting the smooth collection of the Grain Tax 
might explain the reason that “Provisional Chapter of the Elementary Schools in East 
Route” directly prescribed that elementary school teachers carry the responsibility of 
mass mobilization in addition to regular teaching.9 Teachers were required to mobilize 
and organize their students to take an active part in various social activities, such as 
selling newspapers and singing on occasions of public gathering. They were supposed to 
take advantage of routine family visits to obtain detailed information of village 
compositions. In addition, they were organized through their own professional 
associations—Teacher Resistance Association (Jiaojiu Hui), under the supervision of the 
Party. 
After gaining control of the teaching echelon, the Party’s next step was to screen 
textbooks. The CCP technically allowed elementary and middle schools to choose their 
text books independently. Nevertheless, the registration system and frequent training 
programs mentioned above actually confined teachers’ choices to the Party sanctioned 
books. According to the guidelines issued by the Party, schools usually set the subjects of 
Chinese, Maths, General Knowledge (Sometimes known as hygiene), Music, Drawing, 
and P.E.. Some senior or complete elementary schools set Current Affairs, History and 
                                                 
9 “Donglu jiaoyu weiyuanhui banxing donglu xiaoxue zanxing guicheng” (Provisional chapter of the 
elementary schools in the east route by the east route education committee), Dongjin bao, 10 February 
1941. 
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Geography when possible. Table 7 below shows the weekly school schedule of an 
ordinary elementary school student.  
Table 7: Elementary School Subjects and Weekly Teaching Time (minutes) 
Subject/Time/Grade Junior Grade Middle 
Grade 
Senior Grade 
Political Speech 120 120 120 
Maths Calculation 150 150 180 
Abacus * 60 60 
Chinese 330 330 360 
General Knowledge 150 150 180 
Military Training * 180 180 
Music 180 90 90 
Drawing 180 * * 
Social activities * 180 180 
Sum 1110 1260 1320 
Source: “Donglu jiaoyu weiyuanhui banxing donglu xiaoxue zanxing guicheng” (Provisional chapter of the elementary 
schools in the east route by the east route education committee), Dongjin bao, 10 February 1941. 
 
Although literacy and mathematics were the most imperative skills for ordinary peasant 
life, political education enjoyed priority over all other subjects. The content of all set-up 
subjects were infiltrated with the ideas of Resistance, anti-civil war, and overthrowing 
three mountains over the people.10 For instance, the six-grade Chinese textbook of Ruli 
Complete Elementary School (central Jiangsu) included articles of “Pingxingguan 
Victory,” “After the establishment of the Second Front,” “Ordinary People in Charge,” 
which publicized the ideas of Resistance and democracy;11 those of “the Breakout in 
Wannan,” “Selfish People’s thoughts,” “the Story of Cat and Mouse,” and “Taiwan 
                                                 
10 “Three mountains” refers to feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism and imperialism. 
11 When the CCP used “democracy”, it did not refer to such democratic institutions of the United States or 
European countries. At the time when the Nationalist government was still a legitimate authority, the Party 
used “democracy” as a discourse to justify its opposition against the GMD and its existence as a political 
entity. 
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People under Japanese colonialism” that attacked Jiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist 
government and Wang Jingwei’s collaborationist government; and those of “What the 
World Would be?” and “When the Sun Takes a Break” that taught scientific knowledge 
(Zhu Ping 1984). Besides regular textbooks, reports of local newspapers, such as the 
Yanfu Dazhong (Yanfu Public), the Sunan Bao (Sunan Newspaper), the Dazhong Bao 
(Public Newspaper), etc., were also used as teaching materials in senior level classes.  
The Party regarded middle school education more as a method of cadre discipline 
and middle school graduates as a pool for future Communist cadres. Its purpose was to 
ensure students a Communist worldview. It emphasized a thorough understanding of the 
ongoing warfare, the development of the Chinese society and history, and the 
Communist-Nationalist clash within the framework of the Party’s doctrines. Therefore, 
History of Society Development, Popular Philosophy, and Mao’s works including 
“Theory of New Democracy”, “Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party”, 
“On the Protracted War”, and “Discussion about the Strategies of Opposing Japanese 
Imperialism” comprised the major content of middle school curriculums. 
Moreover, anti-Japanese and pro-Party contents were prevalent in the teachings of 
other subjects. Math drilled incorporated anti-Japanese factors. Here is an example:  
One day a puppet troop went out for mopping-up campaign. It contained X 
battalions (each battalion was composed of X companies and each company X 
soldiers). After a fierce counterattack by the NFA, X were killed and X were 
captured. In this case how many Japanese soldiers were sent out and how many of 
them finally retreated? 
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To avoid over-attachment to abstract knowledge, which might repel students and their 
families, the Party paid special attention to developing practical skills, such as abacus, 
practical writing, knitting and knowledge of animal-breeding into ordinary teachings. The 
class of Music taught various revolutionary songs—the “Song of NFA”, the “Song of the 
Eighth Route Army”, the “March of the Volunteers” (later the National anthem of the 
PRC), the “Yellow River Cantata”, “On the Songhua River” and other local resistance 
ballads. In the Xinhua Sub-district when school was over, students were lined up and 
sang these songs on their way home. Peasants nearby went out of their way to see this 
parade and sometimes they happily echoed the songs (Lv Peihe and Liu Jing 1984). It 
functioned as a daily ritual for both the students and their audience, which helped the 
students to internalize the ideas that these lyrics carried and spread the anti-Japanese and 
pro-Party messages in an amusing way. 
The Party’s third step was to compete for the support of school principals. There 
were generally three categories of schools in the Jiangsu base areas. The first was 
established by local Communist government after the NFA’s arrival. The Party usually 
held full control over their personnel. The second category was the prewar Nationalist 
government sponsored public schools and private schools registered in the Nationalist 
Education Department, which consisted of the majority in Jiangsu. Some principals of 
these schools were pro-Party while others struggled to keep their distance from all 
political groups. This category was the major target for the Party’s mobilization and 
penetration. The last category was controlled by the local Nationalist diehards, who 
maintained consistent loyalty to the Nationalist government in Chongqing. 
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The Communist infiltration occurred at all levels of these schools. In Jiangba 
Town of northern Jiangsu the local elementary school was controlled by the gentry. The 
Party moved to convert the school when it entered the area. Consequently, the local 
regional government dispelled the former personnel and replaced them with outside 
cadres and newly recruited local activists. However, such a rearrangement was secretly 
resisted by the local gentry. They concealed teaching supplies and prevented new outside 
teachers from finding places to live in town. This situation lasted for more than two 
weeks until the government and the local gentry agreed on a compromise, in which the 
school rehired some of the former teachers (Lv Peihe and Liu Jing 1984). In this case, the 
local gentry and the Party reached a truce, through which a new local power structure 
developed. 
Bottom-up channel provided another way of establishing control. First the Party 
sent young activists to the targeted schools or selected several leftist students already in 
attendance. These infiltrators would then mobilize their fellow students through 
fraternity, sisterhood, or various after-school associations. They composed leaflets and 
big-character posters to attack the current leaders of the schools. Most frequently they 
made accusations of treason and corruption. Meanwhile they also publicized the Party’s 
image as the pillar of the anti-Japanese cause. When the mass mobilization was well-
prepared, those activists organized a school-wide protest to force the principal to step 
down. This action was backed by military force dispatched by the local Communist 
government. In a typical case, the principal of Taixing County Middle School, Jianhua 
Zhu, was dismissed during the students’ calls of “Step down Zhu Jianhua!” “Step down 
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the Japanese Imperialism!” “Step down the traitor!” and “Let the Anti-Japanese 
democratic government take over our school!” The chief of the county Cultural and 
Education Section, Ju Qi, took over the entire school as the representative of the local 
democratic government that day. Soon the County Middle School was relocated to the 
central area of the Subei Regional Base to facilitate the Party’s close surveillance (Li 
Xuemin 1988). This strategy was even more successful in winning over the leadership of 
existing middle schools. Given local literacy conditions, middle schools were a sparse 
human resource for which the Communists, the Nationalists and the Japanese and its 
collaborationist government had to compete. Therefore, it was hard for the local 
government to simply install its own personnel and dispel previous ones. Furthermore, 
the Party’s firm anti-Japanese stance had won the educated youth’s favor and facilitated 
in-school bottom-up mobilization, at least in the Communist spheres of influence. 
The Party also deployed various methods to exert influence on students. For those 
children who attended schools, the regular curriculums were only one part of their duties 
as students. The other was social activities, which sometimes extended into their after-
school lives. These activities served as an efficient method for the Party to organize and 
control its people from school age onward. The “little teacher” (xiao xiansheng) program 
was widely adopted to spread ideas taught in school to local families. It called for 
elementary school students to be little teachers who conveyed what they learned in school 
to their parents. It not only helped the students memorize and digest new knowledge, but, 
more importantly, spread the Party-endorsed ideas to the basic cell of the society—
family. A mother once told a local cadre in a half-proud-half-complaining tone, “My 
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child stuck to me every night in order to teach me recognizing characters. He will not go 
to bed until I memorized the words (Jiang Peizhi 1983).” Moreover, little teachers went 
beyond families and consisted of an important teaching force for adult learning classes. 
For instance, they served as teaching assistants in female literacy classes (Funv Shiziban). 
Adult teachers were responsible for cultural classes, and little teachers for teaching words 
and revolutionary songs. These songs were usually based on popular folklores. They had 
only four or five sentences long, and therefore were easy to memorize. Here is an 
example: “the Japs were running ahead, I was chasing behind, let the bullet fly, and make 
sure he fall (Tang Minglun 1985).” Here the Party utilized teachers’ authority on students 
and extended it to families via kinship ties. It is difficult to evaluate how effective such an 
infiltration was. Their parents might simply disregard their words as meaningless childish 
talk. However, the little teacher program was an illustrative example to show how the 
indirect Communist penetration occurred on the basis of existing social relations. 
If one regarded the little teacher program as an extension of school education, 
Children’s Corps (Er’tongtuan) functioned as an organizational method that continued 
the Communist discipline on the school-age children when they were not attending 
school. The Children’s Corps were usually organized on the basis of one school or a 
certain administrative unit. Its general leadership was composed of one chief, one deputy 
chief, one organizational member and one propaganda member. It had a branch in every 
village and each branch copied the structure of the general leadership. Under the branch 
there were several units with one leader and one deputy, who were usually third-grade or 
older. The leaders were publically elected among the corps members. The members of 
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each unit were not confined to students. It included all school-age children. Most corps 
had their own charters which prescribed their aspirations and behaviors. Here is an 
instance: 
1. The great goal is to fight against Japan and to save the country. The 
responsibilities of the Children’s Corps are to offer volunteer safeguards for each 
village. Once messages or traces of enemy are detected, members should 
immediately report to the village or town government. 
2. Members should get alone well, unify together and be cautious of traitors and 
enemies. Keep balanced between study and attending agricultural production. 
Everyone should try to be a little hero. 
3. Members should behave themselves, be brave, and should not easily get set up. 
No true words should be told in front of the enemy. 
4. Never be late for assembly or drop out when on duty (Yang Zemin 1987). 
 
Besides these abstract articles, the Children’s corps also had concrete daily 
activities. The elected branch or unit leaders were responsible for the team’s good 
manners and its security on the way home every day. The two leaders were also the 
organizers of the village corps after-school activities and coordinated between the school 
and the village administration. The members were required to attend group activities each 
day after dinner, which included teaching and singing anti-Japanese songs, playing 
military games—such as manoeuvres of air defense and catching secret agents, guards, 
message delivery and withdrawal with all the belongings to nearby villages—telling 
revolutionary stories, learning characters, soliciting contributions, helping military 
families, mutual aid, small-scale meetings of village, etc.. The corps activities usually 
lasted for one or two hours. Each month or at times when there were large-scale 
activities, nearby branches joined together for big entertaining parties, which invited the 
members of the general leading group of the corps or local cadres to give speeches and 
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had programs prepared by the members. Some corps even had a regular meeting system 
that convene branch cadre meetings on particular dates, checking current tasks and 
arranging new ones (Yang Zemin 1987). Promising corps cadres were sent to special 
training classes for further education. A typical training day started with an anti-Japanese 
class teaching revolutionary theories in the morning. Propaganda skills, such as singing, 
dancing and drama playing, were taught in the afternoon. In the evening students were 
required to report their own thoughts, do self or mutual criticisms, or learn military 
knowledge through guerrilla games (Dong Dao and Liu Zeguang 1986). 
The corps activities, however, were not always welcome. The Nantong Children’s 
Corps began their activities once the NFA won Shigan (central Jiangsu) from the 
collaborationist troops. They sang on the street in hoping to attract local children and 
youngsters but failed. The leaders assumed that people were worried about the Japanese’ 
revenge and thus kept their children at home. Guided by this assumption, the members 
stayed with families that had children for further persuasion. One member, Ji Chenghao, 
lived in the house of a shopkeeper whose son was about his age. Ji tried to explain the 
anti-Japanese cause to them several times, but both the shopkeeper and his son avoided 
the topic. His fellow members reported varying experiences in their attempts to persuade 
the people they stayed with, but generally speaking, the poorer the host family was, the 
more interest they showed in the anti-Japanese ideas. For these corps members, it was a 
vivid lesson of differentiating people by class (Ji Chenghao 1998).  
Based on the description above, it can be argued that the corps was more than 
simply a child’s organization. It had rigid ranking system, behavior codes, member 
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responsibilities, and checking and reporting regulations. It provided its members with a 
concrete interpretation of anti-Japanese cause, which would have remained as a hollow 
concept if one had only tried to comprehend it relying on school education. More 
importantly, it was a miniature of the Party’s organizational system. Thus, from a very 
early age these children got used to a culture that submerged participants’ social as well 
as private lives, encouraged collective activities and infiltrated political messages in 
every possible ways. In this culture, individual’s loyalty was primarily devoted to the 
organization to which one belonged, i.e. the Party, not family. In Zhuangtan of Sishu 
County (north Jiangsu), a father was dissatisfied with his son’s frequent activities in the 
local Children’s Corps and cursed him that “sooner or later you’ll get caught by the 
Eighth Route Army to the front and die for nothing.” Other corps members heard his 
words and forty to fifty of them went to his house to argue with him. Even his son agreed 
that his father absolutely should be punished if he did not realize his fault.12 In this case, 
the son sided with the Party rather than his father. The family bond was broken by 
organizational loyalty. Filial piety, the fundamental principle of the traditional Chinese 
society, was pushed aside in these children’s mindset. 
Most elementary school graduates returned to their families who eagerly awaited 
their help in farming. Some of them became village cadres. Only a lucky few were able to 
further their studies. Middle school education was financially unaffordable for most rural 
families and went far beyond family’s expectations of their children as well. It actually 
                                                 
12 “Huoyue zai Sishu Siqu de Er’tongtuan” (the Children corps that was active in the Fourth District of 
Sishu), Renmin bao, 11 September 1944. 
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became de facto elitist education especially after the Party began to view middle schools 
as a pool of future Communist cadres near the end of the War. Therefore, the social 
activities of middle school students worked more like an internship for their future 
careers. They were encouraged to participate in propaganda teams singing, dancing and 
playing skits to publicize anti-Japanese discourse and the Party’s ideology. They also 
joined mass workers for rent and interest reduction and Grain Tax collection.13 
With a series of reforms on school education, the Party had successfully 
convinced the educator and the educated to establish a close bond between education and 
political affairs. This success facilitated the Party to build a politicized atmosphere that 
was new in Jiangsu, as well as other places in China. 
ADULT EDUCATION 
Besides the regular school education described above, adult education composed 
the other imperative part of the Party’s education program. Actually, it was prioritized 
over school education when the War was coming to an end and cadre shortages became a 
significant obstacle in the Party’s post-War agenda. Adult education was generally 
categorized into mass and cadre parts with the latter enjoying priority over the former. 
Cadre training classes mainly focused on two points: political indoctrination and 
practical skills in mass mobilization. The length varied from a couple of weeks to three 
months depending on the trainees’ ranking and the specific circumstances of warfare. The 
average term lasted for a month. The Party avoided public discussions of any sensitive 
issues, such as class struggle and land reform that labeled it “communist” and potentially 
                                                 
13 I will discuss these issues in details in other chapters. 
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repelled pro-Party landlords and national bourgeoisie during the War. It nonetheless 
aimed at building a Marxist worldview among its cadres through training classes, and 
therefore attempted to maintain its internal ideological uniformity. The first lesson that 
the trainees studied was “history of social development,” which taught the Marxist model 
of linear social development. It asserted that human society experienced the phases of 
primitive society, feudal society, capital society, socialist society and would eventually 
reach communist society. It assured students of the superiority of communism over 
capitalism and the latter’s doomed fate. Second, the trainees were required to study the 
history of modern China, which dated from the First Opium War (1840-1842) to the 
current War of Resistance. The Party blamed the misery of China on imperialism, the 
Qing government, and more importantly, the impotent and seriously corrupted Nationalist 
government led by Chiang, who, according to the Party’s view, was responsible for the 
current semi-colonial status of China. The CCP then promoted itself as the country’s 
savoir, the only force which was capable of regaining China’s independence.  
Meanwhile, the training content also dealt with issues concerning current 
situations. The classes introduced Mao’s theory of the protracted warfare, which ensured 
students of an ultimate victory over Japan. In addition to political indoctrination, the 
trainers helped to outline the characteristics of local communities with which the trainees 
routinely worked. Besides regular studies, military training was also mandatory. The 
trainees practiced running, rifle shooting, and grenade throwing on a daily basis and took 
their turn at secure duty each night. Sometimes night march was also a requirement (Zeng 
Zijian 1984; Zhang Chengzong 1981). One trainee, Hongyun, claimed, “Although no big 
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progress was made, neither can I put all the one-month rich and brilliant content into my 
mind, I still feel much better than before…in terms of my mind, I am much firmer…as 
for daily works, even if [I] will meet difficulties beyond words… [I] am not afraid at all 
and come out with plenty of solutions, and persuade the backward masses with patience. 
[I] do not feel frustrated at all. It would not have been such without attending the training 
classes.”14 
In terms of organizing mass education, “winter school” (dongxue) enjoyed the 
most popularity. Keating’s study shows that mass education in the Shan-Gan-Ning 
Border Region was arranged on the basis of “production organizations,” which was 
deliberately designed to stir competition between these organizations in order to 
accompolish production goals (Keating 1997, 233-234). Such a production-oriented 
policy might have resulted from the inclement ecological environment unfavorable to 
agriculture and the Nationalist economic blockade of the northwest Communist base 
areas. In the regional bases of Jiangsu where physical surroundings were much more 
friendly, the party authorities were therefore inclined to nurture a new political culture via 
mass education. The Party explicitly stated to its cadres that winter school was not only a 
kind of regular literacy class, but more importantly, a wide-scale mass movement that 
targeted political mobilization. It took advantage of winter season when agricultural 
production stopped and provided the people with mandatory—even if it was not directly 
prescribed—political education that intended to deepen ordinary people’s political 
                                                 
14 Hongyun, “Wo Canjia le Minxunban Hou” (After I attended the Mass Worker Training Class), Dazhong 
bao, 22 January 1941. 
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understanding, mobilize them to participate in anti-Japanese production, base area 
construction and counterattack preparation (Zhonggong Sunan qu xingzheng gongshu 
1944; Yanfu qu 1943f). The targeted objective was the “basic masses” (jiben qunzhong), 
especially organized people, such as members of various local mass associations, and 
used them as a channel to attract unorganized people. Although the Party prohibited 
coercion in eliciting popular participation by local administrations, mass associations, 
local militaries, children’s corps, and schools usually obligated their members to attend. 
Under the coordination of regional governments, winter school committees were formed 
at different administrative levels to take charge of issues concerning the winter school 
campaign. This committee was composed of representatives of mass associations, 
military and administrative organs, and residency council (canyihui). The Party especially 
encouraged the participation of local gentry on the committee at the township level and 
above. This encouragement was regarded as a concrete implementation of the “three-
thirds” policy. The committees of bao and township were composed of five to seven 
members, and those of county and district about seven to eleven members. The regional 
government provided nothing but the textbooks and relied on local communities for all 
other cost of the winter school program. The financial support usually came from the 
contributions of rich families and mass associations, or sometimes the participants 
themselves. 
The Party paid special attention to training winter school teachers since it fully 
understood that their proficiency would be a key factor in determining the campaign’s 
success. Winter school teachers generally came from five categories: current elementary 
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and middle school teachers, middle school and senior elementary school students, mass 
workers, private school teachers and local educated youth. To assure that the messages 
the Party intended to spread would be accurately conveyed to participants, short-term 
trainings for winter school teachers, usually around five to seven days, were conducted on 
county basis before winter school began. The training program included a reconfirmation 
of the significance of winter school campaign, dissemination of news on current affairs 
and political subjects that was going to be taught later, and teaching skills that 
emphasized mass route, and adult psychology and education. 
The spirit of winter school curriculum was pragmatism. The regional government 
issued uniform textbooks, which were aimed at publicizing knowledge regarding rural 
production and deepening the masses’ understanding on the Party’s policies, such as the 
“three-thirds” policy, rent and interest reduction, and grain tax. The texts were usually 
quite short and composed of only simple characters. However, they sometimes delivered 
complicated messages. Here is a lesson text entitled “people and cattle want peace,” 
which called for military struggle against the Japanese and class education.  
People are not cattle.  
People are not horses.  
Be a man not a cattle or a horse. 
[if people are] Being cattle and horses this year, 
Next year [they should] fight for peace (Zhang Zhengyu 1983, 102). 
 
This text was written based on the fact that people’s lives had been thoroughly destroyed 
by the Japanese mopping-up campaigns. “Cattle,” the most important livestock in rural 
life, was used here as a symbol of peasants’ interests. To obtain a peaceful life for both 
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cattle and people, the only way was to fight and defeat the Japanese. It further implied 
that peasants’ miserable fates had resulted from the repression characteristic of 
imperialism and feudalism, which was doomed to be overthrown by united peasants. 
Thus, “this year” and “next year” actually indicated two different eras. Certainly, whether 
the students fully caught the underlying message or the winter school teachers were 
capable of accurately conveying it remained a mystery. There were also texts that 
summoned the nerve to fight Japan by retelling common knowledge. Here is an instance: 
One bamboo stick was easy to bend. 
Three cotton yarns were hard to break off. 
Nowadays the Japs came to intrude [our homeland], 
[we have to]Unite like one heart for resistance (Xu Shanwen et al 1985, 89). 
In addition, various local newspapers became textbooks of current affairs. Each week 
students had a review session to go over and discuss what they learned in the past week. 
Besides regular teaching methods, singing was also widely adopted as a way to fulfill 
teaching purpose and amuse the class at the same time. Here is a song entitled “it is really 
miserable to be illiterate” encouraging students to learn words: 
Folks, it is really miserable to be illiterate; 
[you are] not able to read newspapers or documents; 
[you are] not able to write contracts; 
Folks, work hard to learn and read; 
do not waste any minute or second; 
be a hero of production and fighting [the Japanese] (Xu Shanwen et al 1985, 89). 
 
A large-scale entertaining party was held every other week to boost students’ morale. 
After all, most participants of the campaign had left school for quite a long time or had 
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never before attended a regular school day. Therefore, winter school not only meant 
education but also functioned as an organizational discipline for ordinary peasants, who 
focused merely on domestic issues and lacked collective awareness of acting by rules and 
authorities. 
During the winter season there were usually two class periods with the spring 
festival a break in between. Each period lasted for at least thirty days and on each single 
day the winter school could have a whole-day, half-day or evening class, depending on 
local convenience. Normalized literacy class and community sponsored schools were 
strongly encouraged, especially in central areas where mass organizations such as peasant 
resistance association were active. Such classes or schools usually borrowed the facilities 
of local elementary schools, ancestral halls, temples or other public places for teaching 
purpose. Students were divided into different classes according to their age, sex, literacy 
level, and available time. Each class recommended one monitor who was in charge of 
keeping fellow students’ attendance, maintaining order during class, and leading 
discussion. To emphasize its democratic characteristic and encourage wider attendance, 
normalized winter school stipulated rules of behavior and attendance times upon which 
all the students agreed. In front areas where the local party branches were not powerful 
enough to guarantee normalized winter school security, itinerant teaching groups and 
literacy classes were encouraged. In addition to normalized schools, public blackboards, 
newspaper-reading groups, speech forums and wall newspapers served as supplementary 
forms of the campaign. On marketing days, trained winter school teachers and mass 
workers chose the most crowed places in towns, such as tea houses, restaurants, and 
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public bathrooms, to give speeches on public affairs and anti-Japanese ideas. They also 
taught revolutionary songs to the masses on such occasions. Under the name of 
promoting mass education, the winter school served as a bridge for the Party to reach 
ordinary people’s daily lives in the slack season. 
The Party’s initial expectations of winter school were simply to publicize its 
political agenda and increase the literacy level of ordinary people. To the Party’s joy, it 
functioned far beyond merely a mass education program. The winter school 
spontaneously served as a public forum for peasants to make judgments and discuss 
issues related to their daily life in some places. For instance, issues such as how to divide 
reclaimed land, selling land for funeral expenses and in-law disputes were brought into 
the winter school classroom for final judgment. A local military soldier of Ruibei Town 
in Yancheng County was forced to make his public apology in the winter school when he 
abandoned his night patrol duties to play cards.15 This new development was significant 
for the Party for two reasons. First, it changed peasants’ conventional way of dealing with 
domestic issues, which had attempted to confine discussion and negotiation within the 
family or families with the same surname. Now family disgraces (jiachou) like in-law 
arguments could be brought in front of the whole village. In this sense, familial bonds 
were weakened and an official authority, i.e. the Party, became an alternative to solve 
family disagreements. It also showed the Party’s successful infiltration into the private 
lives of the masses. Second, ordinary people gradually accepted the ritual of regular 
                                                 
15 “Zai dongxue chengren cuowu” (Admitting making mistakes in winter school), Yanfu Dazhong, 22 
January 1945.  
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public gatherings under the Party’s summons. This ritual might not be a fresh experience 
for the cadres of government or mass associations, which held meetings on a regular 
basis. However, it certainly was a fresh experience for ordinary peasants. Such a ritual 
made the participants feel close to fellow community members and self-identify with the 
group, and thus enhanced their awareness of collectivism. This, to some extent, further 
weakened the role that family played in local communities. 
Certainly, disjunction between policy-makers’ intentions and the actual 
implementation of winter schools did occur in places. The winter school in Guanyun 
County (north Jiangsu) was organized in a normalized form regardless of local 
conditions, which resulted in low participation and complaints.16 The winter school 
teachers in Dongguanmu area began their lesson with theories of original communism, 
which drove their students away from the classroom and aroused dissonance from local 
gentry. 17  Nevertheless, these shortcomings did not shadow the Party’s success in 
assimilating ordinary people into its pan-political culture. 
CONCLUSION 
If one needs to concisely outline the Party’s education program, there is no phrase 
more suitable than “education as mass mobilization” (jiaoyu minyunhua). This concept 
was firstly brought out on Jiangnan, a half-monthly magazine circulated in higher-
ranking Communist cadres in the Sunan Regional Base. Although I did not find such 
                                                 
16 Jin Feng, “Guanyun dongxue zhong de jige wenti” (Several issues in the winter schools in Guangyun), 
Renmin Bao, 3 February 1945. 
17 Yang Ning, “Zenyang caineng ban hao dongxue” (How to run the winter school well), Renmin Bao, 3 
February 1942. 
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expression in newspapers or official documents in other Jiangsu base areas, the 
characteristics of mass mobilization underlied almost every single educational policy and 
program. “Education as mass mobilization” fulfilled the Party’s urgent request of 
penetrating local society and creating a new culture that favored Communist leadership. 
First, this concept clearly articulated that education was part of the Party’s 
comprehensive framework of the wartime Communist movement. “Education as mass 
mobilization” revealed the marriage of education and politics, intending to counteract the 
collaborationist government’s slogan of “studying equals to patriotism.” It also showed 
that the Party was open to the possibility of the upward social mobilization of ordinary 
masses, like a CCP cadre once stated during the Jiangxi period—“to break off the upper 
class’s monopoly of education resource.” Furthermore, it undermined the independent 
status that educators enjoyed in the traditional Chinese society and assimilated them to its 
political institution. Therefore, this marriage was not only between education and politics, 
but also between the Party and the educator. Meanwhile, the mass-mobilizational 
education also attracted students and social youth who were enthusiastic for anti-Japanese 
patriotism. Within the schools, students were organized into student unions; outside the 
schools, social youth were mobilized to join the Youth Resistance Associations under 
anti-Japanese discourse. Both were peripheral organizations of the Party. “Education as 
mass mobilization” demonstrated the Party’s determination of absorbing each possible 
individual, regardless of age, into its revolutionary cause. 
Second, the mass-mobilizational education program was the result of the party’s 
pragmatism. Due to its practical need for penetrating local society, the most senior local 
 166 
party members who joined the Party upon its first arrival were usually among the lowest 
class and without any education. After a couple of years, an embarrassing situation in 
which the chiefs of counties were not able to read or calculate, gained prevalence in base 
areas in Jiangsu. To improve the literacy level of local cadres, a kind of education 
suitable for mass work training had to be developed. In addition, the objective 
environment made the mass-mobilizational education imperative. After the Hundred-
Regiment Battle in the 1940 revealed the growing military power of the Party, the 
Japanese army had shifted their major target from the Nationalist to the Communist base 
areas. Meanwhile Nationalist-Communist skirmishes occurred frequently, especially after 
the New Fourth Army Incident in 1941. Such an unstable environment required schools 
to move between different locales along with students if they wanted to survive Japanese 
military attacks. Sometimes students had to carry two sets of textbooks, one assigned by 
the Communist government for regular study and one by the collaborationist government 
to cope with sudden checks from the Japanese. Students in the areas subject to mopping-
up campaigns did not have fixed places or time to attend school, or even indoor 
classrooms that provided shelter from inclement weather. Such loyal insistence might not 
be achieved merely by conventional education. 
Most importantly, “education as mass mobilization”, like the Party’s various other 
strategies, was designed to build the legitimacy of the CCP as the national leading party 
vis-a-vis the GMD in the hearts of ordinary people. After ten years of tenure as a 
legitimate government, the GMD’s orthodox status was quite popular in the minds of 
different groups including intellectuals, peasants and landlords. Some people did not 
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regard Wang Jingwei, the head of the collaborationist government, as a traitor simply 
because he still carried his Nationalist member identity and believed that he would turn 
around when the Nationalist army initiated counterattacks.18 Ordinary peasants secretly 
returned the rent that they should not have turned in according to the rent reduction policy 
since they lacked faiths in the Party’s legitimacy and did not believe that the orthodox 
Nationalist government would be easily overthrown by the NFA. To eradicate people’s 
faiths in the GMD’s legitimacy, the Party endeavored to create a politicized culture as an 
intermedia that incorporated each aspect of people’s life into the anti-Japanese agenda 
and further linked this agenda to the Party. Once people spontaneously identified with 
this culture, they identified themselves with the Party and recognized the Communist 
government as legitimate. 
It was hard to objectively testify to the effectiveness of the Party’s wartime 
education policy in Jiangsu Province solely based on official documents. But generally 
speaking, the Party maintained closer supervision over elementary schools and adult 
educating classes since most of them were established or sponsored by the Communist 
government. However, when it came to middle schools, especially those transferred from 
Japanese occupied regions, students’ families held serious doubts upon the Party’s 
ideology and discouraged their children’s attendance. Most families which were able to 
afford middle school education belonged to at least the middle peasant class or above. 
                                                 
18 Xinru Zhang, “Ji Jiaoshi Zhengfeng Hui” (A record of the Rectification meeting of teachers), Renmin 
bao, 27 January 1945. 
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This brings our attention back to the issue of class division, which the Party deliberately 
evaded during wartime for the United Front.
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Chapter Five In the Name of Resistance: Taxation, Conscription, 
and Mass Mobilization in the Base Areas 
As previous chapters have shown, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
painstakingly penetrated local society through a variety of channels. It organized ordinary 
masses into resistance associations, making them into semi-official branches. It 
established residency councils at various administrative levels to appease the local gentry 
in the name of the United Front. It gradually disaggregated the landlord class through 
rent-interest reduction policy. Through the New Township renovation and general 
elections, it replaced traditional bao-jia system with its own personnel. Most importantly, 
it nurtured the future cadre echelon by devoting special attention to building and 
maintaining its own education system even during the most intensive pacification 
periods. 
How did the masses react to such penetration? The vast majority of people, 
especially those below the middle peasant level, benefited from Communist policies such 
as rent reduction and the grain borrowing campaign.1 The Communist movement, 
however, did not only bring peasants benefits. In most circumstances, sacrifices and the 
extraction of manpower and supplies followed these benefits. Why did the peasantry 
                                                 
1, The Party classified rural population into landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and 
wage workers according to people’s properties and their relation to land. Here are some general definitions 
of each class: landlords were those whose living expenses relied entirely on rent from their lands and other 
financial investments and did not attend any agricultural production. Rich peasants were those who were 
engaged in agricultural production with their own lands and still hired people for help. Middle peasants 
were self-cultivators and occasionally hired short-term labors. Poor peasants owned little lands and needed 
to rent land in order to make livings. Hired hands did not possess any land, and were usually hired by 
landlords or rich peasants, or rented land from landlords. 
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decide to support or resist the Party’s policies? Moreover, what kind of strategies did they 
adopt to achieve their goals?  
Social scientists have presented various explanations to these questions. Moral 
economists suggest that peasants based their decisions on communal norms, values, 
moral codes, mutual commitments, and, especially, the ethics of subsistence (Scott 1976). 
Others insist that peasants’ decisions were the result of rational choice. These scholars 
believe that peasants tried to maximize individual interests by weighing possible gains 
and losses (Popkin 1979).  
My observation of the Jiangsu base areas demonstrates the “rationality” behind 
peasants’ responses to Communist mobilization. However, in contrast to previous studies 
that understand the financial interests of the individual as the sole factor in “rational 
choice” calculations, I argue that it was also influenced by “local knowledge.” Borrowing 
from Clifford Geertz, I see peasants’ choices as driven by a combination of commonly 
held sense of moral values, rituals and popular culture (Geertz 1983). This chapter 
examines Grain Taxation, military recruitment and the anti-pacification campaign (fan 
qingxiang yundong), all of which asked people for supplies or sacrifices in the name of 
resistance, as three indexes to explore the degree to which the Party penetrated into the 
power structure of the local communities. By exploring these three movements, I 
demonstrate the degree to which people volunteered or were forced to make sacrifices in 
order to receive benefits under the Communist governance.  
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GRAIN TAX COLLECTION: THE EMERGENCE OF A GROWING STATE POWER2 
The ability to levy taxes is one of the most important indicators of state control. 
During the Republican period, agricultural taxes were generally collected based on land 
ownership, meaning that tenants were not subject to state taxation. Thus, in Jiangsu 
Province, where the developed market economy made tenancy and absentee landlordism 
prevalent, most peasants did not face official tax collectors directly. Rather, they paid the 
rent demanded by landlords or their agents. Historian, Kathryn Bernhardt, suggests that 
the tax rate in the Lower Yangtze Region was lower under the Nationalist regime than the 
Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). She argues that the power vacuum left by absentee landlords 
was soon occupied by the Republic government. Hence, the state played a dual role 
between peasants and their landlords. On the one hand, it employed bursaries and created 
rent-dunning bureaus to collect rents from tenants. On the other hand, it served as a 
protector that regularized and stabilized rents at a relatively acceptable level (Bernhardt 
1992). Bernhardt’s analysis indicates that in the Republican period peasants no longer 
understood the state as a faraway idol that they worshipped in ancestral halls. Rather, 
they saw it as a de facto force intervening in people’s daily life when the War broke out. 
Liu Chang furthers Bernhardt’s argument by claiming that the CCP continued its 
predecessor’s role as a mediator between tenants and landlords. He argues that although 
the political and social environment of the region changed during the War, the economic 
structure was not altered accordingly. Since peasants in Jiangsu did not face the 
government’s taxation directly, it was hard for the CCP to initiate revolution (Chang Liu 
                                                 
2 In this chapter, I discuss the collection of jiuguo gongliang (literally translated as saving-country public 
grain, I use Grain Tax to refer to it) from the time when it involved most social groups in the bases. 
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2003). Liu is correct in contending that the CCP faced obstacles in agitating for 
revolution in the Lower Yangtze Region. He also sides with other scholars of China as 
well as the Party itself to treat Jiangsu Province as a peripheral to the Chinese Communist 
Revolution. However, an exploration of the Grain Tax in Jiangsu Province reveals that 
the Party was never able to employ tax as an issue through which they could attack the 
Nationalist government. Actually, there is no evidence suggesting that the tax rate of the 
CCP was lower than that of the Nationalist government before the War. In contrast to its 
predecessors, however, the Party collected Grain Tax directly from ordinary peasants. 
Relying on its pre-taxing mobilization, the Party utilized Grain Tax as a means to 
reinforce itself as the state power vis-à-vis the masses.3 
Most Communist base areas began to collect Grain Tax between 1940 and1941, 
when the New Fourth Army (NFA) strategically shifted its focus to the north side of 
theYangtze River. In 1940, when Chen Yi triumphed over Han Deqin, the Nationalist 
Governor of Jiangsu, and a division of the Eighth Route Army joined his force, the NFA 
began to enjoy considerable strength and influence in this region.4 However, shortly after 
                                                 
3 Here “pre-taxing mobilization” means the policies and movements, such as the Double Reduction policy 
and various mass associations that have introduced in previous chapters. They, for the first time, were 
implemented in the base areas slightly before the Party got ready to tax its people. Hence, I use “pre” to 
indicate this point. However, some of these policies and movements were stressed cyclically, and thus, their 
relation with Grain Tax collection was mutually interacted at the same time. 
Usually the Party would not begin to collect tax before it fully controlled the areas. In front areas, it 
collected tax through those double-dealing town chiefs hired by the collaborationist government, who 
secretly included the Party’s tax in the amount required by the collaborationist government. I focus on the 
central areas and did not include the discussion of front areas in this chapter.  
4 This was also the time when the new headquarters of the NFA was established in Yancheng, Jiangsu 
Province. 
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the New Fourth Army Incident of January 1941, the NFA was disbanded.5 Although it 
was impossible for the CCP to relinquish its forces in central China, the NFA stopped 
receiving financial support or ammunition from Chongqing. This forced the Party to seek 
other sources of revenue to cover its administrative and military expenses. More 
importantly, the incident resulted in the death of Xiang Ying. Xiang was not only the 
commissar of the NFA; he was also the loyal representative of Wang Ming.6 Xiang’s 
death prevented a further conflict among its highest ranks over the NFA’s development. 
After the Incident, Chen Yi and Liu Shaoqi—Mao’s closest partner during the 
Rectification campaign—became the army commander and the commissar. Thus, 
Yan’an’s policies were executed in central China with less resistance and distortion of its 
original intention. It was also during this time that the NFA lost the characteristics it 
developed during the three-year guerrilla war (1934-1937) in southern China and began 
to be assimilated to the pattern of the Eighth Route Army (Benton 1999). 
After the New Fourth Army Incident, the Communist movement relied on local 
tax revenue more than ever before. It was also the first time that the Party could 
concentrate on its development without considering the restraints set by the Nationalist 
government or the internal power struggle within the Party.  Fabi, the official 
                                                 
5 A brief introduction of the New Fourth Army Incident is in the section of “Base Areas in Jiangsu 
Province” in Chapter One.  
6 Wang Ming was the major opponent that prevented Mao Zedong from achieving dominant control over 
the CCP before the Rectification Campaign. Wang used to study in Soviet Union and was prestigious as an 
orthodox Marxist and Soviet protégé in the Party. His contest with Mao was not only for the ultimate 
leadership of the Party, but more importantly, for the path that the Chinese Communist Revolution chose. 
Xiang Ying, a previous urban worker, allied with Wang from the beginning when Wang returned from the 
Soviet Union, while Chen Yi was a loyal supporter to Mao’s policies. Wang’s famous maxim during the 
War was “everything goes through the United Front,” which indicated his soft stance towards the 
Nationalist government. Since the GMD confined the NFA movements to the south side of the Yangtze 
River, Xiang and Chen bifurcated on the issue of the development of the NFA. 
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Republican currency, had experienced serious inflation due to the ongoing war and 
Japan’s intervention in the Chinese economy. Its purchasing power decreased 
dramatically (Table 1). To circumscribe this malignant inflation, the Party collected land 
taxes in kind, allowing peasants to pay with rice, wheat or corn.  
Table 8: Price of Daily Necessities 
Items Before the War (1937) After the War (1943) 
Wheat 4.5-11.5 yuan/dan* 500 yuan/dan 
Foreign Cloth 0.08 yuan/chi** 25 yuan/chi 
Pork 0.21 yuan/jin 20 yuan/jin 
Salt 0.05 yuan/jin 10 yuan/jin 
Oil 0.2 yuan/jin 32 yuan/jin 
Match 120 boxes/yuan 4 yuan/box 
Soda 0.05 yuan/jin 32 yuan/jin 
Hoe 0.5 yuan 120 yuan 
Source: Rao Shushi, Anle Xiang Diaocha (An Investigation of Anle Town), (1944.2.1):49-50;  
stack in the Archives of Jiangsu Province, File no. GZ 11-164. 
*1 dan=150 jin; 1 jin=0.5kg; 
**1 chi=1/3 meter; 
 
In contrast to land taxes that were collected on land ownership, Grain Tax targeted 
everyone who engaged in agricultural cultivation. It comprised a critical source of the 
NFA’s provisions and supplies for cadres above the town level. The Party claimed that 
the Grain Tax was collected to “guarantee the grain ration of the anti-Japanese forces and 
different levels of the resistance democratic government and maintain the tax burden at a 
reasonable level” (Huaihai qu 1943a).7 The tax was collected twice a year in the summer 
and the fall. Each time, the regional government issued collection articles, which 
prescribed tax rate, collecting procedures, due dates, discount and waiving conditions, 
                                                 
7 Such claims exist in all articles about Grain Tax collection. Here I only name one source. 
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etc.. Generally speaking, the tax rate was based on household output, except in the 
Huaihai district, where the rate was individually based. Families who owned less than 
three mu8 of land were exempt from tax duties. For rented land, owners and tenants were 
both responsible for the Grain Tax. To reinforce the Party’s image as the representative of 
the “basic masses,” the Grain Tax gave tenants an extra ten percent discount on their 
portion. If a family both owned and rented land, the two portions were calculated 
separately. Although the government only took specific crops as tax payments, peasants 
in different areas cultivated different crops. In consequence, each region established a 
standard crop, wheat or rice in most cases, which they used to measure other crops. The 
average tax rate was about 3% of the output per mu. Together with the average land tax 
of about 2% of the output per mu, the tax burden of grain production was around 5% of 
the value of output in Jiangsu Province.  
Considering the variety in weather conditions and land quality, the burden of the 
Grain Tax on local people varied. Although most regional governments considered 3 mu 
as a prerequisite for the Grain Tax, the rate differed significantly. In 1942, owners of first 
class land in Suzhong were required to turn in 10 jin9 of wheat or 12 jin of rice for each 
mu, regardless of the amount of land they owned. In Yanfu, however, land owners whose 
families owned 3-10 mu only had to provide 5 jin of wheat per mu, regardless of land 
quality. This 5 jin figure was even lower than the amount turned in by people who held 
third class land in Suzhong, which required 6 jin of wheat or rice (Zhonggong suzhong qu 
                                                 
8 1 mu=666.67 square meter. 
9 1 jin=0.5 kg=1.1 lb. 
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dangwei 1942c; Yanfu qu 1942c). As Table 9 indicates, a family with less than 50 mu of 
land in Huaihai turned in significantly less than a similar sized family in Suzhong or  
Table 9: Grain Tax Rate Comparison (1942) 
 Suzhong Yanfu Huaihai 
1
st
 class land /10 mu* 70 jin** 65 jin 20 jin 
2
nd
 class land /10 mu 55 65 12 
3
rd
 class land /10 mu 40 65 8 
1
st
 class land /20 mu 140 130 80 
2
nd
 class land /20 mu 110 130 48 
3
rd
 class land /20 mu 80 130 32 
1
st
 class land /50 mu 350 350 300 
2
nd
 class land /50 mu 275 350 180 
3
rd
 class land /50 mu 200 350 120 
1
st
 class land /100 mu 757.5 808 808 
2
nd
 class land /100 mu 600 808 484.5 
3
rd
 class land /100 mu 454.4 808 323.2 
Source: Zhonggong suzhong qu dangwei 1942c. 
* 1 mu = 666.67 Square meter; 
** 1 jin = 0.5 kg 
 
Yanfu. In Huaihai, however, the tax burden of a family with 100 mu of first class land or 
more was no lighter than one in Yanfu. It was even heavier than that of their Suzhong 
counterparts. Also, the rate went up sharply from 50-100 mu in both Yanfu and Huaihai. 
These numbers reflected the fact that there was an extremely large population of poor 
peasants in Huaihai, and land was highly concentrated both there and in Yanfu. Finally, 
Yanfu did not classify land into various classes when collecting the Grain Tax. As a 
result, the Grain Tax made peasants without fertile lands experience far more hardship in 
Yanfu than their counterparts in Suzhong and Huaihai. Later, paralleling a more thorough 
cadastral investigation, the base areas of Jiangsu were gradually capable of differentiating 
land quality and collecting the Grain Tax in a progressive term. Although the exempt 
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level remained unchanged during the War, the tax burden of those who owned the 
smallest amounts of land actually increased. Those who owned large amounts of land, 
particularly landlords, also faced an incremental load. While those groups suffered, 
families who owned less land but generated higher outputs received the largest benefits 
from the Party’s tax policy (Huaihai qu 1943a, 1944a). Fortunately for the Party, this 
group comprised the largest portion of the population. 
THE PARTY’S STRATEGIES OF MOBILIZATION 
During tax season, the Party moved towards wide-scale mobilization by targeting 
every member of local communities. Widespread meetings were its first choice for this 
mobilization. The Party began by organizing meetings for local cadres and the gentry, 
who stood in as representatives of different social groups. During the meetings, the cadres 
in charge emphasized the importance of the Grain Tax. They explained that it was a 
critical source of provisions for the anti-Japanese military forces. They also argued that 
the Grain Tax provided a way to adjust grain prices, prevent manipulation by malevolent 
merchants and counteract malignant inflation. The Party further claimed that the tax did 
not put increased burden on people’s finances since the government had already lowered 
or exempted for dozens of other taxes. High-ranking Communist cadres personally wrote 
to or visited the most prestigious members of the local gentry in order to reinforce these 
arguments. Meanwhile, the Party held special training classes to deepened trainees’ 
understanding of the collection’s political significance for the Communist movement.  
Mass mobilization continued after the training classes. Village-wide gatherings 
and group meetings were held in central areas. These meetings celebrated the NFA’s past 
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accomplishments, which helped to convince the masses that the NFA was the only power 
that could drive the Japanese out of China. They also promised that once the Japanese 
were defeated, people’s hardship would come to an end. Certainly, military action was a 
supplementary method for those who refused the Party’s request relying on their 
connection to the collaborationist government. For instance, the Party arrested the 
daughter of the collaborationist town chief of Benniu in the fall of 1943 for the very 
reason (Lu Yi 1985). 
The Grain Tax collection was based on the Party’s extensive knowledge of land 
ownership and classification in taxed areas. However, when the Party first began to 
collect Grain Tax in the base areas of Jiangsu, it had to rely on the inaccurate cadastral 
records from the prewar Nationalist government or assumed the peasants honestly 
reported the amount of the land they owned. Most base areas began cadastral surveys the 
next year when the NFA held substantial control over local communities. To take Anle 
Town as an example, a cadastral committee was formed for each bao. It consisted of the 
bao and jia heads, experienced peasants, local gentry, landlords and the leaders of 
peasants’ and women’s resistance associations. It contained seven to nine members 
according to the “three-thirds” principle. This committee was in charge of the survey, and 
the sub-district government sent two to four cadres to each bao to supervise the process. 
They began by inquiring of each family the amount, location and quality of the land they 
owned. Then, they went down to the plots to check the reliability of the provided 
information. After that, the result was publically posted for a second opinion. When all 
the revisions and negotiations were done, the district government issued a registration 
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card to the land owner. This document recorded the ownership, location, and 
classification of the piece of land. Finally, all cadastral records were stored in the 
township administration office (Rao Shushi 1944, 45-46). In those towns that were 
unable to afford the cost of manpower, people were encouraged to report their land 
ownership honestly. The reported information was also publicized for verification. Then, 
the cadres only had to verify the information of families who repeatedly tried to cheat the 
system in person. 10  The accomplishment of the cadastral surveys quickly became 
apparent. The amount of taxable land in Dongtai County and Rugao County (central 
Jiangsu) increased 500,000 mu and 60,000 mu respectively. 11  The Yanfu District 
discovered 2,000,000 mu of “new” land, around 20% of the previously registered land 
(Xue Bucan 1986). 
The Communist cadastral investigation turned out to be more successful than the 
surveys that the Nationalist government launched before the War. Li Huaiyin’s case study 
on Huailu County suggests that the investigation’s uncovering of “black land” was far 
more satisfactory than the government expected during the 1930s. One of the key reasons 
for Nationalists’ failure was the government’s inability to control its local officials, 
xiangzhang, who, entrenched in the local community network, acted more as protectors 
of communal interests than state agents when enforcing the investigation (Li 2005, 247). 
Li’s explanation also insinuates the cause of the Party’s success—its ability to control its 
local cadres. Since these men achieved their current social status and political power 
                                                 
10 “Fei Qingxiang Diqu de Liangfu Gongzuo (1944)” (The grain and tax work in the non-pacification 
areas), in Hua zhong kangri genjudi, vol. 3 (Beijing: Dang’an Press, 1987), 482-489. 
11 Ibid. 
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through the Communist authorities, they were more eager to show their loyalty to the 
Party than protect the common interests of local communities. 
During the process of collection, different levels of local government adjusted 
their procedures in accordance with specific conditions almost every year. In Anle, a 
township level Grain Tax committee was organized for general supervision. In each bao 
or village, a Grain Tax group (gongliang xiaozu), composed of the head of the village, the 
grain committee member, the leader of the peasant resistance association, an experienced 
peasant and a town-ranking cadre, was in charge of concrete duties, such as land 
classification and grain storage. When the Grain Tax was collected in Anle for the first 
time in the summer of 1940, the bao or jia heads interviewed each household about the 
amount they produced. Knowing that the Party did not have the power to challenge their 
claims, most households intentionally reported less than their actual harvest. After 1942, 
the Grain Tax Group began to check the figures that families reported. However, the 
Group soon became notorious among villagers, as the members went to each household 
at least two or three time, poked piled grain with a bamboo stick, and left a mess for the 
family to clean. In the fall of the same year, central Jiangsu experienced severe drought 
damage. However, the Grain Tax hardly decreased. Households whose outputs were 
above 60% of the prior year’s production were still required to turn in the full amount of 
taxes. In 1943, to simplify the procedures of collection, the government attempted to set a 
uniform tax rate for all land. Ordinary peasants protested these measures intensely. One 
complained, “Ten fingers are different in lengths. People are different in heights. How 
can tax rates of land be uniform?” Finally, the Party considered peasants’ opinions and 
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classified the land into four categories with corresponding different tax rates. In addition, 
The Party held several village-wide meetings to publicize the procedures of collection, 
discuss the tax ration of each household set by the Grain Tax Group and the household 
head, and call for advice from the masses about collection (Rao Shushi 1944, 47-48). 
This negotiation occurred in the tax season when surroundings were relatively peaceful, 
and the Party had established substantial control in Anle. The CCP, thereby, encouraged 
ordinary people to get involved in political affairs and had the confidence to contain 
unfavorable public opinions. Such encouragement was helpful in reinforcing the Party’s 
democratic image in people’s minds. 
Local grain tax groups adopted various measures to persuade peasants to turn in 
the full amount of the Grain Tax on time. Besides regular propaganda, such as singing, 
dancing and street skits, they organized competitions to motivate peasants. Knowing that 
peasants were sensitive to “face” (mianzi), local grain tax groups in Suzhong Regional 
Base employed red and green flags/billboards, which were hung in the main streets of 
villages, to praise people who met their tax quota and scold the households that lagged 
behind. Meanwhile, they held little ceremonies of “flying a plane” or “being a turtle,” in 
which participants carried winners up high, making them like flying in a plane, or 
distorted losers’ body, forcing them to act like a turtle. 12  According to Chinese 
convention, being symbolized as a turtle was a disgrace and a serious way to lose face in 
front of people. Ordinary peasants, therefore, had plenty of motivation to follow the 
Party’s deadline and prevent such embarrassment.  
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
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In order to guarantee the ration set by higher authorities, local grain tax groups 
showed no lenience to the poor. In one Town of Jiangning County (south Jiangsu), a 
village-wide mass mobilization meeting was held once the collection began. During the 
meeting, the presiding officer inquired of each household whether they could turn in the 
full amount of the tax the following day. The peasants were divided into two groups 
making marks of “○” and “×” for yes or no. In this sense, a regular mobilization 
suddenly shifted to a struggle meeting against the households that were not able to turn in 
the full amount of the tax. This inevitably made the atmosphere intense. The presiding 
cadres interrogated the “no” group one-by-one, with the “yes” group auditing aside. The 
inquiries focused on two questions: “what kind of hardship do you have” and “what shall 
we do to solve the problems.” This process comprised something of a psychological 
torture for the audience: one the one hand, the “no” group members worried about public 
humiliation when it came to his or her turn; on the other hand, it set a vivid example for 
the auditing group if they were not able to keep their word the next day. 
The cadres were experienced enough to know that for those households suffering 
the most difficulty, especially the ones that did not have enough food to feed themselves, 
suggestions such as “you can borrow from other families,” would not work, since no one 
was willing to lend grain to families that were not able to make their own daily ration. 
When poor families were pushed to their ends, they could say nothing but “I will figure 
this out tomorrow.” In such cases, the cadres demonstrated astonishing perseverance in 
their interrogation, asking: “What kind of solution will you come up with tomorrow?” 
“Who will you borrow from?” “How much are you going to borrow?” “Are you sure he 
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is willing to lend?” When the interrogated was silenced by the abundance of these 
questions, the cadres encouraged the “yes” group to voluntarily offer their assistance—
another usage of the auditing group. At the end, some “yes” households stepped out, 
under pressure or not, to lend wheat to the over-burdened families, but they insisted a 
timely payback once their hardship was gone. There was no record that revealed how 
such liabilities ended. What was known was that, eventually, the cadres obtained the 
word of the “no” group—“I will turn in with the full amount tomorrow (Zhonggong 
sunan diyi zhuanshu caijing chu 1943).” Higher authorities praised this method, setting it 
as a positive example to follow within Jiangning County, or even the Sunan Regional 
Base. Moreover, the meeting minutes recorded only positive feedbacks from the 
participants. Their praise remained suspect, however, as they would have been hesitant to 
express any discontent after such psychological sufferings from public humiliation. 
The above instances demonstrate that local cadres played a key role in ensuring 
the success of tax collection. They designed various rituals on the basis of communal 
norms about prestige and humiliation to exert public pressure on the taxed population. 
Their knowledge of local communities enabled them to best reallocate household 
resources to optimize the result of the Grain Tax collection without arousing too much 
unfavorable resistance from ordinary peasants. In this sense, the tax collection was not 
merely an economic mobilization, but more importantly, a complex negotiating process 
of the existing political, economic and cultural situations in local settings. 
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RESPONSES AND REACTION AT LOCAL LEVEL 
When the collection came to an end, the Grain Tax was stored on the basis of 
villages. The village heads recommended households to shoulder this responsibility. In 
addition to the prerequisites of honesty and loyalty, households that maintained the 
storage had to have residences that were big, dry, far away from major roads or rivers and 
free from leakages and mice problem. Usually the capacity of one of these storage units 
was about 500 to 1000 jin. After double-checking the weight and amount of the collected 
grain, the Grain Tax Committee issued an invoice that recorded both the Tax Group and 
the storage household. Local government conducted routine monthly check on the stored 
grain. Considering the huge responsibility of this task, most peasants evaded such 
assignments. One simply claimed, “Turning in the Grain Tax is our obligation, but 
storing it is not.”13 
Although the Party officially claimed that the Grain Tax rate was 3%, peasants’ 
actual burden on land was far heavier. According to an economic report on the Yanfu 
District, the ratio of the Grain Tax load to the total output in Yanyu Town of the 
Yancheng Fifth Sub-district was 5.3% for hired hands, 9.3% for poor peasants, 10.4% for 
middle peasants, and 11.6% for rich peasants (including small landlords). In the Funing 
Sub-district, this ratio ranged from 7% to 30%.14 In addition, people were obligated to 
perform corvee service (chu fuzi). In Anle, the Party required middle peasants, rich 
peasants and landlords to perform long-term corvee service, which lasted for 9-22 days 
                                                 
13 Ibid.; Rao Shushi 1944, 47-48. 
14 “Yanfu Diqu Caizheng Jingji (1944.6)” (Financial and economic situation of Yanfu district), in Hua 
zhong kangri genjudi, vol. 3 (Beijing: Dang’an Press, 1987), 166-186. It is not indicated in the report that 
whether land tax was included or not. 
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each time, and poor peasants and hired hands had to serve as short-term corvees. In the 
first seven months of 1943, altogether there were short-term corvees of 606 people and 
long-term corvees of 79 people. These were said to be the lightest load till then (Rao 
Shushi 1944, 53-54). 
The disparity between the rhetoric of the Party and the reality of peasants’ 
experiences during Grain Tax collection brings to mind a number of questions. Most 
provocatively, how did people react towards such a rhetoric-reality difference? Generally, 
they peacefully accepted the existence of the Grain Tax and hid their complaints, 
expressing them only in private. Such situations were due, in part, to society’s inertial 
compliance inherited from the traditional Chinese culture. As one peasant commented, 
“from ancient time it is a universal rule that officials live on people and people live on the 
land. If we had not turned in the Grain Tax, what would these officials have lived on?” 
(Rao Shushi 1944, 55) Although the Party claimed that they collected the Grain Tax in 
order to support resistance activities and cover administrative expenses, for ordinary 
peasants, it was no different than the taxes collected by the GMD or the collaborationist 
government. A saying began to circulate in Dongtai County: “The Third Brigade (the 
GMD forces) fight for tax; the Two-yellow (the collaborationist forces) rob for tax; and 
the NFA cheat for tax.” (Dongtai xian caijing ju 1943) 
Yearly tax load increases further bothered the people. They complained: “The 
Grain Tax increased every year, and no one knows how much would be added next year.” 
They also bemoaned, “The NFA are shrewd; last year they created a progressive tax, this 
year voluntary contribution. Even if 5 sheng and a half (of grain) was not mandatory, 
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(one still needed to) turn in 3 sheng. There’s no difference between 7 li and 8 li (Dongtai 
xian caijing ju 1943; Rao Shushi 1944, 55-57).”15  
Despite these complaints, people’s discontents only resulted in words, never 
actions. Apart from the embedded mindset that they were taxed anyway, as I point out 
above, the military presence of the NFA in the neighborhood was a decisive reason for 
such compliance. Although persistently portrayed as selfish, near-sighted, parochial and 
manipulated in internally circulated party documents, peasants, as individuals, were also 
capable of making rational decisions for their own lives and their families. After 
calculating possible gains and losses, they decided to follow the Party for the time being. 
Complaints from ordinary peasants actually reflected discordance between the 
rhetoric propaganda of the higher authorities and the concrete situations of local 
communities. The effectiveness and organizational ability that the Party manifested in the 
process of the Grain Tax collection demonstrated its impressive accomplishments in 
penetrating local society in a very short period of time. However, it experienced a 
gradually loss of control corresponding to their descending influence over local cadres, 
especially at the bao level. Quite a number of village cadres in charge of collection duties 
were bao heads who served local communities long before the Party took control. Since 
their power bases did not reside solely in the Party’s endorsement, the Party lacked 
efficient means to restrain their behaviors. Even cadres promoted by the Party did not 
necessarily maintain their integrity. Although the CCP prescribed that the poorest 
households and military dependents were entitled to lower tax rate or exemptions, such 
                                                 
15 1 sheng = 7.5kg; 1 li =0.5 km. 
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benefits usually went to the friends or relatives of town chiefs or bao heads in Dongtai 
County. Corruption related to the Grain Tax was not rare. In the summer of 1941, a town 
chief of the Fu’an Sub-district took 2,000 dan of Grain Tax for private use. The town 
chiefs of Fengying and Jiangying built new houses with the benefits they received from 
Grain Tax collection. Meanwhile, for lack of supervision on storage, the waste of Grain 
Tax was surprisingly high. Two thirds of the Grain Tax of Sanzha Sub-district, about 
2,000 dan, was unsuitable to pick up for use. The average waste rate of the Grain Tax in 
Dongtai County was around 18% from 1941 to 1943. No wonder people sarcastically 
complained, “The NFA cannot eat up the Grain Tax at all!” (Dongtai xian caijing ju 
1943) In addition, unfairness was recorded during cadastral surveys. Middle or poor 
peasants were beaten and tied up for public humiliation, and their properties were even 
confiscated, if they cheated in the survey. The cadres’ attitude, conversely, was much 
more benevolent when rich households did the same thing (Dongtai xian caijing ju 1943). 
Such negative impressions of the Communist local cadres, to some extent, blurred the 
differences that the Party endeavored to construct between them and their Nationalist 
predecessors. 
LOCAL MILITIA RECRUITMENT: PAROCHIAL MOBILIZATION 
The Party initiated all of its wartime campaigns under the name of resistance, 
claiming that they were protecting the masses from Japanese brutalities. Among such 
initiatives, organizing local militias most affected people’s daily lives. Local military 
forces were not a new creation of the Party, but rather, a long-lasting tradition prevalent 
in central China. Elizabeth Perry observes that since the mid-nineteenth century, the rich 
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organized protective militias to secure the public safety of their communities while the 
poor resorted to predatory actions, such as kidnapping, smuggling and banditry for 
survival in Huai-bei region (Perry 1980). The increasing strength of local militias 
paralleled the lessening control the imperial court held over local society. Such a trend in 
decentralization grew when the court had to rely on Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang and 
their locally recruited Xiang and Hui forces for suppressing the Taiping Rebellion in the 
1860s. Philip Kuhn argues that local militias continued into the Republican period and 
gradually evolved into a system of self government that supplemented the functions the 
Nationalist government was unable to fulfill below the county level (Kuhn 1980[1970]). 
However, they also served as a self-protective cushion that precluded state penetration. 
When the Nationalist forces collapsed after its central government retreated from Nanjing 
to Chongqing, various local militias in Jiangsu Province stepped up to protect their 
communities against harassment from banditry, deserting GMD soldiers and the 
Japanese. Another factor facilitating the development of local militias was the large 
amount of ammunitions left by the GMD forces during their retreat. This was the 
situation that the NFA faced in Jiangsu as it struggled to expand its forces during the 
War. 
Here, I introduce the process through which the CCP established its local military 
forces. The first step adopted by the Party was to appeal to the existing local resistance 
militias and assimilate them into the NFA. Local militias in Jiangsu were under the 
control of three kinds of people: bandits, ex-Party members who relinquished their 
membership after the Nationalist purge of 1927, and ex-officials teamed with landlords. 
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The decisive factor to the Party’s success typically relied on the attitude of the militia 
leaders. As previous chapters have shown, the CCP’s image of genuine and firm 
resistance fighters had been widely publicized and had impressed the masses and 
intellectuals when the War broke out. Disappointed by the reckless retreat of the GMD 
troops, some militia leaders volunteered to hand over their leadership to the Party for 
better military training and the coordination of resistance activities. Ren Tianshi, the 
leader of the militia in Tangqiao (southern Jiangsu), was a good example of this 
motivation. Such instances were also found elsewhere outside Jiangsu Province. In his 
study on the peasant salt makers of Shandong Province, Ralph Thaxton shows that local 
people were inclined to ally with the Eighth Route Army when it was fighting their 
enemies—bandits, GMD and the Japanese forces, all of which the peasants viewed as 
atrocious and rapacious. This trend became much more apparent between 1939 and 1942 
when the Japanese began to build their collaborationist forces from bandits and previous 
GMD forces (Thaxton 1997). However, not all militia leaders embraced the Party with 
wholehearted sincerity. Many kept their own agendas and feared to lose substantial 
control over their forces, which could lead to a disadvantageous position in their power 
bargain with the CCP and the GMD. For instance, the local militia leaders of Xiqiao 
(Southern Jiangsu), Mei Guangdi and Zhu Shousong, eluded Communist assimilation by 
repeatedly refusing cadres sent to their forces, despite the fact that Mei had been a Party 
member during the 1920s. Therefore, the Party ran a high risk of militias’ defection to the 
GMD or the Japanese until it was able to replace the original leaders. 
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Besides converting existing militias, the Party made strenuous efforts to organize 
its own local military forces. According to the “Directions about the Military 
Arrangements of the Anti-Japanese Bases” (Guanyu Kangri Genjudi Junshi Jianshe de 
Zhishi), issued by the Central Military Committee on November 7, 1941, “the military 
organization of each base area should contain three parts: regular forces, local forces, and 
local militia (who were not exempt from quotidian agricultural production)” (Ouyang 
Huilin 1988). The NFA was no longer the unnoticeable 8,000 soldiers that converged in 
Nanchang in January of 1938. Instead, as Chen Yung-fa indicates, the NFA had become 
the main target of the Japanese military since Han Deqin’s military force was defeated 
and driven out of North Jiangsu in late 1940. Under this circumstance, the Central 
Committee emphasized strengthening and expanding local forces and the militia. The 
same direction prescribed that the ratio of regular to local forces in plain bases should be 
1:1, and for the weakest base areas, such as Sunan, the difference between regular and 
local forces should not be over-addressed in order to localize all military forces (Ouyang 
Huilin 1988). 
Technically, local militias (including people’s self-defense resistance teams) were 
voluntary military organizations of all people who were not exempt from agricultural 
production.16 It protected local communities from banditry and the Japanese, maintained 
public security and helped local administration in various duties. For instance, the 
Articles of Changshu Self-defense Team stipulated that “all people between 18 to 45 
                                                 
16 At the time, the NFA, the backbone team (gugan dui) of local military forces, and cadres of county level 
and above did not attend regular agricultural production and, thus, were not the targeted participants of 
local militias. 
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years old, regardless of sex, party, belief and religion, have the right and obligation to 
attend the self-defense team except for those who fall into the following categories: 
collaborators and those suspected of collaboration, ones deprived of civil rights, the 
mentally disabled, and people without proper jobs.”17 After 1944, the spectrum was 
expanded to 16-50 years old, except for the disabled. However, based on the internally 
circulated documents, it is evident that the Party treated militias as a class based military 
force. There was a default agreement among party cadres that the backbone of the militia 
should be poor peasants, middle peasants and hired laborers. Although they did not ban 
people who were born in landlord or rich peasant families from participation, such people 
were rarely promoted to leading positions. The Party instead looked to the upper class for 
financial contributions and ammunitions support.  
The Party intentionally reinforced its leadership in local militias. Usually, leaders 
of the self-defense teams were also the administrative cadres of the same place. To assure 
the Party’s leading role in local militias and downplay the influence of local elites, Party 
members and activists from a variety of resistance associations were encouraged to 
participate. Thus, a local cadre sometimes held dual or triple identities as an 
administrative officer, resistance association organizer and militia leader. Such a 
phenomenon resulted from the scarcity of cadres during the wartime, and, at the same 
time, was an inevitable institutional production of the Party’s authoritarian policy. It 
required a high consciousness of the different duties belonging to the corresponding 
                                                 
17 “Diyi Xingzhengqu Renmin Kangri Ziweidui Zuzhi Zhanxing Tiaoli” (the Provisional Articles of the 
People’s Self-defense Resistance Team in the 1
st
 Administrative District), Dazhong bao, 16 March 194. 
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positions, which, unfortunately, most local cadres lacked. Even if militia issues became a 
regular discussion each week at the town Party branch meeting, and each month at the 
district and county committee meeting, militia cadres and members frequently 
overstepped their power. They sometimes arrested people, took fines and confiscated 
private property without proper reasons, and, at times, they even executed prisoners under 
the accusation of collaboration (Huazhong ju 1943b). Such behaviors deeply stained the 
Party’s good reputation of caring for people in local communities. 
In most places in Jiangsu, local militias developed paralleling the mass 
campaigns. The Party employed ordinary people’s deep affection for their hometowns as 
an important incentive to call for mass participation. Many times people volunteered to 
join local militia after some mass movement, such as “Rent Reduction,” under the slogan 
“fighting the Japs and militarily protecting our hometown.” Here the Party caught the 
most tangible request of the masses, who were more willing to invest in their own 
wellbeing, rather than that of their country. What the local militia guarded was the 
security of their regular production, the benefits brought from the “Rent Reduction” 
policy, and their hometown. Therefore, the local militias of Jiangsu expanded quickly 







Table 10: Rugao(dong) County People’s Military Forces during the War of Resistance 
                1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Sum 9,031 12,047 22,682 57,269 40,179 
Militia 432 2,242 9,197 24,618 7,514 
Basic Backbone Team    68 51 385 1,318 1,115 
Small Guerilla 64 167 109 197 215 
Self-defense Team 8,467 9,587 12,991 31,136 31,335 
Source: Rudong geming shiliao xuanji no. 17 (1986): 40. 
 
Despite the rapid development of local militias, ammunitions support did not 
increase accordingly. Although the GMD troops left quite a few rifles and machine guns 
when retreating to the hinterland, such supplies rarely fulfilled the requirement of the 
expanding militia. The militia’s weapons usually came, voluntarily or under pressure, 
from local landlord families who used to have private militias. According to Table 4, the 
average person to rifle ratio was approximately 2:1 in small guerilla groups, 10:1 in basic 
backbone teams and almost 100:1 in the ordinary militia.18 The complaints about the 
dearth of weapons were quite prevalent among the masses. Some pledged, “We will join 
the self-defense team if rifles are provided.” Even local cadres suggested, “It would be 





                                                 
18 Basic backbone teams were selected from ordinary militias, and small guerilla groups came from basic 
backbone teams. Small guerillas were usually counted as part of the Communist military forces and were 
exempted from agricultural production. 
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Table 11: Statistics of District Small Guerrilla Groups and Militia in Rugao(dong) 
County (1944.7) 
District Small Guerilla Militia 















Dingdong 3 80 40 2,500 400 2,900  300 
Shuangbei 3 70 40 2,000 350 2,350 25 250 
Benfeng 3 50 25 1,800 300 2,100 3 200 
North 
Juema 
3 68 34 2,000 350 2,350 20 200 
Fengdong 3 52 36 1,883 217 2,100 11 236 
Juedong 3 11 10 980 98 1,078 10 100 
Sum 18 331 185 11,163 1715 12,878 69 1,286 
Source: Rudong geming shiliao xuanji no. 17 (1986): 38. 
 
Due to the lack of ammunition and provision supplies, local militias were hardly 
capable of fulfilling the military task of “protecting their hometowns” as publicized 
during recruitment. They served more in civil tasks—maintaining public security, 
collecting taxes, and delivering intelligence to the NFA. Therefore, most militias were 
actually afraid of directly encountering the Japanese or collaborationist forces. Apart 
from this, local militias were also a resource for enlistment. According to the Party’s 
military ladder—local militiabasic backbone teamlocal forcesregular forces—the 
NFA occasionally went to local militias to select promising members for promotion to 
local or regular forces (Table 12).  
Table 12: The Militia Promotion of Rugao(dong) County during the War of Resistance 
 Sum 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Sum 3,601 272 296 515 2,121 397 
To Regular Force 1,821 99 130 205 1,314 73 
To Local Force 910 75 92 209 399 135 
To Small Guerilla 870 98 74 101 408 189 
Source: Rudong geming shiliao xuanji no. 17 (1986): 40. 
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However, such promotions were not always welcome. In the worst cases, this double fear 
of confronting the enemy and promotion to regular forces led to defection. For example, 
in Taidong (central Jiangsu) the Self-defense Team of the Second Sub-district defected to 
the collaborationist forces carrying all their weapons in November 1941. Likewise, the 
small guerilla group of Libao and Qizhuang went out robbing during meeting times 
(Hong Xuezhi 1942). As we saw in tax collection, the Party revealed its inability to 
control its cadres or forces at the township level and below. 
The existence of local militias functioned more for political purposes, i.e. mass 
militarization, than protection of local communities. It primarily facilitated the leadership 
transference of existing military forces from local elites to the Party. Then, it served as 
another channel to organize ordinary peasants. Like other mass organizations, it created 
an identity for the masses as militia members, which reinforced the participants’ loyalty 
towards the Party, and bonded them with the Communist system. Certainly, it also 
provided human resources for the NFA. Ironically, the most publicized ideas of militia 
recruitment, family loyalty and community attachment, became some of the largest 
obstacles to conscription. 
CONSCRIPTION FOR REGULAR FORCES  
Chen Yung-fa is right to argue that the Party’s military recruitment was far more 
“voluntary” than it claimed to be. It is true that conscription was a complicated process of 
persuasion, mobilization, compulsion, money and political bargains, or even, cheating. 
However, Chen must also recognize that the Party had successfully changed people’s 
conventional wisdom of “good men never join the army.” He demonstrates the effort that 
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the Party made to construct an image of the NFA as caring, loving, impartial and well-
disciplined, particularly compared with the notoriously coercive and corruptive reputation 
of the GMD forces (Chen 1986, 383-390). Nevertheless, no matter how promising the 
military career could be or how sublime the NFA were, joining the army meant to run the 
risk of losing people’s lives. The enlistees would be relocated soon after conscription. 
Simple parochial mobilization, which worked effectively in militia recruitment, was not 
helpful, and even deepened people’s attachment to their hometowns, which would have 
led to the failure of conscription. Therefore, the Party had to put new stakes on table. 
When the CCP and the GMD was still in the honeymoon period of the United 
Front, the latter deprived the Party of its right to conscript the population. Due to Xiang 
Ying’s soft stance towards the Chongqing Nationalist government, the NFA’s recruitment 
was confined to assimilating existing local military forces, such as the Jiangnan 
Volunteers (Jiangkang) and the People’s Volunteers (Minkang). When Chen Yi became 
the de facto chief commander after the New Fourth Army Incident and the Party secured 
its powerbase in north Jiangsu, the NFA resorted to direct conscription as a main channel 
of military expansion. After 1941, conscription was organized once or twice a year and 
reached its summit in 1944, as indicated by the above tables. It usually occurred around 
the end of each year when the slack season came and peasants were temporarily released 
from land. Although actual conscription only lasted about twenty days, preparational 
mobilization frequently began one or two months earlier. 
Appreciating the Party’s attempts at conscription first requires an understanding 
of its operational process. The prelude to conscription was the reinforcement of the 
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“Assistance Program of Military Dependents” (youkang), typically beginning around the 
Mid-autumn Festival. This program was designed to solve the problem of labor shortages 
that resulted from family members’ joining the army. The scale of benefiting military 
personnel was confined to main forces, local forces and all other guerrillas that were 
exempted from regular production duty. This program was supposed to provide 
assistance to their dependents, including wives, children, parents, grandparents and 
siblings, who were underage or incapable of independent living, under the Party’s 
supervision. The content of the Assistance Program ranged from exemption or favored 
treatment in taxes, corvee, production loans, educational and medical services, to helping 
the military dependents in agricultural busy season and other times of production 
(Huaihai qu 1944d; Suzhong qu 1944c). During conventional holidays, such as the spring 
festival, the dependents were invited to official banquets and received gifts and toasts 
from local cadres. In order to demonstrate the reverence and benefits that military 
dependents enjoyed, and thereby encourage new enlistment, the Party usually took the 
occasion of the Mid-autumn Festival to reinstate the benefits of the Assistance Program. 
Although it was intended to mitigate the hardships that enlistment brought to 
military families, the Assistance Program did not always materialize as planned. On the 
one hand, some military dependents took advantage of the Assistance Program to evade 
diligent work themselves, which aroused massive aversion in local communities. 
Dependents’ complaints about poor treatment and cheap gifts were often heard during 
holidays. On the other hand, villagers were not willing to help military dependents at the 
price of their own harvest during busy seasons. Even local cadres viewed it as a dreadful 
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obligation. Due to such pervasive negligence towards the Assistance Program among 
ordinary peasants as well as local cadres, some obligation, such as sending gifts, often fell 
on the shoulders of previous local elites, i.e. landlords and rich peasants. Thus, the 
dependents were not entirely clear about the exact role that the Party played in the 
Assistance Program.19 Without mutual communication and understanding between the 
dependents and local cadres, the Program, more often than not, simply became a trade off 
between military service and tangible interests. 
After the peak of the Assistance Program, the first round of mobilization focused 
on inner-party education for local cadres and party members. Not only were they the 
major target of annual recruitment, they also acted as intermediates, who actually faced 
the masses in hopes of further persuasion and mobilization. Before village branch 
meetings, town or sub-district leaders had carefully analyzed their subordinates’ situation. 
They had already drawn conclusions regarding the potential draftees and those who 
would be able to enlist more. Party members were expected to be models in the campaign 
and, thus, to move and attract more ordinary enlistees. Although they realized that the 
peasantry was the most imperative power to the success of the Communist Revolution, 
the CCP leaders stereotyped peasants as ideologically backward and lacking in education. 
They believed that mobilization would not succeed without thorough “thought struggle” 
                                                 
19 “Shiyi qu de qunzhong youkang yundong” (The mass assistance program of the eleventh sub-district), 
Huaihai bao, 7 October 1944. 
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(sixiang douzheng). This effort mainly focused on the questions of “what if individual 
benefits conflict with the Party’s benefits,” and, “are they really conflicting?”20 
Before the branch meeting of Yaozhuang Village (Sishu County, north Jiangsu), 
the higher authorities had already categorized party members in the village. Among the 
eighteen members, six were of better consciousness, five hung in the middle with average 
behaviors, and seven kept the membership but never spoke on meetings. Since sixteen of 
the eighteen party members were tenants under poor economic conditions, the higher 
authorities decided to elicit their initiatives via class inquiries: Why did you suffer in the 
past? How had the situation turned over now? And, finally, who brought such changes? 
All these questions were designed to demonstrate the importance of controlling military 
forces. In addition, in order to create a progressive atmosphere, the six good party 
members were arranged to make speeches on the meeting. However, the event did not go 
as smoothly as planned. 
On the first meeting day, most participants were late. Four failed to appear as they 
were out drinking the night before. All the attendees appeared to be tired and reluctant to 
speak out. Once called upon, even those who managed to attend failed to respond to 
simple questions. When it came to the key questions, such as “Are we concerned with our 
troops?” “Would we be fine on earth without the NFA?” “How can we strengthen our 
military forces?” and “Should we control military forces,” only one branch committee 
                                                 
20 “Sishu xianwei guanyu jinnian canjun yundong diyi jieduan hou wutian de gongzuo zhishi” (The 
working directions of the Committee of Sishu County about the last five days of the first phase of the 
conscription of this year), Huaihai bao, 13 November 1944. 
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member and two activists expressed their opinions. All the others remained silent, except 
for one elder whose speech strewed far of topic. 
The second day did not go much better. It started with the issue of class hatred. 
Fearing the possibility that too many pre-arranged speeches would give the participants 
the impression that everything was set up and further downgraded their motives to attend, 
the presiding cadres arranged a free speech forum. However, the forum lacked proper 
guidance, and the backward party members dominated the forum. As a result, free speech 
eventually turned into collective complaints. The organizer decisively stopped the forum, 
and in the afternoon the branch committee members began to talk to the attendees 
individually to exchange opinions. During the evening meeting, despite the continued 
absence of two members, the participants had a heated discussion on past hardships. 
When the topic shifted to the potential threat of retaliation from the GMD and landlords, 
the organizers finally had a chance to communicate to the participants that the Party’s 
military forces were not yet strong enough and lacked party member personnel. These 
words conveyed two messages to the audience. First, if the conscription task could not be 
accomplished successfully, their political status and current life would not be secure. 
Second, if they joined the army, their potential career was quite promising. The attendees 
apparently were motivated by the urgent threat and bright future. One insisted, “We party 
members should pick up the guns and join the army!” Under such circumstances, the 
organizers asked each attendee whether he could be drafted or not. Five volunteered and 
uttered their resolutions to mobilize more followers when conscription began. To 
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reinforce the enlistees’ determination, the rest of the meeting was devoted to a discussion 
of how to help the enlistees’ families when the men left.21 
The above is an instance of a successful mobilization among the party members. 
However, not all party members could be persuaded by this pattern. In Huai’an County of 
the Subei Regional Base, local cadres demonstrated their stubbornness in the county 
meeting: 
“I am not easy to persuade. I do not have anything to say.” 
“Who wants to be an activist? I’d rather return all the Grain Tax that I ate than be 
named an activist.” 
“I will not join the army even my party membership is dismissed.” 
“If he goes, I will go, too. If he doesn’t go, me neither” (Zou ping 1945c). 
 
Some even pretended to go to the restroom, get sick or have a chronic illness when 
recruiting registration began. Their concerns can be outlined into the following 
categories: 
1. Local cadres were not sure about the NFA’s future. They were worried what if 
the NFA was beaten, and the Central Army returned? 
2. The Life in the NFA was too tough; and some worried about no longer being a 
cadre once enlisted. 
3. Some were afraid of fighting and getting killed. They worried that once one 
was recruited he would never able to get released from military service. 
4. Some were bothered by their attachment to hometown: the responsibility of 
taking care of parents and children, the virtue of their wives and not being able to 
come back when their families experienced difficulties. They were not sure of the 
effectiveness of the Assistance Program (youkang) 
5. Some did not want to give up their cadre status and overestimated their 
importance in local works. 
                                                 
21 Zhongjin, “Sishu sanqu yaozhuang zhibu canjun dongyun zhong datong dangyuan xixiang de jingyan” 
(The experiences of yaozhuang branch of the Third Sub-district of Sishu about how to persuade the party 
member during the conscription), Huaihai bao, 13 November 1944. 
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6. Some complained that “I had been working so hard, and, eventually, I was 
enlisted” (Zou Ping 1945c). 
 
Usually, the attitude and ability of local cadres determined whether the recruitment task 
could be accomplished. 
After the inner-party education was finished, wider-scale mass mobilization 
began. Although it targeted everyone, the recruiters had already selected some key 
candidates during inner-party education. These candidates included those who had many 
brothers or no wife, those who were not household heads, those who were poor and had 
no one to depend on, those who believed in the Party’s Military Dependent Assistance 
Program and those who were brave and looking forward to a military career. A Huaibei 
Regional Base recruitment manual recorded the specific strategies adopted towards 
different groups during mass mobilization. For instance, when faced with women, 
recruiters primarily focused on inciting compassion for the NFA. Gradually the topic 
shifted to sending their sons or husbands to join the army. For younger people, recruiters 
focused their attention on describing the bright future a military career would bring. They 
stressed oppression from the capitalists to previous workers who had labored in big cities, 
such as Shanghai, and returned to their hometown to escape warfare. They then forged 
smooth connections between this oppression and an explanation of how joining the army 
could help to overthrow such tyranny. When recruiters came to a village that had more 
collaborationist dependents, a heated discussion about who would lead China was 
introduced beforehand, which served to reinforce images of the glory and bright future of 
the NFA (Liu Ruilong 1944). 
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According to many local reports on conscription, public meetings were usually 
the most effective method of recruitment mobilization in that they created a collective 
motivation, which was easily provoked by an emotional rush and manipulated by skillful 
inducement. More importantly, such public gatherings reinforced surveillance among 
individuals, which helped to retain the emotional result, i.e. being enlisted, even if a 
person did reconsider their choice to join the army after the meeting ended. In a 
provocative conscription gathering of Huai’an County, the models for the recruitment 
campaign individually narrated how they shifted their attitudes towards conscription. 
These personal stories deeply appealed to the audience and received continuous 
applauses. After the speeches, these models cried out slogans, such as, “Who else wants 
to join the army? Come on to the front!” “Come to the bright road!” “Good men, come 
on!” The masses echoed their slogans in the auditorium, and the arranged representatives 
then went to the front of the stage to read a congratulations letter to the enlistees. A 
peasant, Yang, who had been sarcastic towards mass workers, became excited by the 
speeches during the gathering. Another peasant, Lu, demonstrated his resolution by 
claiming “good men’s ambitions reside in the outside world.” An elder peasant, Ji, 
described in tears his experiences of being oppressed in the past and the happy life that 
the CCP brought. These emotional slogans pushed the gathering to another climax. Two 
petty intellectuals, Yang and Zhu, eventually decided to join the army on-site as a result 
(Zou Ping 1945c).  
Consciousness meetings (Liangxin Jiantao) were another widely adopted form of 
public meeting. During the meeting, the participants were encouraged to tell, honest to 
 204 
their own consciousness, the benefits that the Party brought to their lives and envision the 
bright future of aligning with the Party. Then, the recruiter paused to let the participants 
decide what to do next. This type of mobilization was most suitable for the base areas 
where various policies were widely implemented and the Party authorities had achieved 
substantial control over local society. When consciousness meetings began to take effect 
and the masses gradually came to terms with the necessity of conscription, the Party also 
summoned “thought struggle meetings” to criticize backward ideas among the masses. 
Although popular support laid the foundation for conscription, skillful 
manipulation of these public meetings was also decisive in their success. Activists were 
arranged to make speeches, echo slogans, assist the recruiters in intriguing the masses, 
and break silence when the mobilization came to an impasse. However, activists and 
party members were advised not to behave overtly, which might lead to an oppositional 
stance from the masses and added obstacles to the recruitment campaign. The border 
between an active model of recruitment, who encouraged his fellows to join the army, 
and an over-active recruiter, who, on the contrary, distanced potential enlistees, was a 
tricky line to walk. The transition from mass mobilization to mass oppression also 
presented a difficult task. 
The Central China Bureau assigned each regional base a quota in accordance with 
its population. How well the conscription quota was filled became an important criterion 
deciding the future promotion of the local administrative cadres within the Party. 
Therefore, fellow villages and towns often created an atmosphere of indirect competition 
regarding the numbers of enlistees, especially when local newspapers provided updates 
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on the number of conscripts in each village every two or three days. In the recruitment at 
the end of 1943, Shiyan Town (Sishu County, north Jiangsu) was assigned a quota of 
seven to eight enlistees by the sub-district authority. When this task was conveyed to the 
local party branch, the town chief suggested that this number was too small, especially 
considering the success that the Rent and Interest Reduction Campaign had just achieved. 
The branch committee then agreed on twenty. When they attended the sub-district activist 
meeting, the town cadres challenged their colleagues on the quota and pledged to enlist 
thirty persons. The sub-district committee, therefore, took this opportunity to mobilize 
other towns: If Shiyan Town could accomplish a task of conscripting thirty people, why 
could other towns not achieve more? This verbal competition was eventually settled 
when Shiyan increased their target to fifty people, which was more than six times the 
original quota. After arduous mobilization, Shiyan Town recruited more than one 
hundred youngsters, ninety of whom passed the physical exam and officially joined the 
army—eleven to thirteen times the original assignment. This story was recorded as a 
glorious success by a local cadre, Nie, in his memoir (Nie Dapeng 1983). Table 13 shows 
the quota assigned by higher authorities and the actual recruits in the conscription in 
Sishu County in 1943. From this, it becomes evident that the latter was almost as many as 






Table 13: The Actual Enlisted Number in Sishu County (1943.12) 
Sub-district Quota Actual 
7
th
 Sub-district 70 128 
3
rd
 Sub-district 95 162 
4
th
 Sub-district 90 229 
Sanzhuang 90 168 
Chuancheng 65 81 
Liren 40 128 
General Section Subordinate Team * 13 
County Government Subordinate Team * 11 
Shizi 30 25 
Baji 50 65 
SUM 530 1010 
Source: Huaihai bao, 7 December 1943. 
 
Despite his recollection of the Shiyan Town as a great achievement, Nie, 
nevertheless, recognized that the mobilization did not go smoothly. In Xiangshu Village, 
an old peasant was tied up by a village cadre to the township administrator after he 
protested his son’s enlistment at the village office. This episode ended with the release of 
the old peasant. Village officials claimed that the father finally agreed to let his son join 
the army after patient persuasion by the town cadres, and the village cadre received 
criticism for his coercion. They failed to mention, however, the extent to which the 
masses’ fears of higher authorities played a role in these compromises, or how often such 
episodes occurred during conscription.  
Internal reports from local branches frequently recorded instances of coercive 
actions during recruitment. Liu Ruilong, the deputy secretary of the Huaibei Regional 
Party Committee, outlined these actions in six words: “push (ji), lift (tai), struggle (dou), 
tie up (bang), lock up (guan), and hang up (diao)” (Liu Ruilong 1944). In mobilization 
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meetings, participants pushed each other to volunteer, though no one actually wanted to 
volunteer themselves. When it came to an impasse, some participants conspired against 
one target and lifted him to the front stage. If the “lift” still did not motivate anyone, they 
arranged a struggle meeting. They even tied up, locked up or hung up some candidates on 
a roof. Some towns adopted indirect methods of enforcing recruitment. For instance, in 
one town, authorities stopped issuing Traveling Documents, which seriously impeded 
people’s daily life and work. Some even shut down market day several times, in their 
attempts to get villagers to register for enlistment. Below, Table 14 and 15 show the 
results of two conscriptions near the end of the War in two counties of Suzhong and 
Subei Regional Bases. Unsurprisingly, when these forms of coercive conscription came 
to an end, the NFA faced another problem: desertion. 







Fengdong Juedong SUM 
Town No. 20 12 11 12 12 10 77 







490 126 178 208 298 118 1418 
Cadres 25 10 10 2 10 2 59 




36 11 2 3 23 4 79 






292 91 94 145 215 108 945 
Cadres 26 7 7 2 8 2 52 




31 7 2 3 18 4 65 
Source: Rugao xianwei gongzuo baogao (Working report of the Rugao County Committee), stack in the Jiangsu 
Provincial Archives, no. 606-2-1. 
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Table 15: The Enlisted Number in Huai’an County (1945.3, Subei) 
Sub-district Jiqiao Shunhe Machang Jingkou Qingong SUM 
Enlisted No. 75 95 95 95 40 400* 
Source: Zou Ping 1945c. 
*This figure was only 70% of the quota and 108 out of 400 were party members. 
 
The ceremony of sending out enlistees was the last phase of conscription. To 
some extent, it determined the success of future recruitment by convincing the masses 
that the conventional wisdom, “good men never join the army,” was no longer valid 
under the Party’s governance. The whole village or town was required to attend the 
ceremony to witness the enlistees and their families’ most glorious moments. In most 
cases, the enlistees rode donkeys or satin sedans with local gentry or party cadres leading 
the halters or carrying the sedans. The inversion of the status of peasants and the gentry 
constituted an honor that ordinary peasants would never otherwise enjoy. In an isolated 
traditional society immersed within Chinese agricultural culture, this ceremony fulfilled 
ordinary peasants’ dreams of “glorifying ancestors” (guangzongyaozu). This instance is 
illustrative of the process whereby local cadres used communal values regarding personal 
career, family prestige and social status into a popular cultural ritual to facilitate of 
political mobilization. Such a combination largely facilitated the Communist penetration 
and won over popular support during the War. 
In his investigation of Nationalist intelligence reports, Chen Yung-fa confirms 
that conscription in the CCP was much more impartial in regards to whether their targets 
were rich or poor and much less coercive than the Nationalist Party (Chen 1986, 404-
405). However, as I have demonstrated above, the acknowledgement of less coercion 
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does not preclude the existence of reluctant enlistees, whose enlistment was driven by 
oppression from authorities or the hope of material benefits. In order to construct the 
image of a voluntary army that enjoyed massive support, the CCP evaded the topic of 
desertion when discussing its history. Scholars of China, thus, can only speculate on this 
subject based on scant resources. Using Mao’s claim that the Communist troop declined 
in size from 500,000 to 300,000 between 1940 and 1942, Tetsuya Kataoka estimates that 
the Eighth Route Army suffered large losses from dissertation in the middle of the War. 
Considering the context of this figure—to accuse Pei Dehuai of launching the 1940 
offensive in the Rectification Campaign, he recognizes that the figures might be 
exaggerated. However, his estimation is not entirely off base since the desertion rate of 
one newly established guerilla unit and one main force unit in a border region of the north 
was 20.8% and 16.4% respectively (Tetsuya 1974). Chen argues that desertions in the 
Fourth Division of the NFA exceeded combat casualties in 1943, and a total of 477 
soldiers from five counties of the Huaibei Regional Base deserted in 1944 (Chen 1986, 
401). Indirect evidence supports Tetsuya’s estimation. During the first half of 1945, the 
number of “returning soldiers,” a euphemism for deserters who rejoined the army, in 
Rugao(dong) County was eighty six.22 The number of those who deserted and refused to 
be drafted again must be much higher. 
Why was desertion so prevalent? Tetsuya attributes desertion to soldiers’ 
profound attachment to their villages and families. When relocated to other areas, they 
                                                 
22 Table “Rugao(dong) xian 1945 nian shangban nian canjun renshu tongji” (Statistics of the Number of 
the Enlistees in Rudong[gao] 1945.1-1945.6). Stack in Rudong County Archives, no.102, 34. 
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became indifferent and apathetic (Tetsuya 1974). There can be no doubt on this point, as 
the attachment to home was the most powerful obstacle against recruitment. Chen adds 
that the abuse and corporal punishment that rookies experienced further motivated them 
to desert. Meanwhile, some NFA families and relatives received so many threats that it 
gave soldiers little choice but to desert. He contends that the Party’s improper handling of 
desertions, particularly burning, assaulting, binding, or even killing deserters, aggravated 
this problem (Chen 1986). I did not find solid evidence to prove the Party’s coercion on 
deserters’ families. However, corporal abuse of subordinates did exist between officers 
and soldiers, soldiers and ordinary people, or even military and administrative personnel. 
One article published in Yanfu Bao, the official newspaper of the Yanfu District Branch, 
emphasized that senior soldiers’ attitudes towards new enlistees was extremely decisive 
in reinforcing the latter’s decision to stay in the army.23 Therefore, the harsh treatment of 
rookies was very likely another cause of desertion.  
In the Party’s regular reports, desertion became a problem that the NFA could not 
evade. In one report analyzing this issue, the Party provided its own explanations: 
1. Political vacillation: some soldiers were worried about the transition from great 
national resistance warfare to a shameful civil war between the CCP and the 
GMD. Under such circumstances, they felt disappointed, pessimistic and 
desperate about the future. 
2. Reluctant for political education: due to their low literacy levels, many soldiers 
were reluctant to study current affairs and political situations. Being frustrated, 
they ran away. 
3. Incorrect ideology: some comrades, especially those coming from big cities, 
such as Shanghai, still stuck to their bad habits nurtured in the traditional Chinese 
                                                 
23 “Zenyang Gonggu Xin Zhanshi” (How to nurture new soldiers), Yanfu bao, 10 March 1944. 
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society. They were the most corrupt and feudal and refused to make any progress. 
Once criticized, or agitated by others, they chose to desert. 
4. Afraid to die and unable to endure hardship: some comrades had not been fully 
prepared for the dire conditions of the War. Harsh surroundings and tough 
struggles aroused their embedded oscillation, which eventually led to desertion. 
5. Forced enlistees: some soldiers were drafted by cheating, threatening and 
coercion, rather than education or persuasion. They ran away once an opportunity 
arose. 
6. Incorrect management and education: some comrades deserted due to personal 
affection towards their superiors, frictions between their colleagues, and greed for 
money and an extravagant life.24 
 
To prevent their desertion, new enlistees were enthusiastically welcomed by their host 
troops, and the first-phase military training was kept relatively light as to help them adapt 
from ordinary peasants to soldiers. In order to appease their longing for home, they were 
encouraged to write letters to their families.25  
In addition, the Party relied on public struggle meetings to deter desertion. 
Typically, anti-desertion struggle meetings followed a similar pattern. The meeting began 
with a song called “Anti-desertion.” The director then gave a speech on the current state 
of international and domestic affairs and provided instructions on how to develop military 
forces in base areas. Then he told the crowd the basic information about deserters and 
narrated how they ran away. Next he invited the participants to share their thoughts on 
desertion. In one of such struggle meetings, one man reflected, “when their troop was 
                                                 
24 Jiahua, “Taopao de yuanyin” (Reasons for desertion), Dongjing bao, 28 April 1941. 
25 “Zenyang gonggu xin zhanshi” (How to nurtue new soldiers), Yanfu bao, 10 March 1944. 
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located in A Town26, they were quite satisfied since their lived a comfortable and 
relatively free life. More importantly, they were near their hometown. When their troop 
was reorganized into B Team, their lives and responsibilities became regularized and 
formalized…they could not endure the hardship. Together with others’ agitation, they 
decided to desert.” After other participants provided their opinions about desertion, the 
director concluded that there was no future for desertion, and only revolution would lead 
to freedom and liberation. In response, some participants suggested that the deserters be 
executed. Some argued for extra corvee service as punishment. Others pushed for 
forgiveness. Based on these opinions, the director announced that they should be 
sentenced to a six-month corvee, a move that meant to show the Party’s lenience. Finally, 
the deserters expressed their regrets and pledged to be new men. 27  Such public 
humiliation and the possibility of a death sentence confirmed the Party’s formidable 
authority and helped to deter potential desertion. 
As I have shown above, the Party explored various methods to mobilize peasants 
for their local militia and conscription, from invoking sacred nationalism to offering 
tangible material incentives, or even issuing threats and bribes. Nevertheless, not all 
peasants enlisted for exactly these reasons. One senior soldier from Shahe (Yanfu 
District, north Jiangsu) frankly expressed a different motive: “I joined the army for three 
reasons—more money, better food, and a relaxed personal life.” Another man said it even 
more simply: “I can stay in the army as long as my superior offers me a pack of cigarettes 
                                                 
26 The document does not have specific names of the town or the team mentioned in this quote. Here I use 
A, B, C… to refer to such situations. 
27 “’Fantaopao’ dahui suxie” (A sketch of ‘anti-desertion’ meeting), Dongjing bao, 28 April 1941. 
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each day (Li Xuesan 1944).” To obtain extra money, some militia members blackmailed 
ordinary peasants and collected extra taxes in amounts even higher than the official tax 
load in some places. In addition, the new identity of local militia or NFA soldiers 
endorsed these ordinary youngsters with authority that they never possessed before. The 
closing conscription ceremonies endowed the new enlistees and their families with an 
unprecedented aura in their villages. Some militia cadres became celebrities in their 
communities, making speeches at every meeting, meddling in village affairs and even 
interfering in local administration. Nevertheless, these benefits sometimes did not last 
long enough to counteract the hardships of military service, particularly, the labor 
shortage their families experienced after they were drafted. Although the Party’s laid out 
various privileges to entice them, peasants joined the army with their own expectations 
and calculations. Desertion occurred when they found such aspirations intangible.  
KONGSHI QINGYE—DURING THE ANTI-PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN 
During the 1940s, the triangle competition among the Japanese, the CCP and the 
GMD gradually became a struggle between the first two parts. Chen Yung-fa argues that 
the fading GMD influence, politically and militarily, resulted from its inability to attract 
popular support and build a strong local infrastructure (Chen 1986). Under the double 
attack of both the Japanese Mopping-up Campaign (saodang) and the Communist 
offensive, Han Deqing, the Nationalist Governor of Jiangsu, and his troops had to retreat 
from north Jiangsu. When the NFA captured and then released Han and his major staff 
officers in 1943, the GMD had given up their competition for manpower with the CCP 
and the Japanese almost completely. In his report of anti-mopping-up and anti-
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pacification campaigns, Su Yu, the chief commander of the First Division of the NFA, 
wrote that the situation in central Jiangsu “had shifted from a triangle military struggle to 
a two-part political competition” (Su Yu 1943b). Therefore, when the Japanese initiated 
the first Pacification Campaign in Suzhou-Changshu-Taihu area on July 1, 1941, their 
main target fell on the CCP. 
With the protracted front in China and the Pacific, the Japanese realized more 
than at any other time that the ability to deliver constant manpower and provisional 
supplies would be the decisive factor in winning the War. In order to ensure peace in 
neighboring Jiangsu, they launched the Pacification Campaign via the collaborationist 
government in mid 1941. In contrast to the Mopping-up operation, which was a short-
term intensive military action aiming at anti-Japanese forces, the Pacification Campaign 
was a long-term continuous program that involved almost every aspect of people’s life 
including military, economic, cultural and ideological disciplines. The Chairman of the 
collaborationist government, Wang Jingwei, once claimed, “The Pacification Campaign 
aimed at ‘maintaining public safety and improving economic well-being,” and, therefore, 
was “30% military (action) and 70% political (doctrine).” The Japanese intended to 
indoctrinate the masses with the idea of “Sino-Japan harmony” and “the Great East Asian 
Spirit” in order to attract more popular support. They publicized, “The Pacification 
Campaign should be compared to the treatment of a patient…which nurtured his vitality 
and endowed him with a healthy spirit and a strong body” (Zhonggong changshu shiwei 
dangshi ziliao zhengji xiaozu bangongshi 1984, 13-3, 15-16). Mistaking it for the type of 
mopping-up campaign they had experienced before, the Communist forces and cadres 
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suffered considerable casualties and other losses in the first Pacification Campaign in Su-
Chang-Tai region.28 When they fully realized the intentions of the Japanese, the CCP 
launched an anti-pacification movement to compete for manpower, supplies and their 
very survival. Pacification and anti-pacification campaigns, therefore, became a 
continuous theme in the power wrestle between the Party and the Japanese throughout the 
War. 
As a result, the masses faced a distinct division: The CCP or the Japanese? For 
ordinary people either choice could lead to the sacrifice of their property, or even their 
lives. In order to increase popular support, the Party sought to minimize the potential for 
loss while emphasizing possible gains. Meanwhile, they had to ensure that this balance 
would not contaminate the Party’s image of a fearless, anti-Japanese fighter and a 
considerate mentor who cared for her people. The case of “emptying houses and clearing 
fields” (kongshi qingye) in A Town of Ruxi County, the Third District of the Suzhong 
Regional Base provides an ideal window that demonstrates the process whereby local 
cadres mobilized the masses in order to augment their possible benefits and minimize 
their losses.29 
                                                 
28 According to “Qingxiang Liang ge Yue zhi Huigu” (A Retrospection on the two-month Pacification) 
published on Yu bao on 11 September 1941, the Japanese and collaborationist government achieved: “1. 
100 corpses discarded by the bandit troops (the Communist forces); 2. 1,800 captives; 3, 800 surrenders; 4. 
4 canons; 5. 8 Czechic light machine guns and 184 rifles; 6. 40 pistols; 7. Medicines; 8. 1,041 pieces of 
uniforms; 9. Current cash 250,000; 10. NFA issued currency 15,000.” It could be exaggerated considering 
that the Communist forces did not have canons then. However, conservative estimation from the Party 
confirmed that the CCP at least lost hundreds of soldiers and cadres, and more than 200 guns, around 20 of 
which were machine guns. 
29 The following content is composed based on a working report of a local branch of the Suzhong Regional 
Base. This report was internally circulated among Party members and the recorded incident was regarded as 
a successful model of anti-mopping-up campaign. Reference info: Zhonggong suzhong san diwei 
xuanchanbu. 1944, stack in Jiangsu Provincial Archive. 
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Pre-campaign Mobilization 
A Town once comprised a critical area for the Party with an active local 
administration before the Pacification Campaign. Based on their intelligence reports, 
higher authorities speculated that B Zhuang30 in A Town might have been a strategic 
target for the next Pacification Campaign. Therefore, at the end of May 1943, the sub-
district committee went down to A Town to convene a meeting with the branch cadres, 
making arrangements for the incoming anti-mopping-up struggle.31 After explaining the 
possibility that B Zhuang would be a target in the next mopping-up campaign, the sub-
district committee demanded that the town’s next major task would be to mobilize the 
masses for “emptying houses and clearing fields.” They also decided on the way of 
emergency communications during the anti-mopping-up campaign between the sub-
district committee and the town branch. Finally, the branch cadres were divided into two 
groups for leading people in escape when the Japanese and collaborationist troops 
actually came, one located in the north of the town and one in the south. 
After returning to their villages, the branch cadres summoned meetings at 
different levels to ensure the message was conveyed to each villager of A Town. The first 
round of mobilization was among party members. The branch cadres gave a clear 
definition of “emptying houses and clearing fields:” all clothes, grains, mobiles, ropes, 
clothing bags, etc. should be dispersedly hidden in nearby villages; swine should be sold 
and cattle should sneak away with villagers; no one was allowed to stay if the enemy 
                                                                                                                                                 
The name of the town is not revealed in the document. Therefore, I have to refer to it as “A Town” instead. 
30 Again, the name of the village is not disclosed in the document. I refer to it as B Zhuang. Zhuang is an 
equivalent to village (cun) in Chinese. 
31 This date is based on lunar calendar. For solar calendar, it should be around the end of June or the 
beginning of July in 1943. All the dates in this case study are based on lunar calendar. 
 217 
came. “Emptying houses and clearing fields” was designed to deny the Japanese access to 
any potential manpower or supplies. The party members were instructed to lead the 
retreat when the enemy actually came. 
The second phase of mobilization targeted ordinary villagers. A mass gathering 
was held in B Zhuang in the name of the Peasant Resistance Association. After 
publicizing a detailed description of the importance of “emptying houses and clearing 
fields,” the presiding cadre offered to organize a model self-defense team exclusively for 
the upcoming anti-mopping-up campaign. This proposal was immediately echoed by 
several party members, who were prearranged to take the lead in joining the team in the 
previous branch cadre meeting. 32  Their enthusiastic responses encouraged fellow 
villagers, and another eight agreed to join the team at that gathering. The villagers were 
advised to retreat to their relatives’ homes if possible or ask for help from nearby bao and 
jia heads. After the gathering, the cadres of the Peasant Resistance Association went to 
each village for further mobilization, holding meetings for association members of each 
bao. 
Through the meetings at different levels, the message of “emptying houses and 
clearing fields” was conveyed successfully to each resident of the town. Apparently, it 
required considerable sacrifice of the peasants. Not only did they have to leave their 
homes and land unattended; more importantly, they were forced to leave their villages, 
where most of them had been lived since they were born, and head for relatives’ homes, 
                                                 
32 These party members’ identities were kept confidential for safety purpose and preventing isolation from 
the masses. As such, their activities were regarded as spontaneous responses rather than pre-set 
arrangements of the Party. 
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where they might not be entirely welcomed. Others had nowhere to go. How did they 
react to such a policy? 
Even party members were not unanimously in support of the Party’s mobilization. 
Although some had made firm resolutions and psychologically prepared themselves for 
the worst scenario of burnt-down houses, quite a few took a wait-and-see attitude and 
lacked confidence in the prospect of victory. One man worried, “if the Japanese really 
came, my house might be destroyed. But it is worse that some bad guys might report to 
the Japanese that I am the syndic (lishi) of the Peasant Resistance Association.” Ordinary 
peasants understood the fact that peaceful days would be gone permanently if the 
Japanese and their collaborationist forces were stationed in the town. However, even if 
they opposed the occupation of the Japanese, the “wait-and-see” attitude was the most 
popular among the masses. Relying on the previous experience that the enemy passed by 
twice, they believed that the Peasant Association was exaggerating the state of danger. 
They insisted that the Japanese would not stay stationed, even if they came to their town. 
Some people, including ordinary peasants and some local gentry without much property, 
were scared by the mobilization and counted on the defense of the NFA. Meanwhile, 
several landlords and ex-GMD members were looking forward to the Japanese’s arrival, 
hoping to rescind the Rent-Interest Reduction policy and increase rent again. With the 
exception of the branch cadres, most party members and ordinary people were quite 
indifferent to the mobilization, especially to the call to “emptying houses and clearing 
fields.” 
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The branch cadres, therefore, decided to take concrete action rather than simply 
propagandize with words. The party members of B Zhuang were called upon to take the 
lead in “emptying houses and clearing fields,” and two responded to the call. After 
loading all their belongings into a wheelbarrow, they deliberately detoured to make a 
scene in front of the villagers, persuading them to hide everything in nearby villages as 
they had done. This performance created a sense of imminent emergency among the 
masses, which more successfully mobilized them. In the following days, the majority of 
villagers retreated with their property. The only holdouts were a group of landlords who 
did not believe the Peasant Association and simply buried some expensive belongings at 
home. Peasants, regardless of party members or not, were actually unaffected by abstract 
ideas of mobilization, but seemed alert to their neighbors’ behavior. In this case, no one 
moved until the two party members took the lead. The key point here was that the two 
party members were ordinary peasants in the masses’ eyes, which partly explained why 
the identities of party members had been kept a secret. In such a pre-set scene, the effect 
would have been largely discounted if the masses knew the initiators were party 
members. Their habitual consciousness of following would work only if they identified 
the person who took the lead as one of their own, rather than with the authorities. In fact, 
this was an imperative strategy that the Party constantly relied upon in this campaign as 
well as in the course of penetrating local society. 
The Process of the Anti-mopping-up Campaign 
When the Japanese and collaborationist forces arrived in Shuidongkou, a place 
close to A town, on June 21, the party branch summoned another cadre meeting to make 
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arrangements for a massive retreat. The message spread rapidly, and the whole town was 
packing and preparing to evacuate the next morning. At lunchtime, a troop comprised of 
more than one hundred Japanese and around two hundred collaborationist soldiers headed 
for B Zhuang. When they arrived, there were only two blind old men and five or six old 
women remaining in the village. The enemy was so outraged by such a complete 
evacuation that they beat those old people. During the first couple of days, the self-
defense team harassed the collaborationist forces by throwing grenades at midnights. 
They also intercepted a wheelbarrow of supplies that the Japanese extracted from the 
masses and released two forced laborers. 
Among the escaping villagers, the debate about whether to accommodate the 
Japanese and collaborationist forces never ceased. Although they firmly opposed aligning 
with enemy, the local cadres tried to avoid a definite answer and turned over 
responsibility to high-ranking authorities. The secretary of the party branch even 
suggested the town chief hide for a while in order to evade these insistent inquiries. 
Meanwhile, the masses’ attitudes vacillated depending on the enemy’s action. At first, the 
Japanese claimed that they came to provide people with a secure environment for 
agricultural production. However, they also warned that their houses would be burnt 
down if the people refuse to return. In the following days, the collaborationists only 
caught five or six peasants for corvee. Irritated by the current situation, on the third day, 
the collaborationist troops sent an ultimatum. It stated that all the villagers must came 
back by the end of that day, or their houses would be burnt down. The villagers were 
scared and asked for advice from the town chief. After conferring with the branch 
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secretary, the town chief insisted that the enemy was bluffing. He patiently explained to 
the villagers, “If they really had burned down the houses, where would they live?” With 
this, the masses were temporarily convinced. However, the longer the villagers stayed out 
of their homes, the more they were inclined to go back and accommodate the enemy. 
The turning point came on the fourth day. Most villagers had been forced to 
crouch in the sorghum fields, without shelter, since leaving home. Four days of dread and 
anxiety had pushed their endurance to the limit. Resolutions of resistance turned 
evaporated. Some suggested returning to accommodate the enemy. Some cursed the 
Japanese and collaborationist forces. Some blamed the NFA for not having arrived 
sooner. Some raged at the town chief and the Peasant Resistance Association, and others 
were pessimistic about their doomed fate. Only a few were willing to insist on resistance. 
The villagers became panicked when they heard that a collaborationist force of four to 
five hundred soldiers led by Chen Caifu was coming to assist the Japanese. Therefore, 
when a troop of five to six hundred soldiers, together with several horses, paraded into B 
Zhuang carrying the Japanese Army Flag in the morning of the next day, five villagers 
slipped away to accommodate the enemy. They did so under the abetment of the bao 
head, Lou, who had already tried several times to persuade the town chief of 
accommodation. 
Under such dire circumstances, the branch secretary decided to initiate an 
informal branch cadre meeting to organize counteraction. During the meeting, some 
activists reported the details of the bao head’s meeting with the Japanese. In this original 
report, he said:  
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The bao head bought three chickens and a basket of eggs and went with his 
followers to B Zhuang to receive the collaborationist troops. Once they arrived, 
they were introduced to the Japanese’s interpreter. The interpreter asked, “Who 
are you? Why didn’t you come to welcome us until today? We came to protect the 
masses. Do not be afraid! Who is the bao head?” 
“I am the bao head and the others are ordinary people.” The bao head answered. 
“Three of you stay and the other three go back to find the town chief. You should 
ask him to call on the villagers to return home. We should not harass them. We 
came to protect people and give them a secure and happy life as long as they help 
us build casemates and trenches.” 
 
Considering the current emergency, the branch cadres unanimously agreed on a revised 
version of the story and spread it out as quickly as possible. Here is the episode that the 
villagers would hear: 
Look, the bao head, Lou, wants to be a collaborator and accommodate the enemy. 
What is his fate? He winded up being hung there, almost beaten to death. Now he 
is still there, being interrogated for the information on the town chief, other jia 
heads and all the villagers. The Sub-district Office later will arrest him for not 
executing the government order of resistance and surrendering to the enemy. That 
is the doomed fate of accommodating the enemy. Who intends to compromise 
with the Japanese and collaborationist forces? Who plans to accommodate the 
enemy? The bao head, Lou, is an example of what will happen: being beaten and 
hung there. Therefore, there is no other way out except for sticking with 
resistance—not returning home, not compromising with the enemy, and not 
collaborating. In such circumstances, the Japanese and collaborationist forces will 
not be able to stay for long. 
 
The masses were frightened by the atrocious treatment that the bao head received when 
he surrendered to the Japanese, and, as a result, their desire to return home was 
temporarily suppressed. Immediately after the meeting, the branch set out to report the 
situation to higher authorities and received orders to maintain their position for a few 
more days. 
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The sixth day became a critical moment in the anti-mopping-up campaign. That 
morning the pro-accommodating landlords directly confronted the authorities of the town 
chief and the peasant association cadres. Alarmed by the fact that an increasing number 
of collaborationist forces were marching into their hometown, the masses gradually lost 
interest in staying in the sorghum field and wanted to return home. One landlord of B 
Zhuang was aware of this emotional oscillation and took this opportunity to advocate for 
accommodation. He began by describing the miserable situation of the masses, 
“Considering current circumstances, the chance that the enemy will leave soon is 
quite slim, and in most cases, our anti-accommodating movement will wind up a 
failure. Now we are living in a field without food to eat, a place to live, or clothes 
to wear. If things continue, we will have nowhere to go, except to die of 
starvation, illness or inclement weather. Now our stocks are tired out under the 
enemy’s extraction and our swine have starved.” 
 
Then, he shifted his focus to attack the town chief’s evasion.  
“The town chief is the head of our town, who should step up to lead us under such 
circumstances. However, he avoided meeting us, disregarding our hardship. The 
peasant association members, who cannot return home anyway, trapped us here to 
endure these difficulties with them. The collaborationist forces are also men. We 
can reason with them. What kind of hatred would they hold towards the masses? 
All their so-called atrocities are creations of the peasant association cadres, 
fabricated to prevent us from returning home. We masses are ordinary people 
without the ability to defend ourselves. How could we stop the enemy from being 
stationed here if they decide to do so? Let us find the town chief and make him 
contact the collaborationist forces to figure out what on earth we should do!” 
 
The masses were convinced by his argument and accused the town chief of being 
irresponsible. Some villagers even suggested tying up the town chief and sending him to 
the Japanese. 
Faced with the impending chaos, the branch cadres and the town chief decided to 
summon a public gathering to appease the masses’ discontent. A few party members who 
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were not publically pro-party were arranged to advocate for continuing resistance. The 
meeting was held in a nearby village that night and more than one hundred villagers 
attended. The landlord who tried to persuade the masses to accommodate the Japanese 
was the first to give a speech. He tried to win over supporters by reiterating the hardships 
that the villagers had experienced over the past six days and restated the inevitability of 
accommodating the Japanese. His argument was repeated by a few other landlords, rich 
peasants and bao heads. The pre-arranged party member stood up right away to refute his 
argument. He began by relieving people’s worry about the possibility of the enemy’s 
being stationed in B Zhuang. “The enemy will leave soon. At this point, six days have 
passed since they arrived. However, there is no casemate or trench under construction. 
The collaborationist troops do not plan to be stationed here. This is the accomplishment 
of our insistence on ‘emptying houses and clearing fields.’ Why don’t we stick it out a 
few more days to decide the next move?” He further borrowed legitimacy from the higher 
administration, which strictly forbad accommodating the Japanese. Then, a tangible 
question—how to afford the accommodation—was brought up to deepen the masses’ 
reluctance. Finally, he proposed a compromising solution, asking for further advice from 
higher authorities. In doing so, he prevented a possible rush decision in the meeting. His 
contention was immediately supported by other party members and peasant association 
cadres. It, therefore, convinced the masses. The town chief then gave the final notes: 
“I am not in favor of accommodating the enemy. Let us see. How much money is 
left in your family? I can go to contact the Japanese. But, after that, you will be 
deprived of money. Who pushed me to accommodate the enemy? Please take out 
your money first. If the Sub-district Office knew that we were accommodating the 
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enemy, I would also be arrested for collaboration. I will die either way. Therefore, 
I agree with [the suggestion] on consulting the sub-district chief tomorrow.” 
 
Eventually, arguments for accommodation were temporarily stifled. 
The seventh day was full of shock, astonishment and hope for both the party 
members and the villagers. The news that more than ten villagers returned home 
regardless of the agreement reached the prior night spread to the party members in the 
early morning. However, before they had even began to deal with that emergency, several 
runaways fled back from the Japanese control in the late afternoon. They recounted their 
miserable experience in the collaborationist troop,  
“It was really bad. I will never go back. The collaborationist soldiers were not 
human beings, those bastards! They must not have been born to parents! Look at 
all the bruises and wounds on my body! Collaborationist soldiers dragged us to do 
coolie jobs as soon as we arrived home. They did not give us the chance to take 
care of the stocks. I was sent to carry water, several were ordered to light a fire 
and others were asked to grind wheat. We did not have anything to eat the whole 
day, nor were we allowed to rest. Any delay led to a through beating. Even if I am 
destined to die outside, I will never go back!” 
 
Coincidentally, a couple of women, who had gone back for clothes earlier, ran back 
terrified, almost at the same time. Later, it became clear that they had been raped by three 
or four collaborationist soldiers. These two incidents, more so than any rational speech, 
provided the branch cadres with vivid examples of the doomed fate that would 
accompany accommodating the Japanese, and helped them to convince the masses to 
continue resisting. When the town chief and the branch secretary reported the Sub-district 
Office’s command to continue on that night, no one showed any opposition. During the 
middle of the night, several members of the self-defense team reported on the enemy’s 
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most recent maneuvers. The Japanese troops had begun to retreat northward to 
Huangqiao, and only Chen Caifu’s collaborationist force, about three to four hundred 
soldiers, stayed. 
The next morning, the news of the Japanese 19
th
 Division’s retreat lifted the 
morale of the masses. The branch cadres, in turn, further assured the villagers that Chen 
Caifu’s troops would leave on their own if they persevered in the sorghum fields a little 
longer. The villagers were not as close to victory as the branch cadres led them to believe 
and would face other obstacles. For example, the collaborationist troops feigned a move-
out to encourage villagers to come home, and they issued statements claiming that they 
would only target Communist resisters. Then, they randomly shot at the sorghum field, 
captured thirty some villagers and forced them to serve as coolies. However, these actions 
only crystallized the atrocity and incredibility of the enemy in the minds of the people, 
and no one suggested accommodation again. That night, one villager who had been 
captured and forced into coolies that afternoon, fled back to confirm that the 
collaborationist troops were leaving the next day. The branch secretary immediately 
called a branch cadre meeting, making detailed arrangements for people’s return. The 
next day, when the collaborationist troops actually left B Zhuang, the villagers were 
thrilled about their victory. However, they were still astonished by the destruction the 
collaborationist troops left in their wake. 
After the Anti-mopping-up Campaign 
Once the villagers resettled their homes, the Party held a series of meetings and 
public gatherings to share the experiences during the campaign. The bao head, who had 
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argued vigorously in support of accommodating the Japanese, received criticism from the 
local cadres and the masses in a public gathering. However, the Party’s desire to 
demonstrate their lenience allowed him to retain his position. Since the campaign was led 
in the name of the Peasant Resistance Association, the organization’s prestige reached an 
unprecedented peak among villagers, even landlords and rich peasants. Later, many of its 
cadres were elected as committee members in the township government during the New 
Township Renovation. Another positive aftermath was the masses’ pervasive support to 
“emptying houses and clearing fields,” which practically became a habitual behavior for 
villagers. The hundreds of households in the village, no matter they were landlords, rich 
peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, or hired laborers, only saved three days of 
supplies at home and hid the rest nearby. Later, the mobilization for anti-mopping-up 
campaigns received active responses from the villagers. 
The Party attributed much of the credit for this success during the anti-mopping-
up campaign to its correct leadership in the inner-party meetings. However, it was likely 
that villagers would have returned home if they had not been horrified by stories of the 
enemy’s atrocities. Likewise, they might have chosen to accommodate the enemy if the 
Japanese had stayed in the B Zhuang a few days longer. However, no one can deny the 
pressure that the local cadres exerted on the villagers during the nine days in the sorghum 
field. Their creation of efficient connecting channels between the town branch and the 
higher authority, the flexibility and improvisational ability the local cadres exhibited 
when faced with an emergency, and most importantly, the extent of their control over the 
masses, were particularly impressive. On the one hand, the villagers calculated the price 
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of obeying the Party’s call for resistance. Once the risks outweighed the possible gains, 
they disregarded the Party’s instructions and followed their own agendas, as several 
incidents of desertion indicated. In this case study, peasants were clearly not simply a 
compliant group subject to the Party’s mobilization and manipulation. Rather, they were 
autonomous individuals, capable of rational calculation and defending their own interests. 
On the other hand, the Party was also testing the limits of the villagers’ endurance and 
adjusted its responses accordingly. The local cadres never excluded the possibility of 
accommodation. Rather, they simply avoided this option as long as possible. According 
to the campaign’s summary report, the higher authorities had already prepared for the 
aftermath had the Japanese and collaborationist forces been stationed in B Zhuang. They 
planned to excuse these actions by claiming there was a shift in methods of struggle in 
order to maintain local faith in the Party. This reflected the key principle of the CCP’s 
survival and development during the War: demonstrating its care for the masses and its 
resolution for resistance at minimal cost in property and lives. This principle might 
explain why neither the NFA nor the local forces had directly confronted the Japanese 
and collaborationist forces during this the campaign. Even the self-defense team, who 
were supposed to protect the villagers, only harassed the enemy a few times by throwing 
grenades. Nevertheless, such an indirect involvement also prevented ordinary people 
from associating these acts with the Party’s leadership, as all the orders were issued in the 
name of the Peasant Resistance Association. 
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CONCLUSION 
In early 1938, approximately 8,000 Communist guerrilla soldiers, who had 
scattered in the eight southern provinces during the Three Year War (1934-1937), 
converged in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province. By the time they retreated from Jiangsu 
Province, shortly after the end of the War, the NFA had grown expeditiously. It had 
become an army with seven divisions and local forces of approximately 312,000 persons, 
39 times its original size. No one should deny the CCP’s success during the War of 
Resistance. However, by focusing on different locations, we can look beyond sensational 
development to see nuances in the interactions between the Party and the people. 
The Party manifested excellent organizational skills and strategies in mobilizing 
mass movement. Through years of strenuous effort, it was able to establish a full-scale 
political structure composed of party branches, administrative offices and mass resistance 
associations. These organs covered all base areas in Jiangsu. They were designed to 
ensure that local situations were reported to higher authorities, and policies materialized 
in local settings in a timely manner. Meanwhile, the strictly hierarchical political 
structure nurtured an atmosphere of internal competition among the cadres, such as what 
occurred in conscription. The Party encouraged them to fulfill their assigned tasks better 
to get a career promotion. 
As far as ordinary peasants were concerned, the Party relied on local cadres to 
manipulate existing rituals, moral values, popular culture, and economic interests. First of 
all, it provided material rewards to peasants, such as rent reduction and assistance in 
agricultural production for military dependents. Second, spiritual incentives were widely 
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employed to encourage the masses. The farewell ceremony for draftees and the honors 
they received from the higher authority served as a good example of this kind of spiritual 
encouragement. Third, local cadres resorted to pragmatic tactics to carry out specific 
tasks to guarantee the success of mobilization and ensure the Party’s control. The above 
discussion of the conscription has demonstrated that the Party’s selective policy in 
targeting the draftees was very different from the GMD’s indiscriminative strategy. The 
local cadres’ improvisational tactics in dealing with dissenting villagers were decisive in 
mitigating the anxiety and uncertainty of fellow villagers and brought success in 
“emptying houses and clearing fields.” Finally, the Party never hesitated to employ 
coercive measures when necessarily. 
The organizational skills and strategies of Party’s higher authorities were certainly 
significant for local massive mobilization. However, it was local cadres at lower levels 
who made concrete deployments of these strategies and practiced these skills. Therefore, 
they played a decisive role in the Communist mobilization and movements. The 
implementation of a policy largely relied on their digestion of the Party’s doctrines and 
their deployment of optimizing resources, both material and spiritual, in specific local 
settings. The farewell ceremony for the draftees is an illustrative example of how local 
cadres employed existing norms of prestige, social recognition, communal 
responsibilities and public rituals to glorify the act of “joining the army.” Based on their 
comprehensive knowledge of local communities, they were also able to balance the 
peasants’ willingness to sacrifice in their struggle against the Japanese with the resources 
that the Party needed to extract to insure its survival and development. This balancing act 
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was decisive to the Communist success at the local level. The final success of “emptying 
houses and clearing fields” in Ruxi was mostly indebted to the local cadres’ 
improvisational ability towards the emergency and the masses’ emotional oscillation.  
Meanwhile, in contrast to previous scholarship that argues for the CCP’s 
overwhelming controllability within the hierarchical political structure, my observation 
about the base areas in Jiangsu reveals that the Party’s control over its cadres gradually 
decreased, especially below the township level, regardless of its deepening penetration 
into local communities. Such a phenomenon resulted from a pervasive shortage of cadres, 
which forced the Party to rely, in part, on local elites, whose power base did not stem 
solely from Communist authorities. It led to the bifurcation between high-ranking party 
leaders’ original intentions when they composed policies and the actual implementation 
by local cadres. This bifurcation further induced indirect resistance from both cadres and 
ordinary people during the enforcement of policies at the village level. For instance, both 
the local cadres and the military dependants were unsatisfied with the Assistance 
Program. The latter even mistook it for a communal philanthropic measure sponsored by 
the local gentry. The higher authorities gradually became aware of this point. Thus, one 
of the major purposes of the Rectification Campaign was to improve the quality of the 
local cadre echelon. 
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Chapter Six Self Rejuvenation: Reinforcing Internal Consensus 
and Centralization 
One of the most important characteristics contributing to the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP)’s success in the Chinese Revolution was its ability to self-rejuvenate by its 
adapting to different situations during each of its developing phases. During the War of 
Resistance, the CCP wisely took advantage of the Japanese military invasion to rapidly 
expand its personnel and political influence in rural areas where neither the Japanese nor 
the Nationalists had spare forces to keep stationed. As previous chapters show, the Party 
attracted ordinary peasants through tangible economic interests, and alleviated opposition 
from the landlord class by including them in council organs without endowing them with 
real power. It enforced popular identification with the promoted ideology by establishing 
new educations systems and reforming the existing one. Finally, it enhanced its public 
image as a democratic, anti-Japanese, pioneer party through diverse propaganda channels. 
In order to expand its influence in local communities in minimal time, the Party put 
priority on quantity over quality when recruiting members. Although it brought 
unprecedented development for the Communist movement, the overemphasis on 
quantitative growth also set obstacles to the Party’s improvement of cadre echelon, 
institutional reform and further penetration into local society. On the one hand, in its 
initial period in Jiangsu Province, the Party had recruited quite a few local gangsters and 
bullies who later stained its reputation among ordinary peasants. On the other hand, the 
majority of peasant party members joined the CCP without a clear awareness of its 
revolutionary agenda or differences from other anti-Japanese organizations. Therefore, 
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the CCP strenuously sought to establish a self-rejuvenating institution, through which it 
could reinforce its organizational consolidation, enhance party members’ political 
identity, and expel undesirable followers. The Rectification Campaign (zhengfeng 
yundong) launched in the 1940s, to a large extent, fulfilled this task at both the central 
and the local level. 
Scholars of China usually regarded Mao Zedong’s two speeches of February 
1942, “To Rectify the Working Style of the Party” (Zhendung dang de zuofeng) and “To 
Oppose to Party Formalism” (Fandui dang bagu), as the beginning of the Rectification 
Campaign. In the 1960s and 1970s, they emphasized the educational function of the 
campaign. They agree that the Rectification successfully unified the CCP high-ranking 
leaders, enhanced the “Chineseness” of the guiding ideology of the Communist 
movement, reduced Soviet influence within the Party and maintained the independence of 
the CCP from the Comintern (Chalmers A. Johnson, 1962; Mark Selden, 1971; Frederick 
C. Teiwes, 1976). From his populist perspective, Selden further commends the campaign 
arguing that it increased “communication between leadership and lower-ranking cadres as 
well as between cadres and the people” (195). Gao Hua pushes such ideological 
interpretation of the Rectification Campaign even further. He argues that Mao Zedong 
launched the campaign as part of a power struggle within the highest-ranking leaders 
against Wang Ming and his followers, who challenged Mao’s authority by deprecating 
his lack of higher education and inauthentic explanation of the Chinese Communist 
movement (Gao Hua, 2000). With the help of his strategic partner, Liu Shaoqi, Mao’s 
success in this ideological battle was confirmed by the unprecedented deification of his 
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personal charisma. The Rectification Campaign was no doubt significant for the CCP 
because its highest-ranking leaders achieved remarkable unanimity, which later served to 
prevent internal loss from factional friction such as what the Nationalist Party 
experienced in the Civil War (1945-1949). Chen Yung-fa attributes the success of the 
Rectification Campaign to the similarity between its educational characteristic and the 
self-cultivating practice of Confucianism, which facilitated the acceptance and 
internalization of the campaign among party members (Chen 1986). However, he does 
not thoroughly explain the connection between a literati cultural practice and the 
understanding of peasant cadres, who were mostly illiterates or semi-literates. What were 
the underlying purposes of the Rectification Campaign, and how it was launched at the 
local level?  
This chapter begins with an exploration of the formation of a new elite class 
consisting of local party cadres. It particularly focuses on highlighting their differences 
from traditional local gentry. Troubled by the increasing number and power of this class 
as well as the low quality of its personnel, the party authority launched two campaigns 
hoping to eradicate undesirable tendencies and improve quality of its cadre echelon. It 
first dispelled unqualified cadres and party members under the name of “extracting army 
and simplifying administration” (jinbin jianzheng) to retain its tamed reputation caused 
by misbehaved and corrupt cadres. This campaign further strengthened the flexibility and 
mobility of the local party administration when faced with Japanese attacks and lowered 
its maintaining cost as well. The Rectification Campaign beginning in late 1943 in 
Jiangsu targeted political education within the Party. The Huazhong Bureau organized 
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numerous training classes, which took the form of criticism and self-criticism for party 
members aiming to deepen their understanding about the political identity and enhance 
internal consensus. Gradually, the focus of local rectification shifted from ideological 
education to anti-traitor initiatives. Using a case study of an incidence of the Youth 
League investigation in Siyang County, this chapter will analyze the defects and impact 
of the Rectification Campaign.  
THE CCP LOCAL RECRUITMENT 
As a revolutionary vanguard party against the ruling class, the CCP firmly insisted 
on an oppositional stance towards landlords and gentry in local communities. Even if it 
took a moderate and friendly attitude toward them during the War, the Party never 
stopped its attempts to deconstruct the authority of traditional local elite by expanding its 
own theoretical power base of poor peasants and hired laborers. In practice in Jiangsu, its 
recruiting target extended to middle or even rich peasants in order to maximize local 
support and resources. According to existing documents, the Party organs operated 
openly above the township (xiang) level while keeping secret activities at and below 
township for the sake of safety concerns. How, then, did the Party recruit members in 
local communities?  
Generally speaking, the Party recruited new members through three channels. 
First, it relied on party branches of the NFA to approach potential candidates. Second, 
local party branches were also responsible for recruitment. Finally, mass worker teams 
that directly reported to the county party committees were another major recruiting force. 
Most mass workers were educated youth from urban areas. County committees would 
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select qualified candidates, i.e. relatively capable ones with good class background, and 
persuade them to join the Party before sending them out on recruitment missions in local 
communities (Li Zhong 1988). Chen Yung-fa describes nine patterns through which the 
Party enlisted local members on the basis of a working report by a local cadre of 
Yanggang, a town in Siyang County (north Jiangsu) (Chen 1986, 299-302).1 These nine 
patterns share three common characteristics. First, recruiters tried to identify with 
ordinary peasants to shorten the psychological distance between the two parties. They 
claimed to be the representatives of the poor or peasant resistance association. Second, 
recruiters intentionally withheld relevant information from the recruited. In extreme 
cases, the enlisted members did not even know they had become party members. Of 
course, there was the possibility that even recruiters themselves did not have a full 
knowledge of the Party’s intentions. Third, many candidates joined the Party because of 
promises of benefits or threats. According to the working report of Yanggang, thirty-six 
of the fifty-nine members of the local party branch recruited in 1941 and 1942 joined the 
CCP for food borrowing privileges, power, a better life, revenge, and so on. This data 
supports Samuel Popkin’s claims that peasants should be viewed as rational individuals 
who deliberately calculated the possibility of losses and gains before making decision 
(Popkin 1979). The Party was clearly aware of this fact, and thus, did not touch upon 
                                                 
1 The nine patterns are “1) The Party branch recruited members in the name of the peasant association; 2) 
The Party was presented as an organization of the poor; 3) The recruiter enlisted members without telling 
them they were being recruited; 4) Candidates were approached and asked to join without being given all 
the relevant information; 5) Candidates were enticed by withholding information or exaggerating benefits; 
6) The Party recruiter used threats; 7) The Party was introduced to candidates jokingly; 8) Recruiters seized 
on candidates’ need for help or protection; 9) Party recruiters tried to impress the candidates with the 
strength of the CCP.” 
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Communist discourse and theory during recruitment. Such recruiting strategies were 
rewarded with an unprecedented expansion in party membership. Nonetheless, this 
expansion came at the price of compromising the quality of its personnel. The instance of 
Anle Town provides a vivid instance of the successes and failures of local recruitment. 
The Anti-Japanese Democratic Government of Anle was established after the 
Communist troops defeated the Nationalist forces in mid 1940. Before that, the Party had 
already led a large-scale grain borrowing movement in March of that year, which widely 
enhanced its political influence among ordinary peasants. Under such relatively peaceful 
and secure circumstances, the CCP began its recruiting activities in the local community. 
The first party member in Anle was Huang Hao, a better-off middle peasant and later the 
first secretary of the party township branch (xiang zhibu shuji). Although he had been jia 
head under the Nationalist power, Huang had secretly served as the syndic (lishi) of the 
local Peasant Association since the Party began their infiltration in the spring of 1939. He 
also had played an active role in organizing the grain borrowing movement in 1940. 
Huang was recruited by a mass worker, Chen Daohe, from the nearby market town, 
Gucheng, who convinced Huang to join the Party by insisting that he would no longer be 
bullied by big landlords and providing promises of future benefits. Once Huang was 
enlisted, his superior, a mass worker Xu Min, assigned him the task of recruiting more 
wage working members with good class backgrounds. Huang first attempted to approach 
Cheng Ping, also a peasant association syndic serving in the model team (mofan dui).2 
                                                 
2 Model team was a self-defense team organized by the CCP and in charge of the public safety. Sometimes 
it also delivered intelligence reports to the Party. 
 238 
Most importantly, Cheng was Huang’s foster brother and Huang considered him reliable 
even if he was a rich peasant. When trying to convince Cheng to join the Party, Huang 
said, “You will be free of oppression from landlords.” To which Cheng then asked, “Are 
you in?” “Surely I am.” Huang replied. Cheng then agreed to enlist. When the superior 
assigned a recruiting quota of workers, Cheng locked his focus on his good friend, Miao 
Wenming. Cheng mentioned the CCP to Miao in their daily conversations and received a 
positive feedback from the latter. As a result, Miao officially became a party member a 
few days later. This recruiting process vividly demonstrated the Party’s flexibility and 
pragmatism in the initial phase of mobilization. Instead of mechanically applying its 
revolutionary agenda, it built and expanded its social basis on preexisting peasants’ 
values, personal ties and power networks. This largely facilitated the Party’s recruitment 
while bringing indigenous characteristics into its local party at the same time. 
Later, the recruiting procedure was conducted more formally: middle peasant 
candidates were investigated by three party members; poor peasant or oppressed female 
candidates by one party member. When approaching potential candidates, recruiters first 
asked about their impression of the NFA. Once they received a positive answer, the 
question probed deeper, making inquiries such as “who leads the NFA.” Candidates 
would have to pass these examinations as well as an investigation into their backgrounds 
before they officially joined the Party. In addition, recruiters looked for candidates 
according to the Party’s present development needs. For instance, Zheng Huafeng, an 
opportunist and later accused of corruption, was recruited because he was a good public 
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speaker and the local Worker Resistance Association happened to need a syndic with 
such a talent (Rao Shushi 1944, 58-63, 120-122). 
The Party designed specific strategies to facilitate its expansion in local 
communities. While Chen Yung-fa’s nine patterns mentioned above depict how recruiters 
persuaded or forced candidates to join the Party, the Anle experiences explain why the 
Party selected these specific candidates. Since the Party operated secretly at and below 
township level, recruiters usually searched for candidates based on their social networks 
and personal relationships (guanxi). In addition, the Party recruited people such as Zheng 
for their special skills and talents with an eye towards facilitating mobilization and 
infiltrating local communities. Meanwhile, it preferred people who had a reputation for 
being tough and showed bravery in movements against landlords. Huang Hao was 
required to be fearless when faced with the threat of death. It was the very reason that 
another hooligan, Wang Liben, become a party member, got enrolled in the Resistance 
University for six months and was promoted to the position of the head of the township 
model team, despite the fact that the Party had once expelled him for betrayal during the 
Japanese mopping-up campaign (saodang) in 1940 (114-116). 
Class background was another major concern when the CCP recruited new 
members. Landlords and rich peasants were usually denied, if not totally excluded from, 
party membership. The Party deliberately made itself appealing to middle peasants during 
recruitment. Among the forty-one party members of Anle in 1943, twenty-six had been 
middle peasants. Among the party branch committee, middle peasants enjoyed an 
overwhelming advantage, holding eight out of eleven positions (59-62). Due to the better-
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off economic status of local communities, the majority of the population was comprised 
of middle peasants. The CCP would not successfully control local communities without 
their support. Furthermore, not entirely free from exploitation of landlords, they were 
easily motivated by promises to reduce rent and interest. As far as poor peasants and 
hired laborers were concerned, although the Party theoretically regarded them as the most 
reliable force of revolution, they had neither the resourceful social connections, nor the 
powerful influence in their communities needed to lead local Communist movements. 
Therefore, even if the Party claimed to represent the poor, middle peasants still composed 
the backbone force, organizing activities in Jiangsu. Nevertheless, the Party’s stereotype 
of “class background deciding everything” made the label of “poor peasant” or “poor 
middle peasant” a panacea for cadres’ misbehavior. The words, such as “although X has 
shortcomings like…since he is from the poor peasant class, he is still a good comrade…” 
were prevalent in working reports about local cadres’ performances. Unfortunately, such 
a tendency to overemphasize class background and disregard personal integrity during 
recruitment created problems that affected daily operation of the party branches and local 
administrations. This shortcoming even aroused grumbles and uncertainties among the 
public. 
THE FORMATION OF THE COMMUNIST NEW ELITE—THE ISSUES OF WASTE AND 
CORRUPTION 
The CCP regarded the overthrow of the ruling class and establishing a Communist 
government of the oppressed as its ultimate revolutionary goals. As I have shown in the 
previous chapters, its mass movements continuously attacked and undermined the 
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authority and power base of the traditional elites in local society. The Party’s purpose was 
clear—to nurture its own power base and establish new authority in local communities. 
Paralleling the Party’s deepening penetration, a class of new Communist elites, mainly 
composed of party members and local cadres, was forming regardless of the Party’s 
initial intentions. This new elite class not only decided how to launch Communist 
movements in local communities, it also determined the image and understanding local 
people created of the Party. Unfortunately, ordinary people’s feedback about these new 
elites was not always positive. People grumbled of their arbitrariness, squander, and 
corruption. How did decay occur in such a rapid and prevalent way? My analyses begin 
with the goals that made people decided to join the Party. 
The above description shows that the CCP adopted different strategies to persuade 
candidates to join them. Not surprisingly, the latter agreed after realizing that the Party 
could benefit them in different ways. The first major reason was the prospect of 
pleasures, enjoyments and conveniences that came with the improved social status that 
accompanied party membership. After being the VIP in local communities, some cadres 
became captious about food supplies; some loved good clothes; and some enjoyed 
women. One openly claimed, “Revolution is too hard, and we deserve some payback.” 
And another asserted, “What is revolution for? It is all about food, clothes and what we 
use.” In winter, some cadres requested not only cotton-stuffed coats and mittens, but 
cotton-stuffed boots as well. One NFA regiment even sent people to Shandong Province 
to buy leather for boots (Su Yu 1944, 53). In Huaibei Regional Base, one county spent 
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more than 10,000 yuan for a single banquet.3 Another county requested a budget of 
70,000 yuan for expanding local military forces, tens of times more than the sum of the 
budget of other counties (Huaibei qu dangwei 1944a). One platoon stationed in Nantong 
requested a reimbursement for the cost of 1,400 pieces of meal when it was sent out for a 
special mission for two months. This amount could have fed them and a whole other 
squad based on the regular quota. The conference fee in Dingdong Sub-distract (Suzhong 
regional base) reached 40,000 yuan in one month of 1942 (Guan Wenwei 1943a, 210). 
The massive amount of waste and the pursuit of personal luxuries had become so 
prevalent in party, military and administrative organs that it created an environment in 
which people were proud of extravagance. In addition to the influence from working 
colleagues, this trend can be traced directly to the party members and the local cadres’ 
initial motives for joining the Party. 
Other party members regarded their membership as a channel for collecting 
personal fortunes. Some claimed and took a quota of food and clothes they were not 
supposed to enjoy at their rank (Huaibei qu dangwei 1944a).4 Some cadres took the 
advantage of travel assignments to make purchases along their trips and request 
reimbursement when returning. Others even embezzled Grain Tax stock. They sold their 
Grain Tax coupon in places where rice and wheat were at higher prices and bought back 
the same amount of grain in places where the rates were low. The price difference went 
                                                 
3 The currency was issued by the local base government. Its exchange rate against fabi (the Nationalist 
official currency) was not clear. According to my estimation based on the documents of the time, a set of 
winter clothes (including coat and pants) cost around 50 yuan. 
4 Different levels of cadres enjoyed different quotas of daily supplies and welfares, including clothes, food, 
toothpaste, medicines and so on, corresponding to their ranks. Generally speaking, the higher one’s ranking 
was, the more supplies he could receive. 
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into their own pockets. Moreover, their manipulation sometimes facilitated the 
profiteering activities of illegal merchants, who secretly transported grains to the 
Japanese occupied areas for high profits, and thereby, seriously muddled up the Party’s 
arrangements for grain allocation (Su Yu 1944, 56-57). In such cases, local cadres’ 
misdeeds did not merely caused fiscal losses or tarnished the Party’s reputation among 
ordinary people. They interfered with the CCP’s strategic arrangements and endangered 
its survival. 
There were also a group of people who decided to join the Party for upward social 
mobility and personal ambitions. These cadres took advantage of their official positions 
to build their own social network in and outside the Party for future promotions. For 
instance, one cadre in charge of United Front affairs allocated several hundred dans of 
rice, dozens of pigs and hundreds of thousands of cash to the friend troops (youjun, the 
Nationalist or other non-Communist resistance forces) to strengthen his personal 
friendship with the leaders. Another cadre of Suzhong Regional Base issued loans of 
several hundred thousands yuan at low interest rates to merchants under the excuse of 
embracing the United Front policy. Meanwhile, a phenomenon in which subordinates 
bribed their superiors with government funds in exchange for promotions within the Party 
became increasingly prevalent (54-55, 57). Such bribery easily led to factionalism, in 
which a group of cadres were connected by secret financial transactions and covered each 
other’s misdeeds or even crimes. Furthermore, recruiters usually followed their social 
network’s initiatives in deciding on party member candidates, which unintentionally laid 
the foundation for the development of inner-party factionalism. This problem stymied the 
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higher party authority’s attempts to develop control over local cadres and prevented them 
from receiving accurate reports of local situations. 
These three intertwined motivations were prevalently revealed in local cadres. 
The commander of the Allied Defense Team (lianfang siling) of Route East (Ludong), 
Yang Meisheng, was a good instance in this sense. Yang attended the Communist 
revolution during the Jingangshan period in late 1920s and participated in the Long 
March (1934-1936).5 During the War, he served as a middle ranking military cadre in 
Ludong District of Huannan Regional Base. Relying on his personal experiences of the 
Communist Revolution, Yang despised the leaders of the Party District Committee. He 
once publically claimed, “Damned, I have been joined in the revolution for more than ten 
years. They kept such a high profile when coming here. I would like to kill them one 
day.” Unsatisfied by his current position, Yang often went down to subordinate county, 
town and village offices extorting extra money. When the Party called for local 
administrators to open or invest in mutual aid corporations (hezuoshe) to help ease budget 
pressures, the headquarters of the Allied Defense Team initiated its own mutual aid 
corporation and started to do business in tobaccos, and even opium. Yang issued quotas 
of tobacco and opium sales and took commissions from the benefitting merchants. 
Moreover, he embezzled most the profits from these sales and gave the corporation a low 
                                                 
5 Jingangshan is located in boundary of Hunan and Jiangxi Province. In October 1927, Mao Zedong led 
troops that failed in the Autumn Harvest Uprising (qiushou qiyi) to this mountainous region and established 
the first Communist base in Party history. The next year, Zhu De and Chen Yi led the troops that failed in 
the Nanchang Uprising (1927) into the base area, and, together with Mao’s troops, formed the Fourth Corps 
of Chinese Red Army. In the beginning of 1929, Mao led the major force of the Fourth Corps heading for 
southern Jiangxi. Jingangshan Base remained in the Party’s control until 1934 when the Communist forces 
evacuated from Jiangxi and began the Long March (1934-1935). After that, the core area of the Communist 
Revolution transferred to northwestern China. 
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payoff, to prevented investigation from higher authorities. By the spring of 1943 when his 
corruption was revealed, he had sold about 200kg opium, the market value of which 
reached more than two million yuan. To cover these illegal transactions, he bribed his 
two direct subordinates in the headquarters and made the Alliance Defense Team his own 
little kingdom. 
Ironically, Yang was not initially investigated for corruption or illegal business, 
but the suspicion of factionalism. He continuously promoted people who showed 
obedience to his demands regardless of their capacities and suppressed those who 
criticized him. Under his leadership, the military department at the county level 
disregarded orders of the corresponding government. They also showed little respect to 
the Party County Committees. Such hostilities between the administrative and military 
cadres gradually developed into open antagonism, organized by Yang and his followers, 
against the district leaders or even the Huazhong Bureau. When the Huazhong Bureau 
announced the new list naming the Party Committee Members of Ludong district, they 
alleged that it was “a totally factionalist list.” Later, when informed that the list was 
proposed by the Huazhong Bureau and sanctioned by the central government, they 
insisted on their charge and insinuated that “the Huazhong Bureau suggested the list from 
a factional stance and the central government sanctioned such a factional proposal” (Tan 
Zhenlin 1943).  
Yang’s story showed the typical career path of a deteriorating cadre. At first, he 
enjoyed the allowances brought by his political and social status, legally or illegally. 
Later, when extravagantly spending public funds no longer fulfilled his swollen appetite, 
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Yang began accumulating wealth by taking advantage of his official position. When such 
illegal transactions had become big enough that he was not able to cover them up through 
his own authority, he began seeking partners to form interest groups and make corruption 
a collective behavior. However, the Party tolerated a certain degree of personal waste and 
embezzlement. After all, it was undergoing severe cadre shortage because of the rapid 
expansion and any experienced cadre was precious for its development. When corruption 
evolved into factionalism, which inevitably confronted the authority of higher 
administration, the Party ran the risk of losing control over its middle and lower level 
cadres, and, therefore, had to take action. 
In the Fourth District of the Suzhong Regional Base, the 1942 annual report 
shows that the accountant of the First Tax Bureau, Wang Jinquan, ran away with 90,000 
yuan; the chief clerk (zhuren) of the same bureau, Yan Baohe, fled with 25,000 yuan; the 
chief clerk of the Fourth Tax Bureau, Xing Aishen, was executed for embezzling 4,000 
yuan; an office staff of the Tax Management Bureau (shuiwu guanliju), Chen Zhaoming, 
escaped with 29,000 yuan; the head of Haimen Sub-district, Xie Jun, absconded with 
8,000 yuan; and, the head of Xinghua Sub-district, Zheng X, ran away with 30,000 yuan. 
There were four cadres executed for corruption in the Third District in June and July, 
1942 (Fan Xingzhi 1942, 548). 
Unfortunately, even such severe sentences did not hamper the prevalence of 
corruption. The first semi-annual report of the Fourth District of the Suzhong Regional 
Base in 1943 showed that, in the eight towns of north Juema area, there were sixteen 
cases of embezzling Grain Tax by township and bao level cadres with the sum totaling 
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more than 50,000kg. During the same period, corruption cases related to sub-district and 
above level cadres had been above ten, and, in each case, the embezzled amount ranged 
from ten thousands to more than 400,000 yuan (Guan Wenwei 1943a, 210). Su Yu, the 
commander of the First Division of the NFA, concluded that waste was more prevalent in 
cadres above county or regiment levels and corruption in those below sub-district and 
battalion ranks (Su Yu 1944, 61).6 The Party’s ability to control its agents showed a 
declining tendency paralleling a decrease in ranking.  
The Party attributed the pervasive corruption in Jiangsu to unsystematic 
management and a lack of centralized revenue and expending system. It further explained 
that this chaos occurred because base areas were established in different times, and this 
disorder was therefore inevitable during the transition from traditional governance to 
democratic resistance administration (Zhou Yongkang 1991, 122-123). However, this 
explanation is far from satisfactorily explaining large-scale corruption and waste. 
The ultimate reason for corruption and waste can be traced to the failure of middle 
and lower ranking cadres to understand their responsibilities and status in the new 
Communist political institution. The high-ranking Party leaders tried to construct a 
modern party-state, which facilitated the central government’s control over local society. 
Therefore, the duties of local cadres were quite different than the traditional gentry who 
used to serve as sub-officials for the Qing government in local communities. 
Nevertheless, when the party recruiters approached candidates, they never touched upon 
                                                 
6 County and sub-district were administrative units, and regiment and battalion were military units. 
Generally speaking, county is the equivalent level of regiment in administrative hierarchy, and sub-district 
equals to battalion. 
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these more substantive topics and mostly focused on promises of benefits. Confined by 
their limited literacy and education, both recruiters and the recruited were not able to 
fully understand their responsibilities as party members and local cadres. From their 
perspective, their new identity simply brought them increasing social status and personal 
prestige, which endowed them with the privileges previously enjoyed by the traditional 
elites. Hence, middle and lower cadres did not fully comprehend fiscal budgets or 
jurisdictions, and therefore, used public funds however they wanted. They trespassed 
upon peasants’ farmed land as it suited them, without worrying about destroying planted 
crops. They reasoned, “Revolution is to help the masses, and the masses should pay us 
back” (Su Yu 1944, 53-55). Meanwhile, some cadres equated caring for the masses with 
giving them cash. They never bargained when making purchases for the government, a 
fact that advantaged profiteering merchants. Some suggested increasing payment to 
mobilize for corvee service. A district management department (guanli ke) once offered 
almost 4,000 yuan for a long-term corvee (55). Local cadres’ misunderstanding of their 
administrative duties, political identities and the Communist movement mostly stemmed 
from this pragmatist tendency in the Party’s recruitment, which overemphasized the 
economic prospect of party membership while neglecting the real tasks of the CCP. As a 
result, ordinary peasants sarcastically commented that “the NFA used to be diligent, but 
now it got power and turned as corrupt and degenerate as the Nationalists…” (Su Yu 
1944, 51, 58). Faced with such situations, the Party had to take action on this issue. 
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JINGBING JIANZHENG—REINFORCING CENTRALIZED LEADERSHIP 
In December 1941, the CCP Central Committee issued a proposal of 
“strengthening army and simplifying administration” (jingbin jianzheng), requesting that 
party, administrative and military organs at all levels lay off staff and soldiers. It further 
requested that the base areas regard this issue as one of their key tasks for the next year in 
both the Party and the army. The Central Committee proposed this policy for three 
reasons. First, after the Hundred Regiment Battle (baituan dazhan) the Communists had 
become Japan’s number one rival.7 Intense Japanese offensives rapidly diminished the 
area the Party controlled. Thus, personnel arrangements that served for larger population 
became redundant. Second, the current warfare enhanced the priority of flexibility and 
adaptability to the Japanese and collaborationist troops’ continuous mopping-up 
campaigns. Finally, shrinking base areas and frequent military attacks severely decreased 
peasants’ agricultural output, and correspondingly, the Party’s revenue (Suzhong jingbin 
jianzheng de fangzhen yu shishi buzhou 1943, 1-2).  
The regional bases in Jiangsu did not begin to implement this policy of 
“strengthening army and simplifying administration” or design detailed guidelines and 
approaches until January of 1943. According to the working report of a regional level 
cadre, the Suzhong Regional Party Committee decided to make the effort to implement 
this policy for reasons they saw as unsuitable to announce to the public. First, the 
implementation of this policy worked to win over people of middle and high social status. 
                                                 
7 The Hundred Regiments Battle occurred in August 1940 and lasted four months. Since the Eighth Route 
Army dispatched more than one hundred regiments engaged in the battle, the Chinese historians name it 
after this number. The real military strength of the CCP was revealed in this battle and Japanese thus 
shifted their focus from the Nationalist army to the Eighth Route Army afterwards. 
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Second, it reserved human resources: capable cadres would be available for future 
appointments (3). At a first glance, these two reasons lacked a logical connection to the 
“strengthening army and simplifying administration” policy. The second one served more 
as an excuse for alleviating potential resistance from the laid-off cadres than a reasonable 
impulse. These reasons, however, should have been fully conceptualized by party cadres, 
especially those with a higher rank. The rationale of the first reason revealed part of the 
regional government’s true motivation: “We cannot make people hostile to us and make 
them want to betray us for being over-demanding...In the past we knew nothing but 
requesting cash and grains from the masses. We paid no attention to administrative 
expense, which was a huge shortcoming…Corruption and waste are crimes to the 
revolution. In the future the government will strictly legislate on these issues” (4). 
Moreover, according to the same report, in order to sustain regular administrative 
operations the Suzhong Regional Base alone needed 318 cadres to fill positions at and 
above the district level. Unfortunately, there were only 213 cadres in service when this 
policy was issued in Jiangsu in 1943 (17).  
Why did the Regional Party Committee insist on this retrenchment policy when 
experiencing severe cadre shortage? Since the Party emphasized quantitative increase 
when it first arrived in Jiangsu, a considerable portion of the newly recruited party 
members and local cadres were opportunists, or even local bullies, without clear 
recognition to the Communist agenda. Unfortunately, it was these very people who, 
representing the CCP, came into contact with ordinary people on a daily basis. Due to 
their misdeeds, accusations of coercion, waste and corruption against Communist cadres 
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had seriously contaminated the Party’s well-established reputation. Some people 
complained, “The new government has good intentions, but has no good cadres to 
implement them.” Or, “High-ranking cadres of the new government are excellent, but the 
lower ones are so bad.” Others said: “The new government says one thing and does the 
other (17).” All the charges targeted cadres of the sub-district level. Even worse, these 
comments came from people of middle and high social status, the very group that the 
Party worked so strenuously to win over in its contest with the Nationalist Party. 
Consequently, the base areas of Jiangsu regarded this policy as a feasible solution to the 
pervasive corruption and factionalism of local cadres, which could be enacted without 
arousing panic. It prevented the Party from openly admitting the existence of large-scale 
corruption within its administrations and mitigated the expelled cadres by leaving them 
with the hollow hope of a position to return to in the future. 
The policy of “strengthening army” especially facilitated the improvement of 
fighting capacities, quality of military personnel and guaranteed supplies to the regular 
forces. On the one hand, it stipulated that each company expanded to 110 to 120 soldiers 
by selecting qualified ones from local military forces and government security guards. 
Each division established three to four major regiments, each of which maintained a 
range of 1,500 to 1,700 persons. These regular forces were under the direct control of the 
Huazhong Bureau. On the other hand, it required that soldiers over twenty-five or below 
eighteen years of age or those who were weak should be dispatched to their native places. 
Government security guards of all levels were merged into local military forces or 
guerrillas. It further ordered that guerrillas of sub-district level should only maintain a 
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scale of twenty to thirty people (Zhonggong suzhong qu dangwei 1943a, 186-187; 1943i, 
2). Meanwhile, it emphasized higher political understanding and literacy level for its 
administrative personnel, as well as better fighting capacity and physical strength for its 
military forces (Suzhong jingbin jianzheng de fangzhen yu shishi buzhou 1943, 12-14). 
The primary aim of the “strengthening army” policy was to centralize the power of 
military control dispersed at different local levels and enhance the Party’s leadership over 
the major forces. 
As for the “simplifying administration” part, the central tenet was “merging.” The 
party branches, administrative offices, military departments of district, county, sub-
district and township levels were required to merge into one organ at its corresponding 
level under the leadership of the Party. In local military forces, the battalion (equal to 
sub-district level in administration) level unit was annulled unless necessary. Even if the 
battalion unit was kept in some places, the Party ordered that their offices should only set 
three positions: one commander (yingzhang), one director (jiaodaoyuan), and one 
commissioner (tepaiyuan). Each town was only supposed to keep three positions that 
were exempt from daily farm work: the town chief, the deputy and the grain management 
specialist (liangshi guanli yuan). The positions of secretary of the party branch and leader 
of militia were concurrently held by one of the above labor-exempt positions. The below 




Table 16: Structure of District Leading Organs (i) 
Dept. or Position Number 
Party Clerk/Commissar 1 
Deputy Clerk or Deputy Commissar 1 
Organization Dept. 2 
Propaganda and Education Detp. 11 
Military Dept. 44 
Political Dept. 5 
Intelligence/Enemy Arrangement Dept. 2 
Administrative Office 12 
Secretary Office 3 
Sum 81 
 


































Table 17: Structure of County Leading Organs (i) 
Dept. and Position Number 
Party Clerk/Commissar 1 
Organization Dept. 1 
Propaganda Dept. (including mass work) 1 
Military Dept. 19 
Enemy Arrangement Committee 1 
Administrative Office 10 
Secretary 1 
Sum 34 
























Secretary Communication Unit 
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Table 18: Structure of Sub-district Leader Organs (i) 
Dept. and Position Number Note 
Party Clerk 1 Concurrently commissar of guerrilla or sub-district 
self-defense team. 
Organization Dept. 1  
Propaganda Dept. 1  
Administrative 
Office 
7 Concurrently sub-district government 
Military Dept. 6 Serving as guerrilla 
Mass Work Dept 1 Concurrently head of peasant resistance association 
Sum 17  
 
Illustration 5: Structure of Sub-District Leader Organs (ii) 
 
*Sources: Table 16-18, Illustration 3-5 (Zhonggong Suzhong qu dangwei 1943i). 
 
Laid-off party and local cadres were degraded to serve lower level positions or 
sent to places where the Communist influence was still weak. Their other option was to 
return to their native town, getting their CCP membership covered up by a social 
connection and await future appointment. Dismissed cadres, who were not party 








Mass Work Dept. 
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compensation from the Party. For instance, disabled cadres got an indemnity of a three-
month salary and relevant local government was responsible for their accommodations. 
For those still capable of work, the local government offered a starting capital of 300-500 
yuan for small business, or cattle and utilities for farm work. Those unable to work 
received a stipend no less than the wage of their original positions (Zhonggong huaibei 
qu dangwei 1943b, 11-12). When dealing with disbanded soldiers, the Party arranged 
them in a more organized and secure way to avoid uprising or defection to the Japanese 
or the Nationalists. Usually, they were dispatched back to their native places and joined 
the local militias (Zhonggong suzhong qu dangwei 1943i, 7-8). However, even such 
arrangements were not able to prevent some direct or indirect resistances from affected 
parties in this large-scale lay-off campaign.  
These resistances came from the laid-off people as well as the ones who were in 
charge of the implementation of “strengthening army and simplifying administration.” 
First of all, some responsible cadres did not make efforts to enforce this policy because 
they failed to comprehend its significance. Since it was first proposed in the base areas of 
north China, local cadres assumed that there was no urgency in enforcing it in Jiangsu. 
Some cadres said, “Situations are not as severe as the higher authority expected. We do 
not have to take immediate action. We can wait until it becomes necessary.” Others 
expressed their doubts about the policy: “It would absolutely impact on our current works 
and arrangements once ‘simplifying administration’ is enforced. We have already 
suffered from cadre shortage. Why bother to lay off people?” Apparently, these cadres 
failed to understand the underlying function of this policy—to expel undesirable 
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personnel without touching the waste and corruption issues of the local party and 
administrative organs. As a result, a considerable amount of cadres regarded it simply as 
a slogan and were reluctant to turn it into an enforced policy. 
Second, relevant offices and cadres found excuses to counteract the 
implementation of “simplifying administration.” Small departments insisted on their 
significance, worrying that their offices would be totally dismissed from the 
administrative structure. Large ones asserted that their departments had already been on 
retrenchment and refused to corporate with further lay-offs. One department head of a 
county government refused to dismiss his personal orderly. He therefore suggested, “It is 
simple, and we can just switch the title and call him messenger” (Suzhong jingbin 
jianzheng de fangzhen yu shishi buzhou 1943, 5-6). This was a prevalent phenomenon: 
local offices and military forces underreported the numbers of their orderlies and horses, 
which made retrenchment a policy in word only. 
Another problem resided in the improper enforcement of this policy. In the 
Huaibei Regional Base, some troops simply convened soldiers to line up on a playground, 
selected the older and weaker ones and dismissed them right away. Furthermore, some 
administrative offices and troops failed to make further arrangements for the dismissed 
personnel. They regarded it as the end of the mission when the laid-off soldiers were sent 
back to their native places, and did not introduce them to the local offices or the stationed 
troops. Neither did they ask how the former soldiers planned to make a living. Some even 
failed to pay the cost of the return trip for the laid-off people (Zhonggong huaibei qu 
dangwei 1943b). Such indifferent attitudes deeply hurt the self-esteem of the dismissed 
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cadres, which easily led to feelings of desperation, hopelessness or abandonment, and 
fostered the belief that they had been deceived because they were no longer useful. 
Improperly accommodated, these dismissed cadres returned to their hometown, or went 
to the assigned places, resentful and unsatisfied. They consciously or unconsciously 
passed their resentment to ordinary peasants during daily work. The masses thus regarded 
it as a signal of a possible retreat of the NFA, which significantly influenced the morale 
of local Communist movement. 
The CCP Central Committee decided to enforce “strengthening army and 
simplifying administration” for various concerns. Despite the three clearly delineated 
reasons above, it is critical to remember that the United Front only existed on paper after 
the New Fourth Army Incident in 1941. The GMD government stopped supplies to the 
Communist forces and initiated the economic blockade against the Communist border 
regions. Distant from the Yan’an, the base areas in Jiangsu hardly suffered from the 
blockade. This might explained why the local cadres thought that this policy was for base 
areas of north China, not Jiangsu. However, higher authority found “strengthening army 
and simplifying administration” to be a good opportunity to solve the problems of waste, 
corruption, and relevant underlying factionalism in local base areas. No matter what 
drove the policy, its primary consequence was the centralization of military and 
administrative power and the enhancement of the Party’s leadership over them. Through 
this policy, the backbone strength of the local military was assimilated into the NFA, 
which was under the stringent control of the Party. Meanwhile, the merger of local 
administrative offices and the corresponding party branch reinforced the Party’s 
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dominance in local affairs. Such centralization strengthened the Party’s control over local 
cadres through hierarchical operation and minimized room for factionalism. However, 
such a three-in-one pattern further obscured the identities of the involved cadres as 
government officials or party members (see discussion in Chapter Three), and enhanced 
the institutional authoritarian inclination in the political structure of the CCP. This trend 
was further strengthened in the Rectification Campaign. 
THE RECTIFICATION CAMPAIGN—A SHIFT FROM QUANTITY TO QUALITY 
In April 1942, two months after Mao Zedong’s two important speeches, “To 
Rectify the Working Style of the Party” and “To Oppose to Party Formalism,” the 
Propaganda Department of the Party’s Central Committee issued a document stipulating 
the purposes, content, guidelines, methods and study materials of the incoming 
Rectification. 8  On June 8, the Propaganda Department officially announced the 
inauguration of the Rectification Campaign within the Party. The Central Military 
Committee immediately followed this order by moving to rectify the three inclinations in 
military forces at the same time.9 Mao advanced a moderate slogan of “curing the 
disease and saving the patient” (zhibing jiuren) as the principle of this large-scale 
campaign to avoid potential resistance and conflicts from those involved. Nevertheless, as 
his other famous saying “one has to cross over the point of correctness to make things 
                                                 
8 This document is “guanyu zai yan’an taolun zhongyang jueding ji Mao Zedong tongzhi zhengdun 
sanfeng baogao de jueding (Decision on the discussion about the Central Committee and Comrade Mao’s 
report on rectifying the three inclinations in Yan’an). 
9 The official explanation of the Rectification Campaign was to rectify three inclinations: fighting 
subjectivism to rectify (undesirable) inclination in study; fighting factionalism to rectify (undesirable) 
inclination in the Party; and fighting eight-leg style inclination in writing. 
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correct” indicated, he believed that the process of rectifying people’s thoughts to achieve 
political consensus within the military forces and the Party could never be modest. 
Launching the Rectification Campaign required a relatively stable, secure and 
isolated environment, where all subjects could be convened for intensive ideological 
indoctrination. This requirement was not easy to achieve in the bases of Jiangsu, which 
were surrounded by Japanese occupied areas, including the capital of the collaborationist 
government. Therefore, the Rectification there began several months or even more than 
one year later than those in North China. The Subei Regional Party Committee made a 
reading plan of twenty-two mandatory articles targeting cadres of sub-district level and 
above at the end of September.10 The Suzhong Regional Base did not initiate a wide-
scale Rectification until July 1943, and the Sunan Region was even later. It was only 
beginning in January 1944 that the cadres eventually went into a regular study phase of 
the Rectification. 
During the Rectification Campaign, party members and soldiers were required to 
attend study classes organized by offices one level higher, i.e. county cadres to district 
study class, district cadres to regional class, etc. Cadres of sub-district level and below 
attended study classes sponsored by their superior county party branches (Yanfu diwei 
kuoda hui guanyu zhengfeng wenti de baogao 1944, 143-144). Usually, each class ranged 
from 50-100 students and lasted for about fifty days. Students were divided into study 
                                                 
10 These twenty-two articles included “Zhengdun dang de zuofeng” (Rectifying the [undesirable] 
inclination within the Party), “Fandui dang bagu” (Fighting eight-leg [pattern essays]), “Gaizao women de 
xuexi” (To rectify our study) and “Fandui ziyou zhuyi” (Fight liberalism) by Mao Zedong, “Lun 
gongchandangyuan de xiuyang” (Discussing the qualities of a party member), and “fandui dangnei gezhong 
bu zhengque de qingxiang” (Fight all incorrect inclinations within the Party) by Liu Shaoqi, “Zenyang zuo 
yige gongchangdangyuan” (How to be a communist party member) by Chen Yun, etc.. 
 261 
cells (xuexi xiaozu), based on their work places, ranks, and literacy levels. Presiding 
officers assigned several students to form a provisional party branch, enhancing the 
presence of the Party. In addition, each cell had a leader who monitored regular studies 
and meetings, and coordinated between students and presiding officers. Most study 
classes were divided into four phases: first, students should focus their reading on the 
mandatory articles, making notes, holding colloquiums to share their understandings and 
soliciting feedback, and correcting their attitudes towards the Rectification. In the second 
phase, students were required to reflect on their personal histories and analyze the reasons 
for their mistakes and achievements according to the first-phase readings. The third phase 
was background investigation of students, which lasted two to three weeks. The 
investigation requested that each student honestly confess their defects, and conduct self 
and mutual criticism. In the last period, presiding officers would issue an outline of 
autobiography, and each student would compose a draft of their autobiography. He would 
then turn in his draft to the provisional party branch and get approval from each of its 
members. If a branch member had concerns about an autobiography, the author’s cell 
would hold a session in which other cell members interrogated the author. After that, he 
would make the corresponding revisions and turn in a revised version to the party branch 
for further discussion or approval (Fan Zhengfu 1986). As for study classes consisting of 
cadres at the township and bao levels, the first reading phase would be conducted in the 
form of classroom teaching of mandatory documents and articles. The autobiography 
section would also be waived to accommodate their low literacy level. In such cases, 
presiding officers would concentrate on the process of self and mutual criticisms as well 
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as confessions of students’ personal histories and reinforce political consensus within the 
Party.11  
Since mandatory documents and articles were full of political jargons that were 
hard for local cadres to comprehend, presiding officers found other approaches that were 
directly relevant to their daily lives to refresh their understanding about the Party. In a 
study class of village cadres sponsored by the Lianshui (north Jiangsu) County 
Committee, teaching content focused on a discussion about the change of people’s daily 
life after the NFA arrived. When the presiding officer asked, “How did you suffer before 
the NFA came,” the students responded actively enumerating their hardships and 
experiences of being bullied by landlords and previous officials. The classroom 
atmosphere became heated. He then continued, saying, “How different is your current 
status compared with the past and why,” assuming the students would continuing their 
enthusiastic praise of the Party’s achievements in improving their lives. Things did not go 
as he expected. The students unanimously agreed that their social status significantly 
increased since the NFA arrived. One commented, “We, such vulgar people, can do 
nothing but farm work. Who would have treated us with respect in the past? Now some of 
us have become political instructors, and some have become the heads of peasant 
associations. Those landlords finally have common topics with us! And they learned to 
show us respect.”12 However, when the discussion touched on issues of improved living 
standards, a great disagreement appeared among these village cadres. On the one hand, 
                                                 
11 Feng Yiming, “Zai jinzhang jinxin zhong de Guanyun zhengfeng xunlianban” (The Rectification 
training class intensely conducted in Guanyun), Huaihai bao, January 7 1944. 
12 Xinshu, “Babai cungan de sixiang jiantao” (A review on the thoughts of 800 village cadres), Huaihai 
Bao, 11 January 1945. 
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those who were tenants and hired laborers insisted that their lives improved thanks to rent 
reduction and wage increasing movements. Especially after the summer harvest 
movement in 1944, these peasants were able to buy eight or ten mu of land and became 
middle or even rich peasants. On the other hand, those who were self-cultivators 
(zigengnong) or from better-off families felt quite differently. Under pressure from the 
presiding officer, some reluctantly admitted their lives had been improved without giving 
any supporting evidence. Some bold students straightforwardly complained, “Our lives 
are not as good as in the past.” Under such circumstances, the presiding officer reasoned 
with the students: “You guys should speak with conscience. Even if our lives had not 
been improved as significantly as poor peasants or hired laborers, we were still in the area 
protected by the NFA…our lives would have been a mess under the Japanese mopping-
ups if the Party had not defended our property…so even if our burden seemingly 
increased, our lives were actually improved.”13 It was impossible to tell how convincing 
the presiding officer’s explanation was in the students’ minds. Apparently, there was a 
gap between local cadres’ conceptions and how the Party wished they would 
conceptualize the current situation. 
Another important theme that was discussed in the same class was the reflection 
about the students’ understanding of their relation with the masses. This discussion 
developed on the basis of two key questions: for whom did you accomplish your tasks; 
and were coercive methods necessary when you enforced a policy. In regards to the first 
question, the answer from the vast majority was “for the superior.” They reasoned, “We 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
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were led by our superiors, and they assigned us various tasks and supervised us. What 
else do we know?” The second most popular answer was “for the CCP.” Their argued 
that since their superiors worked for the CCP, they must do so also. The third largest 
group put “myself” as the answer because they fulfilled their tasks for career promotions. 
Only a small group of people mentioned “the masses.” Thus, it was not surprising that the 
students almost unanimously agreed on taking coercive action over the masses when it 
came to the second question. Some argued for its effectiveness and efficiency. One cadre, 
Jiang Yufeng, flaunted his experiences: “Each time, I used the force of model team (a 
local self-defense team) to mobilize the masses. Pure political persuasion did not work at 
all. The masses simply disregard you.” Faced with such a situation, the presiding officer 
did not rush to criticize those cadres who despised the masses. After all, they were an 
overwhelming majority in the class. Instead, he tried to input a correct idea into the 
minds of those village cadres by reorganizing the order of the four answers: “Initially, 
one worked for his own promotions; since he mostly worked under the supervision of his 
superior, he naturally thought he worked for the latter; since we all work for the CCP, 
there is no doubt that he later understood this too. Ultimately, he realized that because the 
CCP worked for the masses, he did also.”14 
There was no correct answer to these questions. These village cadres’ answers 
simply demonstrated how they conceptualized their social and political status vis-a-vis 
the masses. Derived from the masses, these local cadres rapidly subscribed to the group 
working against the masses. Their answer to the question “who they worked for” clearly 
                                                 
14 Ibid.. 
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shows that they regarded the superiors, or the CCP hiding behind their orders, as the only 
power source that supported their elite status in social and political arenas. Their 
understanding of what it meant to be a party cadre was confined to viewing these 
positions as a channel of upward social mobility, recognition and respect they received 
from the local gentry, the coercive power they exercised and the arbitrary authority they 
held. In essence, it was no different from the role traditional officials used to play. This 
supports my analysis about party cadres’ ambiguous understandings of their political role 
in the new administration. As a result, the conflict between the rhetorically modernized 
institution and its arbitrary traditional substance continued to exist. 
If local cadres were patient enough to go through the reading and teaching 
sessions, they began to show resistance during the confession phase. Previous studies 
have pointed out connections between the Rectification Campaign and the Confucian 
tradition of self-reflection and cultivation. They attribute its successful implementation to 
the similarity between the two (Johnson 1962; Selden 1971; Chen 1986). This 
explanation might work for higher-ranking cadres. For local peasant cadres who were 
semi-literates or illiterates, Confucian tradition hardly provided a reasonable answer. 
Actually, they failed to understand the significance of making a classroom confession. In 
a rectification study class of Guaiyun County (north Jiangsu), village and town cadres 
complained, “We came in order to study new theory and knowledge, what does 
confession have to do with them?” “Why [do they] ask about our history? Even if we 
made mistakes in the past, it should be all right as long as we do not repeat them now. 
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Why bother to confess?”15 Chen Yung-fa suggests that the Party tried to establish its 
image as a benevolent father to alleviate resistance to confession during the campaign 
(Chen 1986, 338). The CCP’s lenient gesture certainly contributed to the success of the 
Rectification. As I show below, cadres’ rational calculation regarding their careers, the 
manipulating skills of presiding officers and behaviors of fellow students were equally 
important in deciding the result of each study class. 
The most pervasive concern that prevented cadres from making a confession was 
their uncertainty about the Party’s leniency policy. They worried that their career 
prospects would be significantly disturbed or that they would be punished once they 
confessed their previous mistakes, even if the benevolent policy promised remission. One 
township level military cadre, Wang, later admitted, “I initially did not believe in the 
leniency policy. I thought that people who made confession would be under the 
surveillance of the Party regardless of this policy. Neither would they be assigned to any 
important position.” Another cadre’s concern was typical: “I am now a party secretary. 
When the higher authority assigned tasks in future, will they still place me in major 
positions? They might just make me a deputy.”16 Moreover, they worried that mutual 
criticism would harm their personal relationship with colleagues. In the study class in 
Sishu County (north Jiangsu), group leaders were reluctant to criticize their classmates 
                                                 
15 Feng Yijing, “Zai jinzhang jinxing zhong de Guanyun zhengfeng xunlianban” (The rectification training 
class intensely conducted in Guanyun), Huaihai bao, 7 January 1944. 
16 “Xiaozuzhang zuotanhui shang de jilu zhengli” (Minutes of the colloquium of cell leaders). In 
Huazhong zhengfeng yu fangjian de chubu jingyan, 1944, GZ 5-58. 
 267 
for fear of embarrassing people during the first week.17 One township level cadre hoped 
that “the higher authority should not put our confessions on newspapers or posters…if 
they kept doing so, where shall I show my face? I have no face among the people.” 
Apparently, what was at stake in those local cadres’ minds were their career prospects 
and personal prestige. Their decisions of whether to confess, or how thorough their 
confessions would be, depended on a rational calculation about gains and losses. 
The continuous pressure of confession and mutual criticism sometimes pushed 
students towards a psychological dead end that further deterred their wills to confess. One 
lower-ranking military cadre, Zhu, later complained, “Why did not I confess initially? 
Our group pushed me too hard, which simply made me refuse to say anything. I think 
such compulsive enforcement was not a good idea.” The presiding cadres’ attempt to 
force students to confess even aroused the latter’s uncertainty about the credibility of the 
higher authority. Zhu’s colleague, Yin, expressed his doubts: “I felt like, why did they 
focus exclusively on just a few of us these days? Why didn’t they pursue others who also 
had problems with their mindsets? I think the superior only trusted a few specific 
individuals. If that is the case, they must have excluded (from questioning) some people 
who are not-so-innocent.”18 
The behaviors of the presiding officers and classmates also exerted decisive 
impacts on students. Once psychological resistance occurred in study classes, the success 
of the Rectification would largely be determined by the presiding officers’ ability to 
                                                 
17 Liu Ling, “Kaizhan tanbai yundong zhong de sishu zhengfeng xunlianban” (The Sishu rectification 
training class which is conducting confession movement), Huaihai bao, January 21 1944. 
18 “Er’dui tanbai de tongzhi zuotanghui jilu” (Minutes of the colloquium of comrades from the second 
team who had confessed). In Huazhong zhengfeng yu fangjian de chubu jingyan, 1944, GZ 5-58. 
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improvise his manipulative tactics. In a study class in Guanyun County, in order to break 
through the impasse of confession, the presiding officers found five local cadres, who had 
long revolutionary histories and were good at confession, to conduct a comprehensive, 
systematic self-criticism in the public meeting. Their confession aroused a “model” 
effect, helping other cadres to overcome their concerns about punishment, self-esteem 
and career prospects. The presiding officers took the opportunity to call for the 
participants to “be truly frank” and “bravely speak from your hearts.” The present local 
cadres thus continuously came to the stage to make public confessions. Most people who 
hesitated about confession were propelled to follow the majority under such a collective 
enthusiasm. Gradually, the focus of the public meeting shifted from self-confession to 
mutual criticism. After making confessions, the participants began to attack those who 
still resisted doing so. Meanwhile, the presiding officers repeatedly addressed the Party’s 
policy of leniency for those who had confessed. Under such collective pressures each 
participant chose, more or less, to admit their previous mistakes.19 In the Guanyun case, 
the presiding officers successfully took advantage of peoples’ psychological tendency to 
follow the majority, which decreased their focus on self-protection, in order to enforce 
confession. The officers’ accomplishments here were more the result of psychological 
manipulation than an ideological education, the original purpose of the Rectification 
Campaign. A close observation about the campaign’s process makes me believe that the 
                                                 
19 Feng Yijing, “Zai jinzhang jinxing zhong de Guanyun zhengfeng xunlianban” (The Rectification 
training class intensely conducted in Guanyun), Huaihai bao, January 7 1944. 
 269 
Party’s real intention was to fully control its personnel and their personal histories, and 
enhance its authority and leadership among party members. 
After the process of self and mutual criticism, participants were required to write 
a confession report including their personal history. Here are the guidelines of the social 
relation report and autobiography used by the Huainan Party School: 
Confession Guidelines of Social Relation 
1. Personal relationships: 
1) List dependents, relatives, fellow provincials, schoolmates, acquaintances, 
friends who had or might have political backgrounds; their occupations; what are 
they now; whether do you still keep in touch; 
2) Your relationship with the above listed persons after you joined the Party, 
i.e. mail, economic connections, mutual visits, political discussions and other 
communications; 
3) Communication methods—by mail, specific messengers, communication 
spot; whether be checked by the higher authority; 
4) Any communication with the Japanese/Nationalist occupied regions; 
5) Communication with landlords, gentry, major merchants and gangsters in 
the base areas. 
2. Relationship with political groups: 
1) Have you ever attended any political groups’ activities? Your current 
relations with them; 
2) Have you ever attended any social groups (such as cultural, religious 
associations and secret societies)? Are you currently keeping in touch with them? 
3) Have you ever attended any training classes within the Party? 
4) How did you join the Party or/and the NFA? 
5) If you were arrested or captured, list your individual activities and the 
persons who can verify your words; 
6) What revolutionary educations and influences have you received before 
joining the Party? 
7) What anti-revolution educations and influences have you received after 
joining the Party? 
3. Educational and professional background: 
1) When did you attend elementary, middle, high schools, and college? What 
are the political backgrounds of your teachers respectively? 
2) List your professional experiences. What are the political backgrounds of 
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your superiors and colleagues? Who recommended you to this position? 
4. Personal communication within the Party: 
1) Who are your personal friends within the Party? List times and contents of 
your communications, eg. financial transactions, sending documents, 
correspondence, broadcast station, mutual visits after working hours, etc. 
 
Outlines of Auto-biographies 
1. Family situations: 
1) Economic conditions: movable and real property, annual income, etc.; 
2) Family members: occupations, incomes, etc.; 
3) Family members who has political backgrounds, and their positions in the 
political groups; 
4) Relatives with political backgrounds; 
5) Communications with your family after joining the Party 
2. Personal history 
1) Educational history; 
2) Professional history; 
3) History of political activities before joining the Party; 
4) Working history after joining the Party; 
5) Short-term training classes within and outside the Party; 
6) History of being captured (in the form of table, list specific dates, places 
and deeds). 
3. List the key events that made your personal political progresses or 
regressions. 
4. Social relations that have political backgrounds 
1) Classmates, fellow provincials, colleagues and acquaintances, who have 
political backgrounds; who are the closest to you? 
2) Time and contents of your mutual visits with the above listed persons after 
you joined the Party; 
3) Social relations outside the base areas; 
4) Communications with landlords, gentry, merchants and major gangsters 
within the base areas; 
5. Relations within the Party 
1) Personal relations with other party members; 
2) Times and contents of mutual visits with the above list persons; 
3) Who are the ones closest to you? 
4) Who helped you make political progress, and who caused your political 
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regression? 
6. How did your thoughts change before you joined the Party? How did you 
make decision to join the Party? 
7. Confession about party works: working attitudes, policy implementation, 
working style, major progresses and mistakes. 
8. Confession about liberalism: based on the twelve standards.20 
9. Confession about factionalism: 
1) Relationship between local and outside cadres; 
2) Relationship between local and military cadres; 
3) Relationship between departments; 
4) Request independence from the Party; 
5) Relationship between worker, peasant and intellectual cadres; 
6) Relationship between new and old cadres. 
10. Confession about individualism: individual indulgence, averageism 
(pingjun zhuyi), individual heroism. 
11. Several fundamental thought changes after joining the Party: revolutionary 
philosophy, class consciousness, and understandings about the Party, the masses, 
military struggles, and the United Front. 
12. Confession about personalities. 
13. Personal advantages and shortcomings (Huazhong zhengfeng yu fangjian 
de chubu jingyan 1944). 
 
One can tell from these guidelines that the Party had decided to investigate and firmly 
intervene into its members’ professional as well as personal lives. The focus of the 
investigation was their social relations, through which the Party judged the reliability of 
each member. The penetration was so deep that party members even had to report the 
content of each personal visit. The Party thereby successfully asserted its exclusive 
authority vis-a-vis its members and broke any social or personal connections between 
                                                 
20 It is not indicated in the document what the twelve standards are. 
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them. It reinforced a public consensus via such rectification study classes that party 
members and cadres should be loyal only to the CCP, and all their social networks were 
under the surveillance of the Party. In this sense, the Rectification Campaign was not 
only an ideological indoctrination, but more importantly, it was the first time that the 
Party intervened into ordinary party members’ personal lives under a legitimate political 
excuse. This rectification pattern would continue to function throughout the ideological 
purges in the CCP history. 
However, not all study classes ended in favor of the Party’s arrangements. The 
Party’s control over local cadres of township and village levels got lessening, like in other 
mass movements. One sub-district party committee member in Huai’an county (north 
Jiangsu), Zhao, refused to read mandatory articles and documents, make confession or 
relate the content of the study class to his daily work. Mostly illiterates or semi-illiterates, 
a majority of Huai’an local cadres did not have the patience to read the mandatory 
documents or articles. Some even fell asleep when reading materials. One village cadre, 
Yan, took the opportunity of confession to express his dissatisfaction towards the Party. 
When composing their autobiographies and confession reports, most cadres simply told 
their own stories without any of the analyses the presiding officers requested. Some 
simply attributed all their mistakes to subjectivism. Some discussed others’ problems in 
length in order to avoid mentioning their own shortcomings. Others included irrelevant 
contents in their confession reports. One sub-district chief of Huai’an country, Wang, 
even regarded it as a lyric essay and wrote that “time flies like an arrow, my youth and 
vigor passed without being noticed. How sad when I think about this” (Zou Ping 1944f, 
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47-48)! Apparently, the Rectification Campaign was too abstract and profound for the 
understanding of the local cadres, who failed to appreciate its significance. For them, 
concrete tasks were more important than ideological education. That might be the reason 
that rectification gradually shifted its focus to anti-traitor movement in local 
communities. 
THE SECOND PHASE: ANTI-TRAITOR MOVEMENT 
Even in the first phase of ideological education, the study classes devoted two 
thirds of their time to criticism and confession about participants’ personal histories. It 
was obviously the first step in background checks for the Party’s rapidly expanding 
personnel. After the spring of 1943, the attention of the Rectification Campaign in 
Yan’an gradually shifted from education to an investigation of cadres’ histories. Joseph 
Esherick’s case study of two counties in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region shows that 
local rectification was mostly conducted through the anti-traitor movement (chujian 
yundong). He argues that the Party regarded these actions as a way to increase cadre 
activism and political consciousness, and to emphasize the significance of the resolute 
“party spirit” (dangxing) (Esherick 1994; 1998). However, his analyses pay less attention 
to middle level cadres who presided over the movement in different localities and the 
rigid mechanisms through which traitors were eventually uncovered. Based on the 
meeting minutes of the anti-traitor movement in the bases of Jiangsu, I will illustrate how 
the Party convinced the masses and silenced any potential opposition to its authority. 
The first step of the anti-traitor movement was to find major struggle targets, 
some of whom had already aroused the attention of higher authorities because of their 
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behaviors in the rectification study classes. A local cadre of Chuquan County (Huainan 
region, southwest Jiangsu), Huang, was suspected as a possible Nationalist agent based 
on his speech and confession report from his study class. Huang was born in a petty 
bourgeois family, which already classified him as suspicious. In a discussion about the 
current affairs, Huang especially emphasized the revolutionary tendency of Chiang Kai-
shek and induced his classmates to attack the big bourgeoisie (da zibenjia) only. Before 
the discussion, he tried to convince two group members with higher literacy level to 
support his argument. Later, the higher authority discovered that his standard of living 
was not consistent with his reported household income. Neither could Huang offer a 
reasonable explanation of his extra pocket money. His frequent communication with a 
merchant from Jiangba Town, who had already been suspected of Nationalist espionage, 
and his love affair with a woman, Wu, whose political background remained uncertain, 
further aroused the attention of the cadres in charge of the anti-traitor movement.21 In 
this case it becomes clear that confession reports and autobiographies not only facilitated 
the Party’s control over its members’ private lives, but also prepared for its next move in 
the rectification: unearthing traitors.  
After deciding on potential traitors, presiding officers composed a list of people 
who were required to attend a ten-day to two-week confession meeting. According to the 
“three thirds” policy, this group was to be made up of one-third suspects, one-third 
innocent masses and one-third backbone activists. The higher authority designed such a 
                                                 
21 “Yanjiu Huang X de jingyan jiaoxun” (Experiences and lessons of figuring out Huang X). In Huazhong 
zhengfeng yu fangjian de chubu jingyan, 1944, GZ 5-58. 
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proportion of participants to make sure the suspected could be convicted with the help of 
activists and the political message of a benevolent and legitimate Party would be 
convincingly spread by the masses.22 
The confession meeting was generally conducted in the forms of cell meeting and 
public gathering. Participants were divided into cells, which consisted of about fifteen 
members each. Like rectification study classes, each cell had a provisional party branch 
and a leader to preside over cell meetings. On the first day of the confession meeting, a 
mobilization attended by each participant was held. On the one hand, it aimed at 
convincing the masses that Nationalist agents had already infiltrated into each party 
branch. On the other hand, the Party intended to convey to the suspects that it had 
substantial evidences about their espionage activities and showed its resolution of 
eradicating traitors.23 
Under this first round of psychological attack, some suspects would secretly 
confess to the presiding officers under pressure. However, most suspects chose to resist 
real confession in hoping of escaping punishment and maintaining their current status 
within the Party. To do this, they adopted various strategies in cell meetings. First, they 
enumerated every aspect of their experiences without any emphases and made a fuss on 
details or word choices to waste their speech time. Second, those who had committed 
serious mistakes in the past realized they had little chance of escaping. They, therefore, 
                                                 
22 “Chuquan qingjian tanbai yundong dahui de jingyang” (Experiences of the public gathering of Chuquan 
anti-traitor and confession movement). In Huazhong zhengfeng yu fangjian de chubu jingyan, 1944, GZ 5-
58. 
23 “Huainan dangxiao chubu fanxing jingyan jiaoxun, ii” (Experiences and lessons of the preliminary 
confession in Huainan Party School). In Huazhong zhengfeng yu fangjian de chubu jingyan, 1944, GZ 5-
58. 
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only focused on their complicated social relations and misbehaviors in daily works, 
refusing to admit any political oscillation. They evaded the responsibility of making 
conclusions in their speeches under the excuse that they were only capable of reciting 
facts. Third, they furiously charged people who criticized them, claiming to committing 
suicide to prove their innocence. They sometimes pretended to be insane to avoid 
providing reasonable explanations about their behaviors under severe attacks by cell 
members. Finally, they cleverly attacked higher authorities and the Party to evade self-
criticisms. For instance, they accused the Party of imparity for not getting promotions; 
when describing their mistakes, they volunteered to take primary responsibility but 
always added, “It was approved by the superior.”24 
Faced with such various resistances, the Party arranged corresponding 
counteractions. Cell meetings were the first front in which cell leaders coordinated with 
backbone activists to attack suspects. To encourage confession and avoid intense 
arguments among members, which could arouse firm resistance among the suspects, 
presiding officers suggested that cell members only submit written criticisms and the 
suspects should post their responses on wall posters after cell meetings. However, this did 
not mean that the Party was taking a soft stance on traitors. Since the participants were 
convened according to the “three-thirds” principle, in each cell, the suspects remained in 
the minority and the cell leader had enough manpower to exert psychological pressure on 
them. Here is how a typical plot was conducted: Two activists played the role of accusers, 
                                                 
24 “Huainan dangxiao chubu fanxing jingyan jiaoxun, i” (Experiences and lessons of the preliminary 
confession in Huainan party school). In Huazhong zhengfeng yu fangjian de chubu jingyan, 1944, GZ 5-58. 
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who directly confronted the suspect by asking sensitive questions based on his speech and 
further condemned his behaviors as treason. Meanwhile, another two activists played the 
role of mediators who came out to defend the suspect and argued with the two “red 
faces.” After convincing the suspect to identify with them, they began to persuade the 
accused to giving a more detailed confession. 25  This tactic helped to unarm the 
psychological defense of the suspects by convincing them that they would not be 
abandoned by the Party as long as they made sincere and thorough confessions. When it 
came to the daily concluding session, the cell leader would praise the ones who had 
confessed and assigned them some responsibility during the confession meeting, which 
further demonstrated the Party’s trust in those who had confessed. Moreover, he detailed 
to his group members the tactics and strategies adopted by a traitor hoping to refuse 
confession. He also explained typical patterns for identifying a traitor. This set of tactics 
was designed to convince the suspects that the Party had already held a comprehensive 
knowledge of their betrayal.26 
During the cell meeting phase, several supplementary measures were also at work. 
The first was called “wall poster” (qiangbao), which served as an open forum to converge 
public opinions attacking the suspects. The wall poster was divided into two sections. 
One was “questions and answers” aiming at suspects of moderate and minor problems. 
All participants were entitled to questioning the suspects and the accused were required to 
provide a specific answer to each question. The other was a column of free arguments, in 
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which several activists were arranged to personally accuse major suspects of betrayal 
against the Party based on a few pieces of substantial evidence. They described in a 
concluding tune how evil the suspects were and persuaded them to confess their crimes. 
Such an open collective attack usually crushed down most suspects’ resistance, except for 
the most stubborn ones. The cadres of the Huainan Regional Party School estimated that 
the pressure of public opinions stemming from wall posters was just as intimidating as 
being placed in cells.27 In addition, “individual talk” was a frequently adopted tactic 
when a stalemate occurred between the suspects and their cell fellows. Under such 
circumstances, presiding officers took advantage of personal relations, such as fraternal 
and colleague connections, to persuade suspects to confess. Here personal relationships 
were manipulated to strengthen individual loyalty to the Party.  
Finally, successful persuasion relied on well-arranged cooperation among 
presiding officers, cell leaders, backbone activists and the masses. The first two were 
divided into three types according to their official rankings. Lower-level cadres merged 
into the masses, talking about all the information the Party had knowledge of and 
collecting possible evidences. Middle-level cadres took on defensive strategies, 
preventing suspects from knowing the substantial evidences that the higher authority 
controlled. Higher-level cadres explained the principles of the leniency policy without 
touching upon too many details.28 Activists were generously assigned to one of three 
tasks: one group served as under covers, who hung out with the masses and suspects, 
                                                 
27 “Huainan dangxiao chubu fanxing jingyan jiaoxun, ii” (Experiences and lessons of the preliminary 
confession in Huainan party school). In Huazhong zhengfeng yu fangjian de chubu jingyan, 1944, GZ 5-58. 
28 Ibid.. 
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collecting relevant information and spying on the latter; another took responsibility for 
attacking the suspects and igniting the masses in various meetings; the last one pretended 
to be Nationalist agents, openly attacking the Party and making public confessions when 
necessary.29 
Witness reports on Rectification Campaign in Jiangsu indicate that most suspects 
made confessions after going through the procedures outlined above. However, in each 
confession meeting there were always several stubborn captures, who resisted until the 
end. In these cases, a wide-scale public gathering, in which not only participants but also 
nearby masses attended, functioned as the last straw to crush the suspects’ will to resist. 
The 1944 public gathering of the county-wide anti-traitor movement in Chuquan 
(southwest Jiangsu) provides an ideal example. Prior to the start of the meeting, the 
presiding cadres made a detailed plan based on the information collected in the cell 
meeting phase. They first chose two people, Jiang and Xu, who had made sincere and 
systematic confessions, as models to manipulate the atmosphere of the gathering and 
induce additional confessions. Jiang and Xu described their experiences of joining the 
Nationalist Party, becoming Nationalist officials and conducting anti-Communist 
activities. They used their personal experiences to convince the masses that there was no 
future in following the Nationalists and persuaded those who were still resisting to admit 
to their crimes. Both Jiang and Xu were skilled public speakers and drove the masses’ 
emotions to the first peak.  
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Then the presiding cadres instructed the activists to shift the masses’ attention to 
Han, who was selected as the gathering’s major target. Three witnesses volunteered to 
take the stage and testify about Han’s sabotage against the CCP, and more than ten 
people reported that he challenged the authority of high-ranking party cadres, bribed local 
cadres and prevented others from confessing. Under such charges, Han still resisted 
confessing. This ignited discontent among the masses. One seventy-year-old man 
shouted, “Mr. Han! The evidence is substantial. Please confess!” However, Han refused 
to compromise. The presiding officer took the opportunity to reiterate the Party’s 
impartial and lenient attitude towards those who confessed. At this point, Han continued 
to insist that he had nothing to do with the Nationalists. Irritated by Han’s stubbornness 
and moved by the CCP’s leniency, all in attendance, including teenage students and 
seventy-year-old elders, raised their fists, shouted slogans and demanded that the 
presiding officers arrest Han. One cried out with enthusiasm that “if such people are not 
locked up, we will not put down our fists!” Finally, Han was arrested surrounded by the 
shouts of slogans.30  
In places where the major target eventually chose to confess, party cadres showed 
their excellent improvisation. In the confession meeting of Tongcheng (northwest 
Jiangsu), the major target, He Jifu, frankly admitted his identity as a member of the 
Youth Leagues of the Three Principles of the People and confessed to conducting 
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sabotage activities.31 He concluded his confession in this way: “I have made a complete 
confession. However, there must be someone who has similar [anti-Communist thoughts] 
as I used to have. I suggest that you be better off to also confess today. Otherwise today 
you came to hear my confession, but I might attend your confession meeting sometimes 
in future.” His speech received enthusiastic applause from the audience. At this moment, 
the presiding officer and Defense Department Chief of the Huazhong Bureau, Liang 
Guobin, stood up and requested that the chair group of the meeting release He 
immediately. The audience fervently echoed his request, and slogans, such as “release the 
confessed ones,” continued without stops. After a short discussion, the chair group 
publically announced that He was officially released. He then proudly stepped out of the 
seats for suspects and joined his family under the stage. Thousands of audience members 
shouted, “Support the chair group and release He Jifu immediately” with their fists 
swinging to show their embrace of the Party and its leniency policy. His example exerted 
a series of “model” effects over the suspects as well as the audience. Not only did all the 
suspects frankly confess their espionages, four ordinary people from the audience 
volunteered to reveal their hidden identities as league members. The Party’s lenient 
image was further reinforced when one former league member, Li Xiangzhi, was 
reassigned to the position as the head of intelligence section against Nationalist 
infiltration in the local Public Safety Bureau after a sincere confession.32 
                                                 
31 The Youth Leagues of the Three Principles of People was a junior organization of the Nationalist Party. 
Its brief introduction is discussed in the next section. 
32 “Tongcheng de tanbai dahui” (The confession meeting in Tongcheng). In Huazhong zhengfeng yu 
fangjian de chubu jingyan, 1944, GZ 5-58. 
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In such public confession meetings, the manipulation of family bond was also an 
effective tactic to induce suspects to confess. In Tongchen, the families of the suspects 
were invited to audit confession meetings. This arrangement intended to exemplify the 
democratic and lenient image of the Party, break emotional bonds among family 
members and enhance individual loyalty directly to the Party. After hearing suspects’ 
confessions, their family members cleared out all doubts about the charges and began to 
condemn their betrayal of the Party. As a representative of the gentry of Hejian Town, 
Wang Yaheng commented, “About the charge against my father-in-law, Wang Zicai, I 
held reservations until today. But now, my doubts against the government are completely 
gone.” Some pledged to serve as government surveillance to ensure that their families 
would not turn against the Party again. Others compared the Nationalists with the Party 
and exalted the latter’s democratic spirit and lenient policy. They reasoned, “We family 
members would have suffered from their crimes if the Nationalist government had still 
been in charge…now the government even treated us generously. [The government is] 
really worth of respect.” Some housewives and old women encouraged their husbands or 
sons to confess, “The government is so merciful, you should confess for your own 
conscience!” 33  The family members’ support of the government further weakened 
suspects’ wills to resist and led to another peak of confession. 
Although some anti-traitor movements aimed at collaborationist agents’ sabotage, 
most set the Nationalist infiltration as the major target. From hindsight, this actually 
revealed the fact that both the CCP and the GMD were eagerly preparing for their 
                                                 
33 Ibid.. 
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incoming contest in political, economic and military arenas when the Japanese began to 
show sign of exhaustion in battlefield. In contrast to the beginning period of the War 
when the Party showed respect to Chiang and constantly enhanced his authority in its 
mobilization, it now directly attacked the credibility and integrity of the Nationalists, and 
claimed that the Communist government was the only legitimate government in China. In 
the confession meeting of Tongchen, one representative of the local gentry explained the 
meaning of “legitimacy” to the masses and asserted that only the anti-Japanese 
democratic government led by the CCP was truly legitimate, since they worked for the 
people. Another from Yiyang Sub-district said, “I am a GMD member. However, today I 
want to tell these league members that you should follow the CCP and do good deeds for 
the masses!” One landlord enumerated the benefits that the landlord class received after 
the NFA arrived and called out, “We landlords should abandon our bias towards the 
Party!”34 Another GMD member, Zhu, used a business metaphor to describe the Three 
Principles of the People represented in the current three governments in China proper: 
“The Chongqing government put merchandise in stock to monopolize the market. The 
Nanjing collaborationist government sells counterfeits. Only the Communist democratic 
government was the real wholesale.”35 As the above speeches indicate, ordinary people 
considered the Party’s legitimacy as residing in the benefits they received after its arrival, 
while local gentry and landlords endorsed its government as the true heritor to the Three 
                                                 
34 Ibid.. 
35 “Tongcheng tanbai dahui hou—zai gong’anju ganbu hui shang de jiantao yu zongjie jingyan jiaoxun” 
(After the confession meeting in Tongcheng—discussion and analyses of experiences and lessons on the 
cadre meeting of the Public Safety Bureau). In Huazhong zhengfeng yu fangjian de chubu jingyan, 1944, 
GZ 5-58. 
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Principles of the People. Interestingly, neither mentioned any Communist ideology. In 
fact, the Party’s success in Jiangsu largely stemmed from their compromise on the radical 
programs, such as land reform, moderate policies toward local gentry and landlords and 
deliberate blurring of their true ideology.  
Both Tongcheng and Chuquan cases perfectly illustrate how the Communist 
cadres manipulated fanatic public support to deter and attack their targets, while 
simultaneously establishing a lenient and democratic image. By inviting the participation 
of suspects’ family members, the Party sent a clear message to the masses: when personal 
affection and family bonds conflicted with its principles, loyalty to the CCP enjoyed 
foremost priority. Placing personal loyalty to the Party over families continued to be a 
major characteristic of the Communist political culture. It continues even now.  
The reaction of the masses was also worth noticing. Fixed on the idea of 
embracing the Party’s leniency policy, they did not even question why the government 
had not detected evidence earlier, especially considering that four people had come out of 
the audience and surrendered themselves to the Party for espionage. On the contrary, they 
applauded at the Party’s leniency, saying, “How come they are also [league members]! 
The government is so generous for not having arrested them earlier!”36 Through the 
brainwashing of the confession meeting, the masses had gotten used to a thinking pattern 
that deified the Party as an omnipotent and flawless presence. Such a pattern further 
silenced any opposition to the new party-state. Meanwhile, the political culture of 
strengthening internal consensus reinforced by the Rectification and the authoritarian 
                                                 
36 Ibid.. 
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tendency of its organizational hierarchy revealed that the Party lacked efficient reins to 
check the movement from bottom up once it became uncontrollable. As a result, 
deviation inevitably occurred. 
INEVITABLE DEVIATION: AN EXTREME CASE IN SIYANG 
Although both the CCP and the GMD regarded defeating Japan as the primary 
target during the War of Resistance, neither ceased their efforts to appeal to the masses. 
They continued to expand personnel and infiltrate into each other, especially near the end 
of the War. In April 1938, to compete for the support of the youth against the CCP, the 
Provisional National Congress of the GMD passed a resolution, organizing the Youth 
League of the Three Principles of the People (sanmin zhuyi qingnian tuan) as a direct 
subordinate to the GMD. Chiang assigned the two major intelligence systems—the 
Renaissance Association (Fuxing she) led by the Military Investigation and Statistics 
Bureau and the CC Clique—to be in charge of recruitment in central China.37 Later the 
Renaissance Association was merged with the League, and its members became the 
backbones of the League. As the prewar stronghold of the Nationalists, Jiangsu Province 
was a major target for the infiltration of the Youth League. Under such circumstances, the 
Siyang case occurred during the anti-traitor movement. 
Siyang County was located in the north Jiangsu and contiguous to Anhui 
province. It was was then the center of the Huaibei region, one of the seven NFA regional 
                                                 
37 There were mainly two intelligence systems within the GMD during its regime in mainland China. One 
was the Military Investigation and Statistics Bureau, which was officially founded in 1938 and led by Dai 
Li (1896-1946), one of the founders of the Nationalist intelligence system. The other was the Central 
Committee Bureau of Investigation and Statistics under the control of the CC clique, short for “central 
club” established in 1927. The core of the CC Clique was the Chen brothers, Chen Guofu (1892-1951) and 
Chen Lifu (1898-2001). 
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bases in central China. In the spring of 1943, a large number of Youth League members 
were discovered in the Party sponsored Huaibei Middle School. The school required 
some of the students who it suspected were league members to quit studies and return to 
their native places. Since a considerable portion of the Huaibei Middle School students 
were from Siyang County, the Siyang Public Safety Bureau ordered local administrators 
to keep close surveillance on the activities of these returning students. It further instructed 
its subordinate offices to figure out the following problems: whether the youngsters had 
already joined the Youth League before attending Huaibei Middle school or vice versa; 
whether there was any other local Youth League members or branches. Meanwhile, the 
Siyang Public Safety Bureau received guidelines from the higher authority identifying the 
major target of this anti-traitor movement as the Nationalist agents, who were usually the 
backbones of the Youth League. Based on the Party’s message of leniency, ordinary 
members would be released once they realized the counter-revolutionary nature of the 
League and agreed to discard their memberships after proper education (Chen Yu 1983). 
Soon one of the detectives who were sent out for investigation, Hu Hai, reported 
that Wang, an elementary school principal in Longji Sub-district, might be a League 
member. The information Hu had collected showed that Wang once wrote a poster 
criticizing the Party and convened secret meetings for unclear purposes. Moreover, he 
spread rumors against Grain Tax collection and publically encouraged collaboration with 
the Japanese. Hu’s report was confirmed by his fellow detectives, who were dispatched 
for further investigation. Meanwhile, another female detective, Zhao Jichuan, also 
revealed that quite a few elementary school teachers in the Longji Sub-district showed 
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oscillation in the struggles against the landlords (Tong ding si tong 1983). Based on these 
clues, the local elementary schools of Longji become the major suspected spots of Youth 
League activities. The county bureau thus asked Hu to take Wang to the office for 
interrogation. Wang denied all the charges in the first inquest, but several days later, he 
admitted that he was a Youth League member. Soon, he was officially arrested by the 
County Public Safety Bureau and transferred to a house of detention in the county office. 
In order to qualify himself for the policy of leniency, principal Wang not only admitted 
his own espionage, but also revealed several other League members, including two 
teachers in his school and another elementary school teacher in Jinzhen Sub-district, 
Wang Jue (Chen Yu 1983). Half a year later the higher authority discovered that neither 
principal Wang nor the three persons he brought out were League members or related to 
Nationalist espionage. However, the county bureau officers tried every means to convict 
them. From hindsight, the arrest of Wang Jue was a turning point in the Siyang case. 
From then on, the investigation lost rational control and slid into leftist extremism. 
Wang Jue received intense torture during the interrogation after his arrest. No 
longer able to stand any more corporal punishment, he volunteered to confess his Youth 
League membership and revealed numerous people in Siyang’s educational professional 
circle, including almost every elemental school principal in the county, as hidden agents. 
Wang at first claimed to be a division leader, and later promoted himself to the position 
as one of the core leaders in charge of military forces. Since he was in fact not a League 
member, Wang had no knowledge of the organizational structure of the Youth League. 
To make his word convincing, he fabricated an organizational chart based on the Party’s 
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political system: “The Youth League has one county committee and one administrative 
office in Siyang, and, under the county level, there is a sub-district ranking. Siyang 
county committee is subordinate to the district, whose leader is Liu binru (Tong ding si 
tong 1983).” Liu was a convicted Nationalist agent who had absconded at the time. 
Coincidentally, a blind young man reported to the county office that Wang Jue used to 
serve in the Nationalist army and the GMD county office and had secretly hidden a gun 
wrapped in a red cloth by burying it (Chen Yu 1983). There is no way to deduce why 
Wang made up such a long list of suspects and included details that did nothing but 
confirm his guilt. He may have been trying to indict more people in order to decrease his 
share of the responsibility. Even more remarkably, none of the investigators questioned 
how a blind person could find Wang hide his gun and know that the wrapping cloth was 
red. 
Following Wang’s confession, a large-scale arrest began among educational 
circles in Siyang. Faced with the same set of tortures, the arrested could do nothing but 
turn in more innocent people. Soon county administrative staffs and local mass 
association cadres become suspects in the investigation. Yin Shujin, the deputy of the 
Siyang Fiscal and Grain Bureau, was arrested in the third round of arrest when he went to 
the county office to attend tuanbai during the New Year of 1944.38 Yin Xi, the head of 
local Youth Resistance Association was also arrested during this period. He participated 
in the previous investigation and had a full knowledge of what he was going to face in the 
                                                 
38 Tuaibai is a kind of symposium held by the Communist administrations before holidays, such as the 
New Year and Spring Festival. It is attended by Communist cadres and important local powers, and 
regarded as welfare of the Communist government. 
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detention house. As a result, he committed suicide soon after being arrested (Tong ding si 
tong 1983). 
As the charges expanded uncontrollably, two kinds of opinions emerged among 
the Party County Committee. One group asserted that the evidence was substantial and 
the case was a great accomplishment in the anti-traitor movement; the other held 
reservations and suggested a temporary stop to the arrests and a shift to focus on 
verifying suspects’ testimonies. The first opinion soon prevailed because the standing 
committee member and county chief, Xie Kui, reported that League members had 
infiltrated the most recent training class of party cadres. Xie was one of Siyan’s highest-
ranking party leaders, second only to the county party secretary, Zhu Hongxiang. His 
words held significant weight, and the scale of suspects was therefore enlarged to include 
all major party cadres in Siyang (Chen Yu 1983). The sub-district secretary of Longji, 
Tian Zhaolin, who participated in the investigation, protested the continuous arrests and 
questioned the possibility of such a large-scale infiltration of Nationalist agents in Siyang. 
Tian soon became a suspect himself due to these protests as well as suspicious social and 
family relations—some of his friends and relatives had already been arrested in this 
movement. Before Tian was eventually locked up, the county secretary, Zhu Hongxiang, 
told him, “You can retain your official position, and we will keep your confession secret 
as long as you confirm your League membership.” Confused by the true intention of this 
anti-traitor movement, Tian declined his superior’s proposal (Tong ding si tong 1983). 
Apart from these inducements and corporal tortures, there were several other 
major strategies for obtaining indictments. First, one suspect would be brought into a 
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room where he or she was forced to eavesdrop on another suspect’s investigation, which 
was relevant to the charges against him/her. Then the suspect would be asked to testify 
whether what he had heard was true in his own inquest. Second, investigators deliberately 
created situations in which suspects could collaborate to make up identical testimonies, 
which they could later use as evidence to indict other suspects. Third, suspects were not 
allowed to eat, rest or sleep during long hours of investigations. Last, investigators would 
bring suspects to a quiet and remote place late at night and pretended that they were 
going to execute them. As a result of these tactics, investigators were highly successful in 
eliciting confessions (Chen Yu 1983).  
The growing number of confessions aroused the attention of higher authorities. 
The Huaibei Regional Office also dispatched staff to help the investigation (Chen Yu 
1983). The Regional Party Committee even praised the Siyang County for revealing such 
an important espionage case, which further encouraged the county leaders to search for 
more suspects. Deng Zihui, the Regional Party Secretary, instructed Zhu Hongxiang, the 
County Party Secretary, to report updates on the case every ten to fourteen days. (Zhu 
Hongxiang 1983). However, this communication did not help the charging cadres return 
to rational thinking or shift the focus of investigation from collecting testimonies and 
arresting suspects to reasonable analyses and verifying evidence. At the peak of the 
Siyang case, four out of seven sub-district chiefs and party secretaries were arrested. 
When they met in the detention house, they kidded themselves saying, “We could have a 
meeting once a county committee cadre arrives” (Tong ding si tong 1983). At the county 
level, only the party secretary, Zhu Hongxiang, the county chief, Xie Kui, and the chief 
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of the Public Safety Bureau, Cao Yulin, retained their positions and continued extorting 
new testimonies and arresting more suspects. Later repots show that there were altogether 
151 people arrested, including ordinary peasants, students, teachers and administrative, 
military and party cadres. The number of people who were detained for inquest reached 
more than one thousand (Huaibei suwan bianqu xingshu gong’anju 1943). 
It was not until NFA personnel were charged as Youth League members that the 
Huazhong Bureau found aspects of the investigation in Siyang to be abnormal. Since 
some soldiers and cadres of the Ninth Brigade of the NFA Fourth Division  were 
involved in the case, the commander, Wei Guoqing, noticed that there were an 
unreasonably high number of suspects under arrest. After a preliminary investigation, 
Wei argued that it was impossible that there could be that many Nationalist agents in the 
area. Unfortunately, his proposal was entirely disregarded by the Huaibei Regional Party 
Committee. Wei, therefore, directly reported to the head of the Defense Department of 
Huazhong Bureau, Liang Guobin, who later initiated a new investigation on the Siyang 
case. Liang’s investigation eventually proved that none of the hundreds of arrested 
suspects were Nationalist agents. The Huaibei Regional Committee subsequently 
admitted their mistakes in leading the investigation. The county chief, Xie Kui was 
ousted from his position; the deputy of Regional Public Safety Bureau, Tang Jinshi, and 
chief of the County Bureau, Cao Yulin, received disciplinary warnings; and, the county 
secretary, Zhu Hongxiang, was subject to a one-year probation within the Party (liudang 
chakan) (Chen Yu 1983). Putting too much concentration on an imagined Nationalist 
espionage, the Siyang County overlooked regular military defensive measures, and as a 
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result, seriously suffered in the Japanese mopping-up campaign. The former county chief, 
Xie, was killed in this encounter (Zhu Hongxiang 1983). The Siyang case was later 
utilized as a lesson in subjectivism, individual heroism and bureaucratism in rectification 
study classes. 
Since the higher authority concluded that the mishandling of the Siyang case 
stemmed from subjectivism, individual heroism and bureaucratism, the analyses and 
reflections by the concerned cadres dwelled on these topics. No one probed deeper to 
question what made these cadres collectively abandon rational thinking during the 
investigation, or the political culture and institutions that created such irrationality, lacked 
proper reins to balance power and silenced potential opposition opinions among the 
masses. The tendency to emphasize testimonies and neglect physical evidences was 
pervasive in all kinds of investigations, not merely the Siyang case. The Party’s policy of 
leniency was misused by local cadres in daily operations in order to extort fake 
testimony, which created a tense anxiety among suspects and advocated for a strategy of 
“confess for light sentences.” Higher authorities usually regarded the numbers of suspects 
and convicted as an index to measure the achievements of local administrations. The 
Huaibei Regional Committee publically commended Siyang County for this very reason. 
Zhu Hongxiang later reflected, “The more the leaders praised us, the more effort we put 
on extorting testimony and arresting people” (Zhu Hongxiang 1983). The political 
institution of the new party-state established a habitual pattern among its cadres, in which 
they were responsible to their superiors rather than the masses. The investigational 
procedures in the Siyang case were typical for all public safety bureaus. The abnormal 
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aspects of the interrogation were revealed only because the case involved personnel 
stationed in the NFA, creating instability in the military forces. Here, the NFA presented 
a balancing force powerful enough to check the Regional Party Committee. The evidence 
suggests that the Siyang case would have been entirely under the jurisdiction of the 
Huaibei Regional Committee had the suspects not had military backgrounds. In most 
cases, however, there was a lack of this type of balance of power, which turned out to be 
a serious defect in the political institutions of the Party. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated the course through which the CCP shifted the 
focus of its development from quantity to quality. This shift stemmed from the Party’s 
internal needs for institutional adjustment as well as external demands forced by 
objective situations. The rapid increase in the number of party members made the lack of 
proper political disciplines particularly dangerous. As a result, most newly recruited local 
cadres did not understand their social and political roles as different from those of 
traditional officials. Like their predecessors, they demonstrated their elite status by 
making more money from their official positions, benefiting their relatives and friends 
and establishing partnership with powerful members of local gentry. These practices 
helped to build their personal prestige and authority in local communities. Not 
surprisingly, this new Communist power deteriorated at such a rapid speed due to 
corruption and extravagance. Moreover, these problems seriously weakened the Party’s 
credibility and stained the public image of the new party-state.  
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Fortunately, such tendencies of corruption and extravagance in the party cadres 
were curbed by subsequent rejuvenating movements. The policy of “strengthening army 
and simplifying administration” facilitated a timely expulsion of undesirable party 
members and cadres that were recruited during the Party’s early development. It also 
enhanced its centralized leadership in local administrations. Meanwhile, the Rectification 
Campaign reinforced an internal political consensus within the Party by creating a new 
political culture in which criticism, self-criticism and public confession became common 
methods for the Party to crush people’s self-esteems, break up their personal and social 
relationships and intrude into their private lives. Such a culture encouraged mutual 
surveillance among colleagues, friends and even family members, and enhanced 
individual loyalty and the unquestionable authority of the Party. The ways in which 
rectification study classes operated and the anti-traitor movement was launched, 
especially the Siyang case, posed a significant challenge to Seldon’s populist contention 
that no cadres were imprisoned or excluded from the Party in the course of the intensive 
study and criticism that began in the Spring of 1942 (Mark Seldon 1971, 196). On the 
contrary, my study supports the finding of Esherick’s case study of Shaanxi. It indicates 
that the deepening rectification and anti-traitor movement created psychological tension 
in the masses as well as cadres, as it suggested that any grumblings could be tried as 
serious political crimes (Joseph Esheric 1994). As a result, silencing any opposition 
became a prerequisite for the political consensus and deification of the CCP. This 
suffocated channels to receive alternative opinions from the bottom up. Due to its 
expanding territory and augmented human resources after the War, the Party did not have 
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to sacrifice the quality of its cadres for the sake of quantitative expansion. This problem 
was temporarily overshadowed by dramatic growth. However, this institutional defect 
continues to undermine Communist governance until today. 
Since its establishment, the CCP struggled for survival against continuous attacks 
from the Beiyang regime, the Nationalists and the Japanese. The continuous warfare 
forced it to find the most efficient political structure to expand and strengthen its power. 
This political structure facilitated the unprecedented development of the CCP in Jiangsu 
during the War. Furthermore, the efficiency of such an authoritarian political institution 
gave the Party a serious advantage in its struggle with the GMD, which continuously 
suffered from internal factionalism. However, its defect was equally powerful. In the 
course of the party-state building, the CCP overrelied on the personal abilities of its 
cadres in daily operations and overemphasized on their absolute obedience to the higher 
authority. However, it overlooked the development of institutional strength to check and 
balance different powers within this building. These problems would gradually float to 
the surface and cause serious social panics after 1949, when the CCP took over China. 
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Chapter Seven Epilogue 
Communist base areas in Jiangsu short lived after the War of Resistance. 
Considering itself one of the victors of the Resistance War, the Party actively prepared 
for takeover of areas controlled by the Japanese and collaborationist forces. Nevertheless, 
the GMD had already reached an agreement with the Japanese, who would surrender only 
to the Nationalist Army. As a result, once their outside enemy disappeared, the CCP-
GMD skirmish soon escalated until they were on the verge of another civil war.  
The strength of Communist and Nationalist military forces varied in different 
regions. In Manchuria, the GMD encountered considerable difficulties in taking over the 
collaborationist administrations since the CCP, patronized by the Soviet Union, 
controlled a large amount of Japanese munitions and supplies they would use for later 
military confrontation. Nevertheless, the GMD prewar influence and its social networks 
with the collaborationist personnel enabled the Nationalists to outcompete the 
Communists over the course of the takeover in Jiangsu province. On November 1, 1945, 
the NFA divisions stationed in the south of the lower Yangtze River officially announced 
its retreat northward and published an open letter to the masses. It claimed that the NFA 
voluntarily withdrew to show the CCP’s sincerity in maintaining a truce and building a 
new democratic government with the GMD (Xinsijun 1945). The size of the withdrawn 
force reached around 50,000 soldiers. Later when the Civil War broke out in 1946, the 
NFA headquarters was moved northward from Jiangsu to Shangdong province and the 
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CCP ordered that the entire NFA and its subordinate local forces, almost 310,000 
soldiers, evacuated from the base areas in central China. 
The Communist influence, however, did not cease with the evacuation of the 
NFA. Although the regular force retreated, the CCP left militia and local military troops 
totaling 960,000 persons and various mass associations, which secretly maintained their 
activities and functioned as an intelligence and corvee source before the Communists 
returned in 1949. These people further served as a personnel reservoir of local 
administrative cadres after the Communist triumph. Such support could never have been 
achieved without the Party’s mass mobilization and local penetration during the 
Resistance War. In this sense, the Jiangsu experience is no less significant than that of 
other base areas in foretelling characteristics of the Party’s government in China after the 
revolution. 
The Resistance War was a modest period in the Communist Revolution in terms 
of the Party’s claims, programs and policies towards landlords as they sought to prevent 
elite collaboration with the Japanese. Among the wartime base areas, those in Jiangsu 
were among the most restrained when implementing these programs and policies as a 
result of the lack of social supports and mobilization during prewar period. To win over 
various social groups, the Party deliberately avoided any discussion of land reform, 
property redistribution or class struggle, tactics typically used to serve as major measures 
to destroy pre-existing social networks and value systems. In this sense, the Communist 
movement in Jiangsu did not really carry “communist” characteristics. It is more 
beneficial then to conceptualize it as more of a social reform than a revolution. However, 
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considering the manpowers and revenues the Party was able to obtain throughout the 
War, it was no wonder a huge success. Here I highlight some important issues that have 
emerged in the above thematic discussions. 
First of all, the most conspicuous characteristic of the wartime Communist 
movement in Jiangsu was the Party’s attempt to accommodate preexisting social and 
cultural nexuses entrenched in the local communities rather than destroy them. This 
strategy was also key for the success in social mobilization and penetration. The Party 
resorted to rent reduction and tax rate adjustment as major measures to redistribute 
private properties, which did not fundamentally alter previous socioeconomic structures 
of local communities. Although it attempted to deconstruct the social power networks of 
traditional local gentry and elites by promoting peasant activists, the Party hardly touched 
the preexisting norm of patron-client relationship deeply entrenched in people’s mindset. 
Instead, it sought opportunities to replace local elites as a new patron in local 
communities. For instance, the Communists organized the grain borrowing program 
during the spring famines to maintain the peasant’s subsistence. Even if the philanthropic 
grains were still provided by the rich, the Party successfully enhanced its patronage by 
serving as the coordinator between peasants and landlords. Meanwhile, the Communists 
infiltrated popular entertainment by organizing peasant drama associations, which 
performed plays with revolutionary content in the form of local dramas and tunes. 
Furthermore, they relied on conventional rituals to facilitate their mobilization and 
penetration. During the farewell conscription ceremonies, the enlistees publically rode 
donkeys or sat in sedans led by village heads, a traditional way to glorify their families 
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and lineages. Mass workers even created secret societies to recruit and contain local 
strongmen and bullies, attempting to convert these social forces into resistance 
associations subject to the Communist leadership. On the basis of the discussion of 
previous chapters, one can detect the process, in which the Party assumed communal 
responsibilities and gradually transformed them into party-sponsored organizations in 
order to mobilize peasants and penetrate local society. 
Second, the Party would not have been able to ensure its substantial control over 
local communities without the assistance of various mass associations, especially the 
Peasant Resistance Association. Conspicuous state intrusion might arouse direct 
resistance from society, particularly local elites who wanted to maintain their control in 
local communities. Spontaneous mass associations, however, were more likely to win 
endorsements from the peasantry as well as landlords, especially using anti-Japanese 
rhetoric. The Peasant Resistance Association actually functioned as a form of 
“substantive government” that connected the Party with ordinary peasants in the base 
areas in Jiangsu. In order to shorten the psychological distance with the peasantry, the 
Party usually let the Peasant Association publically take the responsibilities for tax 
collection, winter schools, aid programs for military dependents, anti-pacification 
campaigns and so on. Relying on their comprehensive knowledge of local communities, 
these association cadres flexibly adopted their methods to optimize results, not always 
keeping accordance with Communist doctrines. In some places where they failed to fully 
develop connections between the Party and the association in daily operations, ordinary 
peasants seldom recognized the existence of the CCP. The Party’s reliance on Peasant 
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Associations for quotidian administrations further blurred the association’s function and 
identity in the Communist political system. This was also caused by an overlapped 
personnel arrangement in peasant associations, administrative offices and party branches. 
This phenomenon virtually reflected the defect of the vaguely defined jurisdiction in the 
Party’s political institution. 
No matter how successful the wartime Communist movement was in the Jiangsu 
base areas, there was a trend of gradually lessening control over local cadres descending 
with administrative levels. At sub-district, township or village levels, corruption and 
coercion frequently occurred in local cadres’ quotidian administrative operations. 
Lacking a coherent view of the Party’s overall development, they could not avoid falling 
victim to either conservative inclinations that made them submissive to traditional local 
elites, or ultra-leftism that risked losing supports from landlords and rich peasants. This 
phenomenon emerged for various reasons. First, since the Communist influence was 
limited in prewar Jiangsu, when the NFA entered this region, the Party largely relied on 
personal social networks of peasant activists to recruit new members. As I have shown in 
previous chapters, the recruitment process lacked clear explanations of Communist 
doctrines and the recruited had private motives when joining the Party. These factors 
made the local cadres a social force not much different from the traditional elite class, 
who put amassing personal fortunes and prestiges as top priorities, in participating in the 
Communist movement. Second, in some base areas that were adjacent to the Japanese 
front, the Party had to retain previous bao and jia heads and depended on their power 
networks to maintain tax collection, conscription and daily administration. Since these 
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people’s power base did not derive entirely from the Party, the latter lacked effective 
methods to regulate their behaviors or enhance Communist disciplines. Although local 
cadres with their knowledge of the communities largely facilitated the Party’s penetration 
into village life, surveillance and control over them remained a constant issue for the 
CCP’s higher authorities throughout the War. 
After 1943 when the Party’s rapid expanding membership had fostered a 
substantial social base and control over local communities, it deliberately slowed down 
its recruitment and shifted its priority from quantity to quality of party members and local 
cadres. As I have discussed in the previous chapters, it employed “strengthening army 
and simplifying administration” and the Rectification Campaign to expel malfeasant 
party members and cadres as well as to reinforce Communist indoctrination within the 
Party. The first program mainly focused on containing prevalent corruption among local 
cadres, as it had aroused considerable public complaints and stained the reputation of the 
newly established Communist government. The Rectification Campaign was even more 
important in terms of establishing an internal ideological consensus and eradicating 
potential and existing elements of sectarianism. These elements resulted from the Party’s 
development tactics of the early period when recruitment largely relied on personal social 
networks. Such reliance later encouraged people to group together under common 
interests and mutual social connections. When such groups had grown large and powerful 
enough to challenge the higher authorities, they significantly endangered the Party’s 
control over its own personnel as well as local communities. Certainly, the Party would 
not tolerate such internal resistance. The Rectification Campaign thus served as an 
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imperative channel to prevent and annihilate these deviations at local levels, and 
enhanced direct loyalty to the Party. 
Although it contributed to the ideological consolidation of the party-state, the 
Rectification Campaign also revealed the authoritarian inclination embedded in the 
Communist political institutions. During roughly one-month intensive and isolated 
rectification training classes, each participant received a thorough personal background 
check, self and mutual criticism on his working style and personality, and ideological 
indoctrination. The result of the training classes was that the Party ensured its control 
over the participants’ public activities as well as private lives. Party members therefore, 
were incapable of retain individual autonomy or bargain space vis-à-vis the Party 
authority. Even worse, this absolute and arbitrary control lacked checks and balances to 
contain its power. The Siyan incident was illustrative in revealing this institutional defect. 
The Rectification Campaign no doubt improved administrative efficiency and reinforced 
ideological consensus within the Party, which earned the CCP a considerable advantage 
in terms of military maneuvers later during the Civil War. The authoritarian inclination of 
the Communist political institutions, nevertheless, inevitably created severe problems in 
the Party’s governance after 1949. 
I have argued throughout this dissertation that the key to the success of the 
wartime Communist movement was the Party’s wise accommodation of preexisting 
social and cultural nexuses. This, however, did not mean that the Communists gave up 
the attempts to create their own political culture to refashion people’s everyday lives. On 
the contrary, the Party deliberately nurtured a new culture in which each aspect of 
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people’s lives was organized and politicized. During slack seasons, peasants were 
encouraged to attend winter schools, which not only served as literacy classes, but also 
created a forum to judge domestic disputes. Mass workers replaced the content of local 
dramas with revolutionary stories, making them a channel to infiltrate popular 
entertainment in local communities. Meanwhile, mass associations, local administrative 
offices and party branches kept a regular meeting system, through which the Party 
enhanced the collective identities of their members and develop personal loyalty to their 
organizations. Although frequent meetings sometimes aroused complaints from 
participants, this system did distinguish the CCP from other political entities in the minds 
of its own members as well as ordinary peasants. Another important measure of this 
process of politicization was the public struggle meetings, which the Party adopted to 
provoke class conflicts, break up the stalemate of mobilization, and solve landlord-tenant 
disputes. Although the Party claimed that such struggle meetings reflected people’s free 
wills and its determination to promote democracy, mass workers had already made 
arrangements to ensure the scenarios would develop in a Party sanctioned way. However, 
even the most sophisticated arrangement could not prevent leftist extremism during actual 
meetings. This side effect might not have been a fatal issue in the revolutionary period. 
Nonetheless, it would arouse large-scale social chaos under the Communist governance 
during the first three decades of the PRC. 
The Communist movement in the base areas in Jiangsu Province should not be 
understood as a revolution if one defines “revolution” as a process of radical class 
conflicts, fundamental revamping of social structures, power networks and public 
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mindsets, and direct antagonism between the government and its people. It was rather a 
gradual and moderate course of political and social reform, in which the Party played the 
role as part of the state power and fulfilled some of the tasks, such as rent reduction, that 
the Nationalist government was not able to achieve in the prewar period. However, one 
should not deny the fact that the CCP successfully penetrated local communities and 
established substantial control in the form of prevalent mass associations and local party 
branches. Although the NFA and the CCP withdrew from Jiangsu at the end of 1945, this 
social power network did not vanish and continued to function until the Communist 
forces regained this region under the name of the People’s Liberation Army in 1949. It 
was then that a “communist” revolution, in a conventional sense, was launched in Jiangsu 
province. The wartime experience thereby continued to shape the way that the new state 
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